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ABSTRACTResearch on bureaucratic behavior suggests that agencies are more likely to use the implementation process to extend their power and influence under particular circumstances. I argue that when an agency has been delegated considerable power by Congress, but provided only vague guidance on how to implement this authority, an atmosphere of uncertainty and competition is created. Under such a circumstance the agency will feel pressured to further extend its power in order to defend its regulatory turf against competitors and protect the authority it was delegated. I test this proposition by examining the behavior of the Federal Reserve as it implements the functional regulation provisions of the Gramm‐Leach‐Bliley Act. Evidence from the Federal Reserve's dealings with the Securities and Exchange Commission during the approval of the Schwab – U. S. Trust merger provides evidence that the Fed is indeed acting to extend its power and influence.

Examines bureaucratic behavior of the Fed as it implements the Financial Modernization Act of 1999 (known as Gramm-Leach-Bliley), and in its dealings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) during approval of the Schwab-U.S. Trust merger; US. Political behavior of executive branch agencies, the "umbrella regulator", and trends in the financial industry.

Does more lobbying by more interest groups, especially groups representing a state's largest business sector, lead to greater spending and debt? Or does the blame really rest with state lawmakers and their political parties, which compete to attract and retain the allegiance of these powerful organized interests so they can win control of state government? We test this question with data on annual state budgets from 2006 to 2015, the number of interest groups in each state for those years, the size of the constituencies in different economic and social sectors these groups potentially represent, and the degree of competition between the political parties. Our results reveal that while there is a positive interest group effect on spending, the effect becomes negative as parties compete more for control of the state. As the gatekeepers, lawmakers and their parties, more than interest groups, are ultimately responsible for a state's fiscal condition.

What happens after longstanding policies are overthrown in fierce political battles, events scholars refer to as punctuated equilibrium? Do these new policies remain static and unchanging until the next big punctuation, or do they continue to change in explainable and predictable ways? In this article, we develop a model of postpunctuation policy change grounded in theories of boundedly rational decision-making by policymakers. Uncertain about how well the new policy will perform, policymakers learn to rely on competing interest groups for information or, under certain circumstances, look to other political jurisdictions for cues on how their policies ought to be further refined. We test our predictions by studying changes in state charter school laws from 1996 to 2014. We find evidence of policy change, and even convergence, across states suggesting that policies after punctuation do change in ways explained as reactions to political pressures in an environment fraught with uncertainty.

AbstractAlthough significant research has been conducted on economic voting in gubernatorial elections, very few explore the impact of state fiscal conditions in these elections. The little that has been done yields conflicting results regarding the effects of state spending and found that governors are not held responsible for a state's overall fiscal health. Our study examines the impact of spending and fiscal health on gubernatorial elections from 1982 to 2013. We find evidence that voters reward incumbent parties for fiscal health and spending growth and that unified government and stronger executive budget powers enhance fiscal accountability for these outcomes. These findings contradict previous research that suggests voters punish one or both parties for higher spending. We conclude by discussing the implications of this research for the debate about the balance of powers between the executive and legislative branches.

AbstractIntense competition can compel lobbyists to exaggerate the benefits the government would see in tax returns and social welfare if agency officials allocate such resources to the lobbyist's members. This incentive to misrepresent grows when information asymmetry exists between lobbyists and government officials. A large body of literature has investigated how interest groups compete and interact, but it disregards the interdependency of interests between competing groups and associated strategic behaviors of other players. Our signaling model of lobbying reveals ways in which agency officials can compel lobbyists for competing interests to lobby truthfully and what the policy implications of this compulsion can be. We also present case-study evidence of how this works in practice.

ObjectiveCorporations spend significant resources lobbying for billions of dollars in federal procurement contracts, yet this important opportunity to assess the political influence of business has gone unstudied by scholars of business politics. We study it here.MethodsWe approach it by analyzing the influence of direct lobbying of five federal departments, along with data on the lobbying of, and campaign contributions to, members of Congress on patterns of contract awards broken out by congressional districts.ResultsOur analysis reveals that while there are many reasons to expect lobbying Congress to produce valuable contracts, we instead find that it is the direct lobbying of executive branch agencies that is most likely to bring big rewards.ConclusionThese results highlight the importance of studying corporate political power outside of the legislative branch, suggesting that it is the long‐term relationships that lobbyists build with bureaucrats that yield the most lucrative contracts.

This article explores how advocacy organizations strategically select one or more venues for lobbying in a government system that provides multiple access points to state and local lawmakers. Advocates unable to make headway at the state level may refocus their efforts locally, convincing lawmakers in hitherto uninvolved venues to take-up an issue. The data used to test venue shopping hypotheses comes from a survey of charter school advocacy at state and local levels in three states. While ideological congruence between lawmakers and advocates matters, it also turns out that most advocates are also drawn to any venue actively working on an issue. Advocacy resources also limit the number of venues targeted and that implementing venues are chosen when they can be pressured by elected officials who support an advocate's policy preferences.

This article explores how advocacy organizations strategically select one or more venues for lobbying in a government system that provides multiple access points to state and local lawmakers. Advocates unable to make headway at the state level may refocus their efforts locally, convincing lawmakers in hitherto uninvolved venues to take-up an issue. The data used to test venue shopping hypotheses comes from a survey of charter school advocacy at state and local levels in three states. While ideological congruence between lawmakers and advocates matters, it also turns out that most advocates are also drawn to any venue actively working on an issue. Advocacy resources also limit the number of venues targeted and that implementing venues are chosen when they can be pressured by elected officials who support an advocate's policy preferences. Adapted from the source document.

Objective.The objective of this article is to investigate two distinct strands in the charter school movement: one that emphasizes school‐based management and another that emphasizes market efficiency. We were interested in whether charter schools that were founded or co‐founded by for‐profit education management organizations (EMOs) tend to pursue economies of scale and are less likely than others to implement school‐level decision making in key areas.Methods.The analysis uses data drawn from a survey we conducted of the population of charter schools in Arizona, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Washington, DC.Results.We find that charter schools that were founded or co‐founded by EMOs tend to be larger and areless likelyto exhibit decision‐making control at the school level.Conclusions.Our analysis underscores the importance of disaggregating the charter school phenomenon into its distinct constituent parts in order to draw meaningful lessons from this evolving and significant experiment in alternative education delivery mode.