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Any legal or political theory is a theory about 'the good life'. It is nonsensical to talk of law or politics outside of a social context, or to discuss a social framework separate from its laws or politics. Law, politics and societies are inextricably linked, each helps to define and constitute the others. By striving to provide an account of the terms and conditions of collective and individual life in a social group, the legal or political theorist cannot avoid the abiding and central conundra of human existence – what is the proper and best way to live? How are we to live together? Any legal or political theory worth its normative salt addresses these questions directly and attempts to offer. cogent answers, Consequently, a primary and inescapable issue for political and legal theory is not whether an idea of 'the good life' is relevant to the theoretical project, but what that idea is to consist of, and what weight it is to have in thinking about and criticizing legal and political practice.

Formalists have long tried to develop a legal theory, based on the internal rationality of law, which would free it from the influences of instrumentality and ideology. Focussing on the philosophical proposals of Ernest Weinrib, the author argues that this goal is both illusory and undesirable. Weinrib's theory assumes rather than proves the existence of this rationality, which is simply defined as an interrelationship between form and content. In order to maintain the coherence of this fragile relationship, Weinrib is either forced to articulate his theory on such a level of abstration so as to be irrelevant or to reintroduce the values he has tried to exclude. As a result, his theory is ultimately reliant on an ideology which, disguised in the formal equality of corrective justice, defends a notion of abstract rationality at the expense of political and social responsibility. Moreover, that hidden ideology is of a markedly conservative tilt.

Ronald Dworkin is the king of the jurisprudential castle. Having dislodged H.L.A. Hart in the early 70s with a 'naturalist' putsch,l he has managed to retain his pre-eminent position in the face of a constant wave of assaults by a variety of dirty rascals. His power base comprises a small cluster of traditional ideas which he draws on and applies in an almost infinitely resourceful and imaginative way. His claim to originality, if any, lies in his own particular blend and defence of those ideas rather than in their intrinsic thrust or pedigree. Indeed, the glamour and longevity of his reign is, at least in part, due to the opportunities his foes have provided him to develop, strengthen and consolidate his theory. His most important contributions to the jurisprudential tradition have been made in these altercations. His especial talent lies in his uncanny ability to turn the apparently debilitating attack to his own advantage. Few can have owed so much to their aspiring usurpers. In short, he is a formidable figure who stands colossus-like astride the domain of contemporary jurisprudence.

Socially organized activity cannot occur without censorship. Going beyond ideological arguments, this collections of essays explores the extent of censorship in Canada today, the forms censorship takes, and the interests it serves.

As the English causation cases of Hotson, and others, show, the judges still put abstract principle above social justice – it is a sad and wasteful process. Hotson tells us much that we need to know about the common law: principle is prioritised, but there is no escape from politics, indeed the invocation of principle impedes social progress and serves sectional interests. We will continue to make our way through the fog that rolls in from the shores of the future. At a minimum, it is our judicial duty to ensure that we do not add to that murkiness with intellectual smog of our own making.

To talk of law without politics or history is nonsensical. All lawyers must concede that what they do takes place in historical circumstances and has political consequences. Every piece of law-making and law-application is a governmental act, it relies on political authority and claims binding force. Moreover, all legal activity occurs within a particular historical context, it is intended to respond to or influence a past, existing or anticipated state of affairs. This means that the study of law must concern itself with politics and history generally: it must not confine itself to only the politics and history of law. To do otherwise would be to distort and trivialize any understanding of law. Within such a broad political and historical appreciation, the focus of inquiry is not so much on 'law' as on 'law-government' because the idea of law without government is almost oxymoronic. Law is not only a symbol and act of power, it is also a major component of the social context in which those symbols and acts of power acquire meaning, significance and effect.

The failure of traditional strands of legal formalism to provide a satisfactory account of law's relation to material conditions, and its distinction from political practice, has given rise to a new variant of formalist theory: visionary formalism. In this essay, the authors examine visionary formalism through the work of one of its leading exponents, William E. Conklin. They contend that, far from rescuing legal formalism, the visionary account of constitutional adjudication put forward in Conklin's recent treatise, Images of the Constitution, exposes formalism for what it is: an effort to romanticize and legitimize a peculiarly regressive mode of political practice. In the final sections of the essay, the authors provide their own account of the connections among law, politics and material conditions. They conclude that only a "constitutive legal theory", embracing a critical understanding of the political nature and historical contingency of legal structures, offers any real hope of harnessing law as a progressive social instrument.

Few matters seem to arouse greater feeling than local politics and sport. Each reflects and reinforces common qualities of robust partisanship and vigorous exercise. When the two combine, tempers are guaranteed to run very high. This unpropitious state of affairs occurred in Leicester in the spring of 1984. The city of Leicester has a significant and established black community, about twenty-five per cent of the population are of Asian or Afro-Caribbean origins. Leicester City Council was firmly committed to racial equality. In particular, it supported the Gleneagles Agreement made in 1977 between Commonwealth countries which encouraged "taking every practical step to discourage contact with sporting organisations from South Africa". When the English rugby team organised a tour to South Africa and selected three Leicester: players, the council considered the gauntlet to be thrown firmly at its feet. The council allowed the Leicester Rugby Football Club to use a recreation ground for Second XV matches and general training, the First XV played elsewhere.

This paper argues that formal constitutions and their institutional paraphernalia do more to inhibit and mitigate the emancipatory potential of democracy than to nurture and realize it. Spanish Abstract: La relación entre democracia y constituciones es larga y turbulenta. La tendencia de los que se inclinan hacia el lado constitucionalista ha sido la de percibir a la democracia como una amenaza al orden político y a la preservación de ciertos valores considerados importantes, mientras que los que adoptan una postura democrática, más que cualquier otra cosa, tienden a tratar a las constituciones como un obstáculo a la participación popular. En este trabajo, vamos a darle a la teoría constitucionalista un análisis teórico y político más amplio. Con demasiada frecuencia, las constituciones imponen controles y límites a la participación democrática en el nombre de algún otro conjunto de verdades proclamadas o valores que favorecen a las élites. Para el demócrata ferviente, las constituciones formales y su parafernalia institucional hacen más para inhibir y atenuar el potencial emancipador de la democracia que para nutrirla y realizarla.