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It has been demonstrated that human corporality specifies tacit knowledge, which belongs to natural intelligence, by contrast to artificial intelligence. Cor­poral experience endows a person with creative potential that technical devices lack. It has been revealed that a computer cannot have the material basis that a human being as a biological organism possesses. This imposes limitations on artificial intelligence cognitive capabilities. The objectification of the tacit components of corporal experience in language can be considered as an impor­tant factor of creativity and cognition. It is the meaningful connections between implicit components of the subjective inner world that specify new knowledge content and underlie individual creativity. The use of natural language by a per­son differs from the use of sign systems by artificial intelligence. The difference is that natural language is meaningful in the subjective experience context. It would be more correct to speak of sign structure transformation by a computer as information processing rather than knowledge production. AI information be­comes knowledge by virtue of interpretation, endowing it with human meaning. Unlike digital devices, human intelligence is analogue since it expresses a con­tinuous stream of consciousness, an ongoing process of subjective meanings modification. The modern 4E-Cognition approach elicited the specifics of artifi­cial intelligence and its cognitive limitations. It has been demonstrated that cha­racteristics described within this approach are only partially applicable to artifi­cial intelligence.

The article was written in response and gratutude to Chinese Professor Ma Yin­mao in connection with his article 'On the Academician Abdusalam A. Gu­seynov's "negative ethics" and its borders'. It consists of three parts. In the first part, the author examines the question of why negative ethics is at the same time the beginning of a positive moral program of human activity. Proceeding from the belief that philosophy is an ethical project and an act is its first principle, he shows that the path of man as a living rational individual to being lies through denial. The act is deployed in two opposite directions: as a fact, it goes into the individual and is in the zone of his exclusive responsibility, and by its content it is included in the social being, its rationally organized cultural space. The con­tradictory integrity of the act is considered in the context of the concept of non-al­ibi in being introduced by M.M. Bakhtin. The second part is devoted to two main arguments against an expansive understanding of negative ethics. The first is that it does not take into account the existence of people with pure moral intentions. According to the second, the positive normative content of public morality falls out of the field of negative ethics. The third part discusses the moral paradoxes that the consciousness of one's own moral imperfection is an indicator of one's perfection and that good deeds should be done in secret.

For the last two centuries the relationship between philosophy and science have constantly been an issue that provoked vehement quarrels. Positions in theses quarrels are mostly based on a relatively narrow cultural and theoretical horizon. It is rather likely that an uncompromising stance would be represented by an ad­vocate of positivism. Meanwhile an alternative standpoint is not only possible but also quite desirable. The question of self-determination of philosophy cannot be solved by any of the answers about its attitude to science, since the grounds on which such an answer is based (various historical, national and general cul­tural attitudes) are significantly different. The severity and regular recurrence of such disputes are to be taken as symptoms of the fact that some fundamental questions are raised here concerning the nature of both science and philosophy. This means, in particular, that such disputes could never stop, but will constantly serve as an instrument of self-consciousness and self-determination of both phi­losophy and sciences. It is shown that the these disputes are caused by hetero­geneous reaons: a) radicalization of the question of the scientific nature of phi­losophy and the foundations of knowledge in German idealism; b) processes of separation of areas of knowledge, i.e. the separation of science and art; c) in­volvement in science of wider social strata, as well as changes in the organiza­tional forms of science itself. However, the results of these transformations were quite apparent not until the second half of the 19. Century and have been pre­ceded by a long tradition of synonymy between "sciences" and "arts" that is partly reflected in the concept of "artes liberales". Strong identification of phi­losophy with the study of nature in the British tradition gives us another example of a disputed and controversial relation.

The article is an extended version of the introductory speech to the international conference dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the "Philosophers' Ship". It contains an event that began with the expulsion (forced sending abroad on steamboats) by decision of the top political leadership in 1922 from Soviet Russia of a large group of intelligentsia, including a number of prominent philosophers, and ended with the actual recognition by the same political autho­rity of the fallacy of this act. The author proposes to consider this event, which received the symbolic name of the "Philosophers' Ship", as a single (integral) process and at the same time as a historical experiment in elevating a certain philosophy (dialectical materialism) to the rank of state ideology. It is shown that the negative result of this experiment is important for understanding the na­ture of the interaction between philosophy and ideology as different forms of so­cial consciousness. They have a common area of intersection, but an attempt to merge them completely inevitably leads to mutual collapse, the most impor­tant consequence of which the author considers is the revival of the pluralism of philosophical teachings in the country. The symmetry between the expulsion of the "Philosophical Ship" and its return is emphasized. The most important outcome and socially significant lesson of this epoch-making event is the need for such an organization of the space of spiritual life, which by its very nature opposes the elevation of a certain philosophical doctrine, regardless of its qua­lity, to the rank of state ideology.

The article examines the research of Thomas Nemeth, the largest modern American specialist in the history of Russian philosophy, related to the reception of Kantian philosophy, phenomenology in Russia, as well as the work of V.S. Solovyov. Russian philosophy has historically been characterized by a weak interest in epistemological problems, which affected the ways of development of "Kantian studies" in Russia: the perception of the ideas of the German thinker was set by ethical and ontological perspectives, which led, among other things, to the fact that the so-called ontological turn, having started in German neo-Kantianism in the last quarter of the XIX – first quarter of the XX centuries, was largely consonant with Russian philosophy of the beginning of the last century. It is concluded that the key role in such a perception of Kantian philosophy was played by the early Vl. Solovyov. The article T. Nemeth's interpretation of Solovyov's legacy is critically comprehended as an evidence of the failure of the philosophical project proper, the author's thesis about the inherent "ontological error" of V. Solovyov's philosophy, allegedly not allowing the Russian philosopher, with all the depth of the formulation of philosophical problems, to develop ways to resolve them properly, is analyzed. The conclusion is made that trying to comprehend the Russian philosophical tradition as a whole, Nemeth continues, albeit with a number of reservations, the line of its humanistic interpretation. The new English translation of "The Justification of Good", made by T. Nemeth, is compared with the previous translation made by N. Duddington, being widely used in the English-speaking world. The conclusion is made about the comparative advantages of the new translation.

The article was written in connection with the centenary of our outstanding con­temporary Russian philosopher Alexander Zinoviev. The author, relying on the en­tire corpus of Zinoviev's own works, considered with special emphasis on their autobiographical content, on studies of his life and work, and also partly using his personal memories, aims to understand the phenomenon of Zinoviev. The life for­mula expressed by his hero himself is taken as a basis: "I am a sovereign state of one person". The article shows that the accentuated individualism of this state­ment is in fact an expression of personal sociality and a deep connection with the life of one's country and era. This is not about the originality of Zinoviev's per­sonality, but about its uniqueness, which expresses and at the same time affirms the uniqueness of the society, country and era that fell to his lot. Parallels are also drawn between Zinoviev's sociology and his psychology and ethics.

There is a well-established point of view that science and morality are two poles of a person's conscious (conscious) attitude to the world: the first one tells what the world is in itself, the second one tells about what to do with the world. Sci­ence objectifies the world, turns everything it touches, including man himself, into an object; morality looks at the world subjectively, in its own interests, i.e. the interest of the viewer. This difference was succinctly expressed by Kant in the questions: "What can I know?" and "What should I do?". Science and morality are opposites, which is essentially included in the definition of each of them, they are interconnected by mutual negation. They are also aspects of hu­man activity, practice, abstract (one-sided) reflections of which they, in fact, are. The unity of science (knowledge) and morality (must) can be adequately dis­closed within the framework of a philosophical tradition that understands being as practice. This idea is developed in the article on the example of M.M. Bakhtin, namely, science (cognition) determines the content of an act, morality is respon­sible for the fact of an act in its living, personally expressed uniqueness. Science and morality in this sense complement each other. In conclusion, an example is considered that illustrates the unity of morality and scientific truth.

The article expresses a hypothesis about the possibility of using computer games as a tool for the social and human sciences (in particular, philosophical ones), which in the modern world are increasingly dealing with phenomena, practices and communicative acts caused by digital reality. Possible directions of such use are considered. For a long time, the humanities did not have the developed tech­nical infrastructure that the technical sciences had. As if without needing it, they mostly relied on a unique and inimitable experience, which, in principle, cannot be technicalized and modeled, but rather must be experienced, described, inter­preted. But today, the social and humanitarian reality is largely dictated by digi­tal and the transformations it is carrying out. Our life is largely open to new types of interaction, new types of objects, new subjective states, the reality of which is not conceivable outside of digital. Moreover, the numeric associated with control, order, and transparency introduces a significant amount of uncer­tainty into social reality. In this sense, the boundary between the unique and ordi­nary, conceivable experiment and the field of social interaction is blurred. We are increasingly open to uncertain scenarios. In such a situation, the humanities sim­ply need tools to explore possible worlds, rare and unique states and events that at any moment can not only be embodied in everyday life, but also determine its key meanings and values. Computer games allow you to connect a huge number of users and use their intuition and creativity in designing and living in possible worlds.

The article is devoted to the problems of representational theories of percep­tion, which were identified by C. Travis in a 2004 work entitled "The Silence of the Senses". Representationalism plays an important role in contemporary dis­cussions around the problem of a naturalistic explanation of conscious mental states. Travis attempted to demonstrate the inconsistency of the basic assumptions underlying representationalism. If his argumentation does undermine the founda­tions of representationalism, then the naturalization project loses the possibility of representationalist theories. The author analyzes in detail one of Travis's main arguments – "the argument from looks". It is shown that the main responses to this argument miss the mark, as they either misinterpret Travis's idea itself or lead to a distorted version of representationalism that loses its advantage in the context of explaining conscious experience. The author comes to the conclusion that Travis' critique of representationalism should be considered not just as a refuta­tion of some of the theses of the representationalists, but as a metaphilosophical signal indicating the need to clarify (a) what the methodology of the modern philosopher of perception should be and (b) what theoretical obligations imposes on him the dominant naturalistic paradigm of our time.

The USSR as a state and as a social and economic structure had Marxism as its theoretical base. Its fundamental and especially important concepts for Russia were the doctrine of private property, the Russian commune, the class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat. These doctrines, perceived dogmatically and perversely, were used with revolutionary fanaticism in Russia after October and during the formation of the USSR. The task of destroying of private property was carried out without the concretization from K. Marx and F. Engels and in contrary to the instructions that the peasantry should come to collective pro­duction not by force but by the free choice. In addition for a period Marx and Engels themselves pinned too high hopes on the collectivism of the Russian commune. They didn't understand its forced and not free, as they believed, com­munistic character. They also exaggerated the importance of the class struggle as a source of social development, so the proletariat's role of the dictator was abso­lutized after a single historical precedent. The Bolsheviks took full advantage of these concepts of Marxism, usurping power, inflaming a civil war and creating a new empire.

The Artificial Intelligence systems have already become a reality. The work on their development is going very successfully, and therefore this reality requires monitoring and reflection, moreover, understanding not only how artificial intel­ligence can be developed, but also what the price can be, the consequences of the widespread use and applying of such technology. In the article, this theme is considered in the context of the work of K. Schwab, who put forward the idea that a new, Fourth, industrial revolution is beginning today. It is in this context that the phenomenon of AI and its applications is being raised and considered to­day. Therefore, the Fourth industrial revolution itself is considered in the row with other industrial revolutions that are singled out today. In the course of re­viewing the history of industrial revolutions, the author shows that now Schwab's concept looks somewhat unfinished. The first three industrial revolutions have some main distinguishing features, the Fourth industrial revolution so far looks like it consists of equivalent components. In accordance with this, it is shown that the dominant discovery in the Fourth industrial Revolution is still present, and these are developments in the field of AI. An important question of the arti­cle is how to save people in the context of the industrial expansion of AI. In this regard, the theme of universal basic income discussed today is considered. Ac­cording to the author, this tool alone is not enough for people to go through the introduction of robots and AI painlessly. The author draws attention to the fact that people who are unemployed, but at the same time have a basic income, will be threatened by an overly comfortable home environment, leading to degradation.

The article combines historical, cultural and systematic approaches to the analysis of digital transformations of society and man. Digital technologies play a crucial role in the transformation of economy, politics and society at the new stage of technologization. Developments and strategic projects for the introduction of arti­ficial intelligence, robotics, augmented and hybrid realities are implemented not only in the areas of dangerous, labor-intensive and routine work (i.e. in military affairs, industry, financial and economic operations), but also in the intellectual and creative spheres. The global time of change requires a global-system analysis. The invention of high information technologies and the interest of big business in the one-sided technologization of society disrupted the balanced co-evolution of computer technology and society. The author offers a noo-eco-geosystem ap­proach to the analysis of the crisis of technogenic civilization and the search for ways out of it. The complex grid of coordinates of the analysis includes planetary-physical, geo-ecological, geopolitical, geo-economical, geo-social, national socio-cultural, ethical and anthropological dimensions. The noo-eco-geosystem ap­proach makes it possible to reveal the catastrophic risks of digital economy and society strategies. The author considers energy and information and communica­tion technologies as catalysts for the accelerated transformation of society and the individual. These catalysts allow us to identify both the negative and positive as­pects of the global processes of evolution, as well as the "positive in the nega­tive". The system analysis of digital transformations of society and man assumes consideration of methodological aspects of opportunities and limitations of tech­nologies. The destructive and purifying character of the transformations of nature and society is considered as a self-organizing process of the formation of the global world order, the future picture of the world and the qualitative transforma­tions of the mind on the basis of the values of noospheric ethics and geosociality

Progress, truth, and rationality form a basic vocabulary for epistemology and philosophy of science. Sociological investigations of scientific knowledge, start­ing from the works of Thomas Kuhn, Barry Barnes and David Bloor, eliminate these traditional and central categories of philosophy. Their profound works be­came the source for the new types of scepticism toward scientific cognition, its proclaimed goals and received results. Within sociological studies of knowledge, science is researched as an integral part of culture. The scientific belief is deter­mined not only by achievements of reason, transcendental conditions, ways of perception or acquired experience, but rather by social authority, collec­tive agreements and distribution of power. In the article "What is scientific pro­gress?" Alexander Leonidovich Nikiforov outlines perspectives for compromise in sociological and philosophical thinking in order to overcome relativism and sceptical conclusions toward scientific progress. After all, scientific and social progress is not the unconditional ideal for humankind. It means only that scien­tific progress requires a new justification, especially in the light of synthesis be­tween philosophical and sociological methodologies. Another important aspect, stressed by Nikiforov, interprets the progress within the socio-humanitarian field. In the future, it is surely possible to expect the results from human sciences, whereas the resources of natural history evaporate and arrive to the last frontier. The most difficult is the knowledge of ourselves. Perhaps, it explains why the progress in human sciences has been gaining strength and promising the visi­ble, quite instrumental outbreaks.

The formation of the USSR five years after the October Revolution followed not only from internal needs, but also from the idea of "dialectical transition" of the feudal-capitalist component of the Russian empire's heritage to the socialist form. The USSR formation also had a more ambitious goal: The Soviet Union was expected to become the first experience of creating the "world workers and peasants union" (V.I. Lenin). First of all, this experience was gained in the agri­cultural sphere – the dominant sector of the country's economy. In this regard, the main scientific problem of this article is the philosophical and historical un­derstanding of the methods invented by the Bolsheviks during the war commu­nism policy period in 1918–1921 to form a new sense of agrarian life adequate to the future "world USSR". After a short break of NEP the experience gained in the agrarian sphere was used during the forcible сollectivization in the Russian Federation and in the territories of the former Russian Empire annexed to it for internationalist purposes. The article analyzes in detail the political and ideologi­cal reasons of the Bolshevik's activities solving the agrarian question during the periods of "war communism" and collectivization, the legal basis they had de­veloped for this issue, the successive elimination of the peasant cooperation as a self-organization of active people, the idea of historical necessity and the com­munist practicability of the overall labor obligation and the effectiveness of forced labor, as well as the consequences of these measures: the terrible famine of 1920–1921 and the armed resistance of the peasantry to the agrarian policy of the Bolsheviks.