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AbstractMany social scientists still resist Darwinian insights. A possible reason for this is a fear of being associated with Social Darwinism. This article updates a 2002 search for appearances of Social Darwinism in articles and reviews on the JSTOR database. This database has since increased substantially in size, and it now includes far more publications in languages other than English. Use of the term Social Darwinism was rare before the 1940s. Talcott Parsons used it in 1932 to criticise the analytic use of the core Darwinian concepts in social science. Subsequently, and for the first time, Herbert Spencer and Willam Graham Sumner were described as Social Darwinists. This led to a major change of meaning of the term, where it was associated more, but not entirely, with free market individualism. With this reconstructed meaning, a 1944 bestselling book by Richard Hofstadter provoked an explosion of usage of the term in postwar years. The continuing use of the term is partly ideologically motivated and has served to deter consideration of Darwinian ideas in social science.

AbstractExtracts from an important article by the American psychologist, philosopher and social scientist Donald T. Campbell are reproduced here, with an introduction underlining the importance of his argument for today. Campbell identified disciplinary boundaries as enablers of specialization but often barriers to scientific innovation and shared knowledge. But instead of unbounded interdisciplinarity, Campbell argued for focused specialisms that cross disciplinary boundaries. This argument is particularly relevant for the development of institutional research in the future.

AbstractWith its eighteenth annual volume, theJournal of Institutional Economics(JOIE) has come of age. This editorial report looks at the growth of the journal, summarises some of its achievements, reviews progress in addressing diversity and gender balance, outlines current editorial policy, and considers some further issues that are important for the future.

AbstractThis is a review of Joel Mokyr's fascinating book entitledA Culture of Growth.The work is summarized, noting its focus on Darwin-style evolutionary explanations of cultural change. But Mokyr's emphasis on cultural entrepreneurs and positive feedbacks in the procreation of ideas is insufficient to explain the origins of modern economic growth. Too much explanatory weight is placed on too few extraordinary people. It is argued that Mokyr's analysis should be extended, to bring the evolution of institutions, as well as the evolution of culture, into the picture at an additional level. The role of inter-state rivalry and exogenous shocks has also to be underlined. This kind of analysis can be developed within the framework of generalized Darwinism, which Mokyr himself adopts. This is a major and highly stimulating book.

AbstractThis scoping paper addresses the role of financial institutions in empowering the British Industrial Revolution. Prominent economic historians have argued that investment was largely funded out of savings or profits, or by borrowing from family or friends: hence financial institutions played a minor role. But this claim sits uneasily with later evidence from other countries that effective financial institutions have mattered a great deal for economic development. How can this mismatch be explained? Despite numerous technological innovations, from 1760 to 1820 industrial growth was surprisingly low. Could the underdevelopment of financial institutions have held back growth? There is relatively little data to help evaluate this hypothesis. More research is required on the historical development of institutions that enabled finance to be raised. This would include the use of property as collateral. This paper sketches the evolution of British financial institutions before 1820 and makes suggestions for further empirical research. Research in this direction should enhance our understanding of the British Industrial Revolution and of the preconditions of economic development in other countries.

AbstractThis is a review essay of Markets without Limits by Jason Brennan and Peter M. Jaworski and of The Invisible Hand? by Bas van Bavel. From different perspectives, both books focus on the moral or practical limits to markets in modern society. While both works make major contributions, there are theoretical flaws. Brennan and Jarworski powerfully countered some criticisms of commodification. But they downplayed the possibility that the transition from gift to contract or market exchange may raise moral issues that are additional to those intrinsic to the goods or services being traded. Van Bavel investigated cycles of growth, inequality and decline in several market economies over the last 1,500 years. But his argument is built on a confusion between finance and capital goods. Nevertheless, much that is positive remains in both books after their flaws are corrected.

AbstractThis is a response to the criticism by Rod O'Donnell of the account of Keynes' notion of a general theory in the book How Economics Forgot History (Hodgson, 2001). Several points of full agreement are noted, including the fact that Keynes' work contains much discussion of historically specific institutions, including the financial and market institutions of modern capitalism. But it is argued here that even copious discussion of historically specific institutions is insufficient to indicate an adequate understanding or conceptual appreciation of historical periodisation or evolution, as developed in various ways by Karl Marx, the German historical school and the original American institutionalists. Keynes' General Theory is best understood as a theory of modern capitalism. But Keynes did not have sufficient acquaintance with these historically oriented schools of thought to even define the concept of capitalism, or to make that specific historical association clear.

AbstractMarket universalism refers to the non-metaphorical tendency to use the term market to describe a wide variety of arrangements or processes in the real world. Using institutional criteria, this paper establishes some minimal necessary features of a market, to show that some particular arrangements are not markets. For example, while mechanisms of competition and interaction are ubiquitous, ordinary conversation is not literally a 'market for ideas' and much of politics is not literally a 'political market'. Markets are not and cannot be universal. Yet market universalism overlooks missing markets, the theory of which implies that we are in a world of second-best solutions and that markets are not necessarily the answer to every economic problem. Also, by reducing politics to a form of 'market' economics, market universalism downplays the distinctive, non-market nature of the political and legal spheres and corrodes the conceptual separation of civil society from the state.

This paper is in closed access until 09/01/2021. ; Market universalism refers to the non-metaphorical tendency to use the term market to describe a wide variety of arrangements or processes in the real world. Using institutional criteria, this paper establishes some minimal necessary features of a market, to show that some particular arrangements are not markets. For example, while mechanisms of competition and interaction are ubiquitous, ordinary conversation is not literally a 'market for ideas' and much of politics is not literally a 'political market'. Markets are not and cannot be universal. Yet market universalism overlooks missing markets, the theory of which implies that we are in a world of second-best solutions and that markets are not necessarily the answer to every economic problem. Also, by reducing politics to a form of 'market' economics, market universalism downplays the distinctive, non-market nature of the political and legal spheres and corrodes the conceptual separation of civil society from the state.

AbstractDefinitions are crucial for institutional analysis. This article explains the nature of taxonomic definitions, with particular attention to their use in economics and other social sciences. Taxonomic definitions demarcate one species of entity from another. They are vital for the communication of meaning between scientists, who must share some basic conception of what types of entity they are investigating, to establish a division of labour over subsequent theoretical analysis and empirical investigation of the type of entity defined. Generally, taxonomic definitions build on past usage and are parsimonious: they are not meant to be explanations or descriptions. By contrast, overloaded taxonomic definitions can create square-one disagreement about what is being investigated. As illustrative examples, the paper considers different degrees of progress with attempts to definefirms,marketsandinstitutions.

AbstractThis introduction considers the highly influential contribution of Douglass C. North to economic history and institutional economics, as it developed from the 1960s until his death in 2015. It sketches the evolution of his arguments concerning the roles of institutions, organizations and human agency. North's conception of the economic actor became progressively more sophisticated, by acknowledging the role of ideology and adopting insights from cognitive science. Eventually, he abandoned the proposition that institutions are generally efficient, to propose instead that sub-optimal institutional forms could persist. A few noted criticisms of North's work are also considered here, ranging from those which are arguably off the mark, to others that retain some force. The contributions to this memorial issue are outlined at the end of this introduction.