Suchergebnisse

The United States and most European countries have experienced an economic-political crisis unmatched in severity since the Great Depression. The crisis discredits the thesis of a nexus between free markets, unending economic growth and liberal democracy. It is obvious that elites -- principal decision-makers in powerful public and private organizations at national and supranational levels : have been pivotal actors in this crisis. It has without doubt been the hour of elites. What do elites' responses to the crisis reveal? How are elites altered by it? In whose interests have they acted? Although the authority of elites is always subject to dispute, has the crisis damaged it irreparably? What do decisive actions by non-elected elites and leaders in the Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, European Commission and other institutions mean for democracy? In analyses covering five years of crisis, from 2008 to mid-2013, leading scholars in the field address these questions in order to understand the role of elites in the transatlantic crisis

The United States and most European countries have experienced an economic-political crisis unmatched in severity since the Great Depression. The crisis discredits the thesis of a nexus between free markets, unending economic growth and liberal democracy. It is obvious that elites -- principal decision-makers in powerful public and private organizations at national and supranational levels : have been pivotal actors in this crisis. It has without doubt been the hour of elites. What do elites' responses to the crisis reveal? How are elites altered by it? In whose interests have they acted? Although the authority of elites is always subject to dispute, has the crisis damaged it irreparably? What do decisive actions by non-elected elites and leaders in the Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, European Commission and other institutions mean for democracy? In analyses covering five years of crisis, from 2008 to mid-2013, leading scholars in the field address these questions in order to understand the role of elites in the transatlantic crisis.

This compelling and convincing study, the capstone of decades of research, argues that political regimes are created and sustained by elites. Liberal democracies are no exception; they depend, above all, on the formation and persistence of consensually united elites. John Higley and Michael Burton explore the circumstances and ways in which such elites have formed in the modern world. They identify pressures that may cause a basic change in the structure and functioning of elites in established liberal democracies, and they ask if the elites cluster around George W. Bush are a harbinger of thi

Although a majority of Australian voters favour the introduction of a republic, in the November 1999 referendum a majority of them nevertheless voted to retain the monarchy. This article explains the background to this apparently perverse outcome. The central problem was asking the Australian electorate to make a complex, technical choice about the system of government, in the absence of clear partisan cues. As a result, republicans were divided on the method of election for the head of state, effectively resulting in three separate groups of voters favouring change. Using survey data collected just after the referendum, four hypotheses are tested to explain the result. The most important influence on voting was views about whether or not to sever the link with Britain, followed by the positive and negative aspects of the proposed change, and the cues presented by the leaders of the respective YES and NO campaigns. The interaction between these factors enabled political elites opposed to change to manipulate the result in their favour.

Although a majority of Australian voters favour the introduction of a republic, in the November 1999 referendum a majority of them nevertheless voted to retain the monarchy. This article explains the background to this apparently perverse outcome. The central problem was asking the Australian electorate to make a complex, technical choice about the system of government, in the absence of clear partisan cues. As a result, republicans were divided on the method of election for the head of state, effectively resulting in three separate groups of voters favouring change. Using survey data collected just after the referendum, four hypotheses are tested to explain the result. The most important influence on voting was views about whether or not to sever the link with Britain, followed by the positive and negative aspects of the proposed change, and the cues presented by the leaders of the respective YES and NO campaigns. The interaction between these factors enabled political elites opposed to change to manipulate the result in their favour.

Most political regimes, whether authoritarian or democratic, are born in abrupt, brutal, and momentous crises. In this volume [Mattei Dogan, and John Higley: Elites, Crises and the Origins of Regimes], a group of prominent scholars explores how these seminal events affect elites and shape regimes. Combining theoretical and case study chapters, the authors draw from a wide range of historical and contemporary examples to challenge mainstream developmental explanations of political change, which emphasize incremental changes and evaluations stretching over generations. Instead, the authors argue here, political leaders and elites possess significant autonomy and latitude for maneuver, especially in times of crisis. And their choices are frequently decisive in the making of regimes and the forging of national political histories. Providing a sustained comparative analysis of elites, their circulation, and behavior across times and countries, this lucid volume will be invaluable for scholars and students alike.

Postcommunist elites play rational power games throughout East Central and Eastern Europe today. But their games differ according to the structure, behavioral codes, and informal orientations associated with the paths of elite change. Although democratic institutions and procedures are in place just about everywhere, the differing elite power games account for major differences in extra-electoral politics and, thus, for wide variations in the quality of postcommunist democracies. The extent of the particularisms - clientelism and patronage, blurred functional autonomies and boundaries, violations of horizontal accountabilities, manipulations of the media and judiciary, harassment of Opposition elites, personal vendettas, persecutions of minorities - define these power games, and they can be linked systematically to the patterns of elite unity, differentiation, and circulation. We view combinations of these patterns as constituting the critical elite conditions for different types of political regimes, including consolidated democracies.

This article presents and assesses the thesis that a shift in the character of governing elites and leaders has been occurring in several important liberal democracies during recent years. Ascendant elites are more leonine and top leaders are more pugnacious. We attribute the shift to strong centripetal pressures that now impinge on elites and leaders, and we ask about the shift's consequences for the Operation of liberal democracies.

Noting that Marxist and elite paradigms birthed competing theories on social and political change and that the differential development of these theories depends less on evidence than on ideological leanings, the epilogue to a collection of essays on postsocialist elites compares these paradigms in terms of their polarity in the 20th century. Although fading by the end of the 19th century, Marxism saw renewed vitality as it was embraced as a theoretical and ideological tool of radical and reforrnist leaders of the European Left. Elite theory's decline is attributed less to a lack of its plausibility than to a lack of Lies to organized political forces. However, Marxism's emergence as a major global intellectual and political movement had a concomitant destructive impact on its explanatory power. By the end of the 20th century, Marxist theory comprised many dissipating streams. The decline of elite theory is delineated, noting that its tenets remained intact despite its unpopularity among activists and intellectuals. The negative effect of fascism - i.e., the dubious notion that elite theory leads to fascism - is noted, along with the idea that a combination of socioeconomic and sociocultural factors further eclipsed elite theory's development and popularity. Latter-20th-century elite theory lacked urgency in discussions on Western democracies and non-Western developing countries. However, three trends led to the reinvigoration of elite theory: economic advances of Japan and the Asian tigers, state socialism in Eastern Europe, and the elite-driven Soviet collapse. Thus, political developments driving the revival of elite theory include the centrality of elite choices and actions guiding these changes; and the theoretical developments include the exhaustion of Marxist theory's credibility and the reformulation of elite-centered democratic theory. Five suppositions underlying the analyses of contributions are delineated.

"Most political regimes, whether authoritarian or democratic, are born in abrupt, brutal, and momentous crises. In this volume [Mattei Dogan, and John Higley: Elites, Crises and the Origins of Regimes], a group of prominent scholars explores how these seminal events affect elites and shape regimes. Combining theoretical and case study chapters, the authors draw from a wide range of historical and contemporary examples to challenge mainstream developmental explanations of political change, which emphasize incremental changes and evaluations stretching over generations. Instead, the authors argue here, political leaders and elites possess significant autonomy and latitude for maneuver, especially in times of crisis. And their choices are frequently decisive in the making of regimes and the forging of national political histories. Providing a sustained comparative analysis of elites, their circulation, and behavior across times and countries, this lucid volume will be invaluable for scholars and students alike." (author's abstract)

"Postcommunist elites play rational power games throughout East Central and Eastern Europe today. But their games differ according to the structure, behavioral codes, and informal orientations associated with the paths of elite change. Although democratic institutions and procedures are in place just about everywhere, the differing elite power games account for major differences in extra-electoral politics and, thus, for wide variations in the quality of postcommunist democracies. The extent of the particularisms - clientelism and patronage, blurred functional autonomies and boundaries, violations of horizontal accountabilities, manipulations of the media and judiciary, harassment of Opposition elites, personal vendettas, persecutions of minorities - define these power games, and they can be linked systematically to the patterns of elite unity, differentiation, and circulation. We view combinations of these patterns as constituting the critical elite conditions for different types of political regimes, including consolidated democracies." (author's abstract)

"Noting that Marxist and elite paradigms birthed competing theories on social and political change and that the differential development of these theories depends less on evidence than on ideological leanings, the epilogue to a collection of essays on postsocialist elites compares these paradigms in terms of their polarity in the 20th century. Although fading by the end of the 19th century, Marxism saw renewed vitality as it was embraced as a theoretical and ideological tool of radical and reforrnist leaders of the European Left. Elite theory's decline is attributed less to a lack of its plausibility than to a lack of Lies to organized political forces. However, Marxism's emergence as a major global intellectual and political movement had a concomitant destructive impact on its explanatory power. By the end of the 20th century, Marxist theory comprised many dissipating streams. The decline of elite theory is delineated, noting that its tenets remained intact despite its unpopularity among activists and intellectuals. The negative effect of fascism - i.e., the dubious notion that elite theory leads to fascism - is noted, along with the idea that a combination of socioeconomic and sociocultural factors further eclipsed elite theory's development and popularity. Latter-20th-century elite theory lacked urgency in discussions on Western democracies and non-Western developing countries. However, three trends led to the reinvigoration of elite theory: economic advances of Japan and the Asian tigers, state socialism in Eastern Europe, and the elite-driven Soviet collapse. Thus, political developments driving the revival of elite theory include the centrality of elite choices and actions guiding these changes; and the theoretical developments include the exhaustion of Marxist theory's credibility and the reformulation of elite-centered democratic theory. Five suppositions underlying the analyses of contributions are delineated." (author's abstract)

"This article presents and assesses the thesis that a shift in the character of governing elites and leaders has been occurring in several important liberal democracies during recent years. Ascendant elites are more leonine and top leaders are more pugnacious. We attribute the shift to strong centripetal pressures that now impinge on elites and leaders, and we ask about the shift's consequences for the Operation of liberal democracies." (author's abstract)