Suchergebnisse

The power of the European Central Bank (ECB) is rooted in its independence established in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. This power is reinforced though the bank's monetary policy credibility—achieved through meeting its price stability mandate, whilst resisting political pressures to manipulate monetary policy to other ends. This credibility contributes to the ideational power of the ECB which is rooted in widespread support for price stability, one of the core objectives of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The ECB's relative power, as one of the two leading central banks in the world, is determined by the relative size of the Euro Area economy and the growing importance of the euro as an international reserve currency. The ECB is the leading face of the Euro Area abroad and a new and important presence in several international economic fora. The ECB is effectively the 'captain' of the team of Eurosystem (Euro Area) national central banks (NCBs) as well as the wider European System of Central Banks (ESCB)—which includes all European Union (EU) NCBs. The ECB is responsible for coordinating the policy making of Eurosystem NCBs in a range of areas and NCB discussions on inflation forecasts. However, there are clear limits to the ECB's power. It controls neither exchange-rate policy nor prudential supervision. Limits have been placed upon its international role. The ECB must work with governments to build support for low inflationary policies and maintain political support EMU. The ECB is one of the most consistent voices in favour of structural reform in the European Union (EU), yet there is little the bank can do to enforce reform in the short term. Furthermore, the ECB must share many core central banking operations with Eurosystem national central banks (NCBs). This contribution explores the confines of European Central Bank power.

The heightened emphasis on consumer interests reflects the deliberate aim of increasing EU citizen (as consumer) interest in and support for the single market. The Commission's turn to the consumer can be seen as an effort to legitimise market integration in the face of powerful forces, both governments and economic interests, that have hindered progress and succeeded in watering down recent pieces of single market legislation, including the Services Directive adopted in 2006 (see Howarth, 2007). This article outlines some of the main developments in the single market and competition policy areas and draws out the consumerist focus in Commission policy documents, decisions and discourse on these developments.

This contribution briefly explores the context and initial conditions of EMU in France. The pursuit of low inflation through the external constraint of the EMS and then EMU reflected real economic needs linked to developments in French capitalism and notably financial market liberalisation. The discursive/ideological structure underpinning and shaping the impact of EMU involved a dialect between a conservative liberalism—in the ascendant given the economic constraints reinforced by monetary integration—and a rearguard interventionism that is bolstered by widespread public hostility to economic liberalism and globalization. The decision to embrace EMU should furthermore be seen in terms of French strategy to increase monetary policy-making power in relation to both the Germans and the Americans (Howarth 2001) which is not explored further in this chapter because it is of limited significance to the politics of EMU in post-1999 France. This contribution also examines substantive reforms to, respectively, the French polity, politics and policies both in terms of this dialectic between conservative liberalism and interventionism but also in terms of Europeanization. EMU embodies a paradox for French policy makers. The project can be seen in terms of meeting long-standing French macro-economic goals of achieving competitiveness through disinflation, the elimination of the German-centred EMS and sheltering France from speculative pressures. Yet the EMU also involves an institutional framework and rules that ostensibly decrease policy making margin of manoeuvre -- thus the need for the French government to politically manage a paradox.

The aim of this contribution is to explore Commission leadership in terms of the powers and responsibilities delegated to the Commission under the TEU and the Stability and Growth Pact (Stability Pact, Pact, SGP). Delegation theory is a useful tool to elucidate the scope and limits of the Commission's leadership role in EMU. The Commission's potential for leadership or 'entrepreneurship' is maintained yet constrained by the terms of delegation. These terms provided considerable scope for Commission leadership in Stage II of the EMU project (from 1994) notably in rendering credible the commitment of member states to the start of Stage III on 1 January 1999 and the subsequent launch of the euro. Delegation theory can also demonstrate why the Commission has had difficulty asserting a leadership role since 1999 in the context of macroeconomic – notably fiscal – policy coordination in EMU and more specifically with regard to the application of SGP rules. The Commission's role can be seen principally in terms of the management and watch-dog functions delegated to it in the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP. However, the rule book according to which the Commission must operate in terms of these two functions has been widely criticised – both by member state governments and the Commission itself.

This article questions the more exaggerated claims of a freestanding "spatial heuristic" in explaining, justifying and criticizing social practices, not least because the category of space remains undertheorized and conceptually indeterminate. Building upon the work of Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Martin Heidegger, Ernesto Laclau, and others, the article clarifies the category of space, showing precisely how and why it is important for understanding politics, subjectivity, and ethics. It calls for the envisaging of "spaces of heterogeneity" that are compatible with radical democratic demands for equality and a "politics of becoming," and that can form the basis of a post-structuralist conception of cosmopolitanism.