Suchergebnisse

This article examines whether electoral reform in Japan replacing a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system with a parallel mixed system has led to two-party competition in single-member districts (SMDs) in House of Representative elections from 1996 to 2005. While nationwide figures suggest declining numbers of effective candidates and losers, distinguishing SMDs by levels of urbanization reveals that this trend is largely limited to urban areas. Instead of converging toward a two-party system as many proponents of electoral reforms had anticipated, elections under the SMD portion of the new system have witnessed the emergence and continuation of two distinct patterns of competition: urban constituencies featuring contests between two major parties, and rural constituencies dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The persistence of the latter pattern diminishes the prospect of power alternation. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

This article examines whether electoral reform in Japan replacing a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system with a parallel mixed system has led to two-party competition in single-member districts (SMDs) in House of Representative elections from 1996 to 2005. While nationwide figures suggest declining numbers of effective candidates and losers, distinguishing SMDs by levels of urbanization reveals that this trend is largely limited to urban areas. Instead of converging toward a two-party system as many proponents of electoral reforms had anticipated, elections under the SMD portion of the new system have witnessed the emergence and continuation of two distinct patterns of competition: urban constituencies featuring contests between two major parties, and rural constituencies dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The persistence of the latter pattern diminishes the prospect of power alternation.

AbstractThe delineation of constituency boundaries and variations in vote distribution across districts often favor certain parties at the expense of others. Applying a hitherto under-utilized formula (Brookes, 1959; Johnston et al., 1999), this study investigates whether the mechanism translating votes into seats in Japan's single-member districts results in systematic partisan advantage that may influence election outcomes. Simulations are conducted for the 2003 and 2005 general elections under two scenarios: where the governing coalition and the main opposition party receive equal vote shares, and where their vote shares are reversed from the actual results. Components of electoral bias are then disaggregated into size and distribution effects, and the impact of malapportionment, electorate size, turnout, and the role of third party/independent candidates on overall electoral bias is examined. Results show that while partisan bias exists, disadvantages toward one party in some components are likely to cancel out benefits derived from others, producing a relatively small net effect. Furthermore, electoral bias in Japan is found to award sectoral rather than partisan seat bonuses.

This article examines changes in patterns of party competition in Japan and Taiwan following the introduction of mixed parallel electoral systems. National and district level election results demonstrate the consolidation of a two-party system in both countries. Differences in the speed and extent of this development are analyzed.

This paper considers the origins and conceptualizations of social capital, particularly the effects of interpersonal trust and participation in voluntarily associations on support for democracy. In so doing, the study introduces a "two-step process" proposition, suggesting that while a causal relationship exists between social capital and democratic support, this link is mediated by intervening variables in the form of knowledge and skills resulting from trust and participation. Empirical tests are conducted on survey data from seven countries covered by the East Asian Barometer to examine the validity of this hypothesis.