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Despite the considerable influence of Esping-Andersen's categorization of three 'worlds' of welfare capitalism, researchers have largely neglected investigation of his dimensions of welfare state policy and politics. Building on and extending the foundations provided by Esping-Andersen, we explore the identities and consequences of welfare state regime dimensions. Our principal components analyses identify two such dimensions. The first, which we label 'progressive liberalism,' rearranges Esping-Andersen's separate 'social democratic' and 'liberal' dimensions into two poles of a single dimension. Its positive pole is characterized by extensive, universal, and homogenous benefits, active labor market policy, government employment, and gender-egalitarian family policies. The second, which we label 'traditional conservatism,' is similar to but broader than Esping-Andersen's conservative dimension. It features not only occupational and status-based differentiations of social insurance programs and specialized income security programs for civil servants, but also generous and long-lasting unemployment benefits, reliance on employer-heavy social insurance tax burdens, and extension of union collective bargaining coverage. Pooled cross-section time-series regressions covering 18 countries over the 1980s and 1990s suggest that progressive liberalism is associated with income redistribution and gender equality in the labor market. The principal consequence of traditional conservatism appears to be weakened employment performance.

This article elaborates the thesis that economic growth and various types of collective action by class-linked actors determine the expansion and decline of welfare spending in rich capitalist democracies. Our multivariate model of this thesis, specified to 1960-1971 growth rates in direct cash transfer payments as proportions of gross domestic product, is supported strongly by regression analyses. These indicate that economic growth notably facilitates transfer payment growth. They also suggest that rightist party participation in government notably dampens welfare expansion, while leftist, centrist and Christian democratic party participation in government are conducive to welfare expansion; and they suggest that the political influences of both unions and large industrial corporations are conducive to growth in transfers payments as well. In addition, state authorities appear to augment welfare spending in response to working class protests, strike activity, and capital investment/disinvestment — activities outside the boundaries of political arenas typically conceived. In short, institutional and extrainstitutional class-linked politics along with economic growth seem largely to determine welfare payment changes. In contrast with other comparative research on the welfare state, the fit of model to data is strong and findings are robust in the face of statistical controls, small changes in measurement, and small changes in sample.

THIS ARTICLE ELABORATES THE THESIS THAT ECONOMIC GROWTH AND VARIOUS TYPES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION BY CLASS-LINKED ACTORS DETERMINE THE EXPANSION AND DECLINE OF WELFARE SPENDING IN RICH CAPITALIST DEMOCRACIES. OUR MULTIVARIATE MODEL OF THIS THESIS, SPECIFIED TO 1960-1971 GROWTH RATES IN DIRECT CASH TRANSFER PAYMENTS AS PROPORTIONS OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, IS SUPPORTED STRONGLY BY REGRESSION ANALYSES. THESE INDICATE THAT ECONOMIC GROWTH NOTABLY FACILITATES TRANSFER PAYMENT GROWTH. THEY ALSO SUGGEST THAT RIGHTIST PARTY PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT NOTABLY DAMPENS WELFARE EXPANSION, WHILE LEFTIST, CENTRIST AND CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT ARE CONDUCTIVE TO WELFARE EXPANSION; AND THEY SUGGEST THAT THE POLITICAL INFLUENCES OF BOTH UNIONS AND LARGE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS ARE CONDUCIVE TO GROWTH IN TRANSFERS PAYMENTS AS WELL. IN ADDITION, STATE AUTHORITIES APPEAR TO AUGMENT WELFARE SPENDING IN RESPONSE TO WORKING CLASS PROTESTS, STRIKE ACTIVITY, AND CAPITAL INVESTMENT/ DISINVESTMENT-ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THE BOUNDARIES OF POLITICAL ARENAS TYPICALLY CONCEIVED. IN SHORT, INSTITUTIONAL AND EXTRAINSTITUTIONAL CLASSLINKED POLITICS ALONG WITH ECONOMIC GROWTH SEEM LARGELY TO DETERMINE WELFARE PAYMENT CHANGES. IN CONTRAST WITH OTHER COMPARATIVE RESEARCH ON THE WELFARE STATE, THE FIT OF MODEL TO DATA IS STRONG AND FINDINGS ARE ROBUST IN THE FACE OF STATISTICAL CONTROLS, SMALL CHANGES IN MEASUREMENT, AND SMALL CHANGES IN SAMPLE.

Methodological innovations in comparative political economy : an introduction / Thomas Janoski and Alexander M. Hicks -- Introduction to time-series analysis / Thomas Janoski and Larry W. Isaac -- Direct state intervention in the labor market : the explanation of active labor market policy from 1950 to 1988 in social democratic, conservative, and liberal regimes / Thomas Janoski -- Quality of quantity in comparative/historical analysis : temporally changing wage labor regimes in the United States and Sweden / Larry W. Isaac, Susan M. Carlson, and Mary P. Mathis -- The politics of public and private investment in Britain / John R. Freeman and James E. Alt -- Introduction to pooling ; The social democratic corporatist model of economic performance in short- and medium-run perspective / Alexander M. Hicks

Von zentraler Bedeutung innerhalb der Debatte über die Folgen von Globalisierung sind die Effekte für den Wohlfahrtsstaat. So ist unklar, ob es als Folge der Globalisierung zur Beschneidung von Wohlfahrtsprogrammen kommt, oder, ob nicht vielmehr die staatlichen Wohlfahrtsausgaben steigen. Die Analyse der Beschneidung von Wohlfahrtsausgaben in den OECD-Ländern zwischen 1978 und 1994 verdeutlicht, dass die Auswirkungen der Globalisierung sehr komplex sind. Während die zunehmende Marktöffnung und die Liberalisierung des internationalen Kapitalverkehrs offensichtlich negativ mit einer Beschneidung der Wohlfahrtsausgaben korrelieren, was die "Kompensations-These" stützt, scheinen Investitionsverlagerungen ins Ausland entsprechende Kürzungen im Sozialsystem zu befördern. Zudem läßt sich beobachten, daß ökonomische und demographische Faktoren nicht nur Druck in Bezug auf eine Erhöhung von Sozialausgaben hervorrufen, sondern, daß die selben Faktoren oftmals auch zu einer Änderung der Anspruchsvoraussetzungen führen. (rll-swp)