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Résumé À partir de données d'enquêtes électorales, cet article montre la présence chez les électeurs français d'attitudes populistes exerçant un effet distinct et substantiel sur l'orientation des comportements électoraux. Les attitudes populistes augmentent de manière significative la probabilité de vote pour les principaux candidats populistes, Marine Le Pen et Jean-Luc Mélenchon, au premier tour de l'élection présidentielle de 2017, en interaction avec les idéologies plus substantielles auxquelles le populisme vient s'adosser, en particulier l'identité politique gauche-droite. Par ailleurs, le populisme opère comme mécanisme « supplétif » produisant un surcroît de mobilisation en faveur des candidats populistes chez les électeurs positionnés au centre des principales dimensions de compétition, venant ainsi suppléer la faiblesse de leurs affiliations ou de leurs préférences idéologiques.

This article examines the performance and party system diffusion of Euroscepticism of the French Front National (FN) during recent European crises. The article argues that Europe's successive crises since 2008 have been essentially 'absorbed' by the FN into its existing Eurosceptic framework which is guided by its radical right-wing ideology. While allowing the FN to successfully mobilize issues and grievances about the European Union (EU), Euroscepticism is, however, significantly impeding its strategy of governmental credibility. The article identifies the main political outcomes of these crises and finds differences in impact between the different EU crises on party competition over Europe. These findings provide insight into the relationship between the radical Right, Euroscepticism, and party competition. They also inform our current knowledge of Euroscepticism in French politics, and changes that EU crises have triggered, according to party system location and whether FN influence can be postulated.

International audience ; This chapter examines the supply and demand sides of populism in France. It looks at the two main populist actors i.e. the Front National (FN) and La France Insoumise (LFI). The FN exemplifies the typical radical right populist organization, primarily mobilizing grievances over immigration, while LFI shows a left-wing egalitarian and socially inclusive profile. Electoral support for populism in France is fuelled by economic instability and voter distrust of mainstream politics and of the EU. Both LFI and the FN increasingly converge on a common protectionist platform, opposing the EU and globalization. Populist voting in 2017 is found predominantly amongst the youngest cohorts and it is strongly correlated with populist attitudes. FN voters are primarily found amongst the so-called 'losers' of globalization in the lower social classes, who are typically more anti-immigrant and more authoritarian. LFI attracts on the other hand a broader coalition of secularized voters in the middle and lower social classes, who are primarily motivated by economic concerns. Both FN and LFI voters are more Eurosceptic than the mainstream, and they share similar concerns about globalization.

International audience ; This chapter examines the supply and demand sides of populism in France. It looks at the two main populist actors i.e. the Front National (FN) and La France Insoumise (LFI). The FN exemplifies the typical radical right populist organization, primarily mobilizing grievances over immigration, while LFI shows a left-wing egalitarian and socially inclusive profile. Electoral support for populism in France is fuelled by economic instability and voter distrust of mainstream politics and of the EU. Both LFI and the FN increasingly converge on a common protectionist platform, opposing the EU and globalization. Populist voting in 2017 is found predominantly amongst the youngest cohorts and it is strongly correlated with populist attitudes. FN voters are primarily found amongst the so-called 'losers' of globalization in the lower social classes, who are typically more anti-immigrant and more authoritarian. LFI attracts on the other hand a broader coalition of secularized voters in the middle and lower social classes, who are primarily motivated by economic concerns. Both FN and LFI voters are more Eurosceptic than the mainstream, and they share similar concerns about globalization.

International audience ; The 2017 French presidential elections have seen a considerable rise in support for populist actors at the periphery of the party system, challenging the dominance of the more established parties of the mainstream. The electoral success of Jean-Luc Mélenchon's France Insoumise (LFI) has expanded the political space for populist politics to the left of the political spectrum, competing with Marine Le Pen's Front national (FN) to the right. Meanwhile, the emergence of Emmanuel Macron as a politically viable centrist alternative has dislodged further the traditional bipolar dynamics of competition in French politics, resulting in a significant reshaping of the party system. Based on a national survey of French voters conducted in 2017, this paper examines the dynamics of electoral support for populist candidates in the presidential election, looking at commonalities and differences between the left and right-wing manifestations of the populist phenomenon, and to which extent these differed from the mainstream according to party system location.

International audience ; This chapter examines the supply and demand sides of populism in France. It looks at the two main populist actors i.e. the Front National (FN) and La France Insoumise (LFI). The FN exemplifies the typical radical right populist organization, primarily mobilizing grievances over immigration, while LFI shows a left-wing egalitarian and socially inclusive profile. Electoral support for populism in France is fuelled by economic instability and voter distrust of mainstream politics and of the EU. Both LFI and the FN increasingly converge on a common protectionist platform, opposing the EU and globalization. Populist voting in 2017 is found predominantly amongst the youngest cohorts and it is strongly correlated with populist attitudes. FN voters are primarily found amongst the so-called 'losers' of globalization in the lower social classes, who are typically more anti-immigrant and more authoritarian. LFI attracts on the other hand a broader coalition of secularized voters in the middle and lower social classes, who are primarily motivated by economic concerns. Both FN and LFI voters are more Eurosceptic than the mainstream, and they share similar concerns about globalization.

International audience ; The 2017 French presidential elections have seen a considerable rise in support for populist actors at the periphery of the party system, challenging the dominance of the more established parties of the mainstream. The electoral success of Jean-Luc Mélenchon's France Insoumise (LFI) has expanded the political space for populist politics to the left of the political spectrum, competing with Marine Le Pen's Front national (FN) to the right. Meanwhile, the emergence of Emmanuel Macron as a politically viable centrist alternative has dislodged further the traditional bipolar dynamics of competition in French politics, resulting in a significant reshaping of the party system. Based on a national survey of French voters conducted in 2017, this paper examines the dynamics of electoral support for populist candidates in the presidential election, looking at commonalities and differences between the left and right-wing manifestations of the populist phenomenon, and to which extent these differed from the mainstream according to party system location.

International audience ; The 2017 French presidential elections have seen a considerable rise in support for populist actors at the periphery of the party system, challenging the dominance of the more established parties of the mainstream. The electoral success of Jean-Luc Mélenchon's France Insoumise (LFI) has expanded the political space for populist politics to the left of the political spectrum, competing with Marine Le Pen's Front national (FN) to the right. Meanwhile, the emergence of Emmanuel Macron as a politically viable centrist alternative has dislodged further the traditional bipolar dynamics of competition in French politics, resulting in a significant reshaping of the party system. Based on a national survey of French voters conducted in 2017, this paper examines the dynamics of electoral support for populist candidates in the presidential election, looking at commonalities and differences between the left and right-wing manifestations of the populist phenomenon, and to which extent these differed from the mainstream according to party system location.

En dépit de ses évolutions récentes, le Front national français conserve les traits distinctifs de la droite radicale populiste européenne, au regard de la pérennité de sa stratégie de « niche » sur les enjeux culturels tels que l'immigration ou l'islam et de la permanence de son populisme ethno-nationaliste autoritaire. Le fn se trouve en outre à la pointe du combat contre l'Union européenne et son programme dessine les contours d'un social-populisme de crise(s). En termes systémiques, enfin, le parti de Marine Le Pen se situe aujourd'hui au « barycentre » stratégique de la droite radicale en Europe, entre tentative de normalisation et radicalité.

Les élections européennes de mai 2014 ont été dominées par la poussée des forces eurosceptiques. La nature de cette mobilisation demeure toutefois profondément hétérogène, entre euroscepticisme « soft » mainstream et formes plus radicales d'opposition à la construction européenne, qu'incarnent en particulier les droites radicales populistes. L'analyse de ce succès suggère la conjonction d'un vote protestataire à l'échelle nationale sur fond de crise économique, et d'un rejet croissant de l'Union, notamment à l'ouest de l'Europe. Les enjeux européens ont occupé une place centrale dans l'offre programmatique des principaux acteurs de la droite radicale populiste européenne. Ces derniers ont articulé un discours protectionniste et anti-immigration, assorti d'une critique forte des plans d'austérité et de sauvetage de l'Euro, consolidant leur base électorale populaire. L'analyse de leurs performances montre cependant d'importantes variations, qui témoignent de la fragmentation de cette famille politique et de son incapacité à se constituer en force organisée au sein du Parlement européen.

International audience ; The Front National (FN) has made an impressive come back into France's electoral politics since 2012. Adopting a supply-side approach, this article places the electoral rejuvenation of the FN in the context of the global crisis and looks at how the party has adapted programmatically to socio-economic demands emerging from this context. On the basis of manifesto data analysis, we find that despite having recently broadened its economic programme, the FN maintains a niche status in the party system. Our findings show, however, that the party has significantly shifted its economic platform, moving from a predominantly right-wing to a left-wing location since the mid-1980s. This move is characterized by an increase in egalitarian and nationalist economic policies, espousing also a populist framework. The reconfiguration of the FN suggests that the party may have moved to a pivotal position in recent years by converging around the economic preferences of the median voter. We discuss the role of internal and external factors in explaining the economic policy shift by the FN, and consider possible implications of our findings for understanding current populist radical right electoral dynamics in Europe.

International audience ; Les élections européennes de mai 2014 ont été marquées par la percée des partis eurosceptiques et le déclin des principaux acteurs du processus d'intégration européenne. Cette poussée des forces anti-UE s'inscrit naturellement dans le contexte de crise économique. Au-delà des seuls enjeux nationaux et de la sanction des exécutifs en place, l'essor des partis eurosceptiques a témoigné aussi de l'européanisation croissante du débat public, sur fond de défiance des citoyens vis-à-vis du fonctionnement de l'Union européenne et de ses institutions. Cette crise de confiance à l'égard du projet européen a soulevé un mouvement de protestation protéiforme, qui a alimenté la perception d'une « vague eurosceptique ». Le véritable challenge au projet européen vient cependant de formations politiques qui incarnent aujourd'hui une variante « dure » de l'euroscepticisme , opposée par principe à l'intégration et l'abandon de toute souveraineté nationale, jusqu'à réclamer, dans certains cas, la sortie pure et simple de l'UE. En grande majorité, ces acteurs partisans sont les protagonistes de la droite radicale populiste, avatar contemporain de la vieille extrême-droite pan-européenne. Ces partis ont fait de l'hostilité à l'Union européenne un cheval de bataille et un thème central de leur plateforme électorale, articulant une offre politique nationaliste en réponse aux enjeux et aux défis de la dénationalisation.