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Compiled by Thomas Johnson, a memeber of the Dublin Mansion House Conference, 1918. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Labadie Pamphlet Collection.

As secretary of the faculty, Johnson reports that Partridge has been appointed Military Instructor at the University of Virginia, to be paid by the students, not the university. ; Transcription by Raymond Bouchard. Transcriptions may be subject to error.

Political Islam or Islamism - in contrast to Jihadism or terrorism - does not necessarily first and foremost have anything to do with violence. On the contrary, the large majority in the Islamic movement turned away from the use of violence long ago and is instead attempting to peacefully exert political and societal influence. Representatives of political Islam are well-trained political strategists who, in suits and ties and via organized Islam and Islamic organizations conduct resolute lobbying activities in Europe in order to promote the implementation of Islamic society. Christine Schirrmacher provides a sophisticated overview of the genesis of this global movement, its view of the world, and its goals, and she demonstrates that it is essentially a product of the twentieth century. The reader will additionally gain insight into the Muslim Brotherhood, the first institutionalized form of political Islam. At present it is the most interconnected and successful movement in the world..

Why has the Taliban been so much more effective in presenting messages that resonate with the Afghan population than the US, the Afghan government & their allies? This text, based on years of field research & the assessment of hundreds of original source materials, examines the information operations & related narratives of Afghan insurgents, especially the Afghan Taliban, & investigates how the Taliban has won the information war. Taliban messaging, wrapped in the narrative of jihad, is both to the point & in tune with its target audiences. On the other hand, the US & its Kabul allies committed a basic messaging blunder, failing to present narratives that spoke to or, often, were even understood by their target audiences. Importantly, the text systematically explains why the US lost this 'battle of the story' in Afghanistan, & argues that this defeat may have cost the US the entire war, despite its conventional & technological superiority.

This book applies the best of scientific decision-making practices and introduces the concept of risk management and its application in the structure of national security decisions. It examines the acquisition and utilization of all-source intelligence and addresses reaction and prevention strategies applicable to chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons; agricultural terrorism; cyberterrorism; and other potential threats to our critical infrastructure. It discusses legal issues and illustrates the dispassionate analysis of our intelligence, law enforcement, and military operations and action.

The article of record as published may be found at https://doi.org/10.1177/2347797020906635 ; This article's primarily focus concerns Afghanistan's 'democratic' electoral processes and procedures. Fraud and other critical aspects of the 2018 election for the Wolesi Jirga, Afghanistan's lower house of parliament, are systematically assessed and official election data and results are examined in depth. As witnessed in earlier Wolesi Jirga elections, this legislative election was duplicitous and unrepresentative. By definition, a democratic legislature serves as the voice of a country's population. Assessing the voting results in Kabul, the largest and most important province, can summarise the problems of the election.The leading 'vote getter' in the Kabul Province got a mere 2.0 per cent of the vote—11,158 out of 666,478 votes cast. Twenty-six of the elected Wolesi Jirga legislators received less than 1 per cent of the vote. Only 23.5 per cent of Kabuli voters voted for a winning candidate. Overall, this article paints a bleak picture of the state of democ- racy in Afghanistan.The already restricted Afghan environment is further hindered by operational mismanagement by the Independent Election Commission (IEC) throughout the electoral process. The single non-transferable voting (SNTV) system again proved to be a disaster resulting in the vast majority of Afghans voting for losing candidates and winning candidates receiving few votes.