Suchergebnisse

The author focuses on recent trends in Chinese thinking about nuclear doctrine and some elements of its nuclear modernization programme, and suggests that China has doctrinal and foreign policy incentives to increase the size and operational sophistication of its nuclear arsenal over the next decade or so. (DÜI-Sen)

Die Analyse des Autors kreist um die Frage, ob der von ihm konstatierte Wandel in der chinesischen Haltung zu Abrüstungsfragen in Begriffen der Adaption (taktische Anpassung) oder des Lernens (Wandel grundlegender Muster in der Sicherheitspolitik) zu erklären ist. Nach einer Untersuchung der institutionellen Entwicklung chinesischer policy in Rahmen internationaler Konferenzen und Verträge, innerpolitischer Veränderungen auf dem Feld der Expertise und der an der Diskussion beteiligten Kreise in Politik, Wissenschaft und Militär sowie des taktischen Verhaltens chinesischer Vertreter bei multinationalen Verhandlungen kommt Johnston zu dem Schluß, daß von einem Lernprozeß z.Zt. noch nicht gesprochen werden kann. Er sieht aber Chancen für einen Wandel der derzeitigen Real- in eine Idealpolitik. (APCh-Emn)

In October 1983, the secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Hu Yaobang, formally announced the beginning of a two-stage, three-year Party rectification. The aim of this article is took at rectification of the CCP organization inside the People's Liberation Army (PLA). "Leftist" thinking in the PLA and the emphasis on combating "leftism" as a key task of rectification. (DÜI-Sen)

Many analysts argue that public opinion creates pressure on Chinese leaders to act coercively in territorial disputes, and that it also limits their options to de-escalate once crises have broken out. Evidence suggests, however, that Chinese leaders may prefer having more flexibility rather than less in a crisis. Using original data generated by a survey experiment conducted in China in 2015, this article examines several strategies that Chinese leaders could use to reduce public pressure so as to make concessions in a crisis easier. These strategies include pledging to use economic sanctions instead of force; invoking China's "peaceful identity"; citing the costs of conflict to China's development; accepting United Nations mediation; and backing down in the face of U.S. military threats. In all cases except one, approval for the leader increases over a baseline level of support for making concessions. The exception is if the leader backs down in the face of U.S. military threats. Here, approval drops below the baseline level of support, especially for nationalists and hawks. The findings suggest that if one assumes that Chinese leaders are constrained by public opinion, a U.S. cost-imposition strategy to compel China to back down in crises may have the opposite effect—tying Chinese leaders' hands even tighter.