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AbstractThis article addresses whether perceived goal agreement matters for cross‐sectoral collaboration outcomes. Using original survey data from Lebanon that compares the perceptions of local governcment and nonprofit leaders, the findings indicate perceived goal agreement is salient and linked to judgments that collaboration meets its objectives. The article also examines perceptions of goal agreement as it relates to social (trust) and process (power‐sharing) collaboration outcomes and find it to be associated with higher trust between collaborators. While this is the case for nonprofits more than local governments, we find no corresponding sector differences for the relationship between perceptions of goal agreement and effectiveness. In addition, agreeing on goals seems to be linked to perceptions of unequal decision‐making authority for local governments. The results highlight implications for the relationship between goal agreement and cross‐sector collaboration outcome, particularly in the context of developing countries.

Leaders' perceptions of the effectiveness of their organization's collaborations are critical as they determine current and future collaboration. This article examines perceived collaboration effectiveness—the extent to which targeted goals are achieved—based on an organization's role in that collaboration's governance arrangements (initiation, funding, coordination, and decision-making). Findings suggest that governance arrangements have modest association with perceived effectiveness of collaborations between nonprofits and local governments in Lebanon. Perceived effectiveness increases when an organization is directly engaged in coordinating the collaboration's work, activities, resources, and partners, but decreases when an organization has the responsibility for decision-making. Perceived effectiveness also appears to be related to trust, relationship effectiveness, service category, and the organization's sector.

This article focuses on two types of state policies that shape county revenue decisions. First, states can impose tax & expenditure limits (TELS) designed to restrict county financial discretion & limit the general taxing authority of counties. The authors construct a state restrictiveness scale that is used to measure the impact of TELs & taxing authority on county revenue decisions. Second, state aid to counties plays an important role in many county financial decisions. The impact of state aid is analyzed to determine whether aid compensates counties for revenue losses that may result from state restrictiveness. Results suggest that state restrictiveness induces counties to reduce their reliance on tax revenues & related resident tax burdens. However, state restrictiveness leads to greater reliance on fees to maintain budgets & higher fee burdens on residents. States appear to provide aid to those counties most constrained by state restrictive policies, & states may direct more aid to counties that shift resident revenue burdens from taxes to fees. 5 Tables, 40 References. Adapted from the source document.

With the nature, scope, and pace of public sector contracting accelerating significantly during the Bush administration, and with the Obama administration promising to curb the contracting excesses of its predecessors, it is useful to take stock and ponder the consequences of this movement to date for human resource management. This article puts public sector contracting and its effects in a larger historical, political, and democratic context by (a) reviewing the American propensity for market-based solutions (including contracting) to government problems, a disposition rooted in American exceptionalist values; (b) chronicling how that predisposition has manifested itself in four successive and now overlapping expansions of contracting (from products, to services, to core governmental functions, to human resource management functions); and (c) showing how these developments have had significant consequences not only for the future of the public service but also for the values associated with democratic constitutionalism in the United States.

AbstractResearch focuses on various macro and meso aspects of collaboration and less on the individuals who make decisions about their organizations' collaborations. Organizational leaders make these decisions based on their interpretations, influenced by their personal characteristics. Existing studies examining organizational outcomes such as a decision to collaborate typically consider these characteristics separately and independently, ignoring the reality that a leader's characteristics jointly and interactively shape perspectives, attitudes, and behaviors. We focus on five prominent characteristics in the literature—gender, educational attainment, prior cross‐sector experience, current cross‐sector affiliation, and tenure in position—and study their configurational dynamics regarding the organization‐level outcome—the propensity of cross‐sector collaboration. We employ qualitative comparative analysis to develop and test a configurational model for cross‐sector collaboration, using survey data of local government and nonprofit leaders in Lebanon. The analysis offers exploratory insights into four configurational types of leaders whose organizations opt to collaborate at the local level.

Capturing the benefits of competition is a key argument for outsourcing public services, yet public service markets often lack sufficient competition. The authors use survey and interview data from U.S. local governments to explore the responses of public managers to noncompetitive markets. This research indicates that competition is weak in most local government markets (fewer than two alternative providers on average across 67 services measured), and that the relationship between competition and contracting choice varies by service type. Public managers respond to suboptimal market competition by intervening with strategies designed to create, sustain, and enhance provider markets. In monopoly service markets, managers are more likely to use intergovernmental contracting, while for‐profit contracting is more common in more competitive service markets. The strategies that public managers employ to build and sustain competition for contracts often require tangible investments of administrative resources that add to the transaction costs of contracting in noncompetitive markets.