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Argues that the sense of great change hanging over the immediate post-Cold War period is gone & that international competition among great powers for regional dominance & global prestige has reemerged. The US response to international conditions is examined in light of the US's position as the sole superpower in the currently unipolar world. The place of the Bush Doctrine in US foreign policy tradition is discussed before asserting that despite challenges to the US from chiefly Russia & China, there has not been a concerted effort at balancing against the superpower as realist theory would indicate. US global predominance is assessed as a positive condition, contending that it in fact stands in the way of regression toward a more dangerous world & that the choice is not between a future of US dominance or something like the EU. While the world is currently unipolar, the existence of great power competition rooted in national ambition persists, even manifest in the actions of the EU & the Islamic world. This competition has been exacerbated by the return of ideological competition, particularly between liberalism & autocracy, as well as by divisions between modernity & tradition, manifest in the conflict between modernity/secularism & Islamic fundamentalism. It is concluded that US power remains necessary. D. Edelman

Die Welt erlebte in den vergangenen Jahren die Wiederkehr des internationalen Wettstreits zwischen den Großmächten, wobei die Vereinigten Staaten, Russland, China, Europa, Japan, Indien, der Iran und andere Nationen um die regionale Vorherrschaft konkurrieren. Das Ringen um Ehre, Prestige und Einfluss in der Welt ist wieder einmal zu einem entscheidenden Merkmal der weltpolitischen Szene geworden. Der Wettstreit zwischen Liberalismus und Absolutismus macht sich erneut bemerkbar, wobei die Nationen der Welt sich wie in der Vergangenheit zunehmend aufgrund ideologischer Prinzipien zusammenschließen. Ferner gibt es noch die Bruchlinie zwischen Moderne und Tradition, der gewaltsame Kampf der islamischen Fundamentalisten gegen die modernen Mächte und die säkularen Kulturen, die ihrer Ansicht nach in die islamische Welt eingedrungen sind und sie beschmutzt haben. Wie werden die Vereinigten Staaten mit einer solchen Welt umgehen? Der Autor stellt in Beantwortung dieser Frage die These auf, dass die amerikanische Vorherrschaft dem Fortschritt zu einer besseren Welt nicht im Wege steht, jedoch dem Rückschritt zu einer gefährlicheren Welt. Er diskutiert die Rolle Chinas und Russlands bei der Gestaltung der zukünftigen internationalen Ordnung, das Verhältnis zwischen Europa und den Vereinigten Staaten sowie die Herausforderungen durch den Islamismus. (ICI2)

In the wake of intensified global economic competition, economic liberalization, waves of immigration, and the rise of European Union governance, many observers suggest that there has been a sharp diminution of the long-standing differences between hierarchically-organized European legal processes and the more fragmented, malleable "adversarial legalism" of the United States. It is not easy to find meaningful quantitative indicators of convergence (or of continued divergence) in systems as complex and multi-faceted as contemporary legal systems. I argue, however, that six salient features of the American way of law have not emerged and are unlikely to emerge in European legal systems. Two of these differences are structural or procedural: (1) the political nature and powerful remedial powers of American judiciaries; (2) the high levels of adversarial legalism in the American regulatory process. The next four differences are substantive, relating to differences in the content of bodies of law that are central to the experience of citizens: (3) laws and institutional practices that make American tort law uniquely threatening; (4) the more limited rights to social provision and employee protections that prevail in American law; (5) the less demanding obligations of American tax law; (6) America's more punitive criminal sanctions, more permissive gun laws, and greater reliance on adversarial legalism in criminal adjudication and police accountability. These six differences are not likely to narrow significantly, I will argue, since they are rooted in the distinctive features of American and European political structures, political belief systems, and legal cultures.

Responds to Melvyn P. Leffler's article, "9/11 and American Foreign Policy" (Diplomatic History, June 2005). Leffler is praised for acknowledging the complex history of US foreign policy when analyzing the policies of the George W. Bush administration; however various weaknesses in his argument are identified. The structure of Leffler's analysis is considered unconvincing, particularly regarding the relationship between threat perception & ideals & values. Also, Leffler is criticized for his non-specific evaluation of Bush's policies. L. Collins Leigh

This article is a response to Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson's critique of Robert Kagan's article, "America's Crisis of Legitimacy." In his reponse, Kagan re-emphasizes his assertion that the United States needs internationaal legitimamcy to conduct successful foreign policy, and that currenlty, the United States lacks this legitimacy. Included is a discussion on the United States sources of legitimamcy during the Cold War, stemming not from its fidelity to the rule of international law, but its ability to portray itself as the leader of the free world. The United State's legitimamcy also derived from the bipolar structure of the Cold War: allied nations did not worry that the United States was too powerful because it was checked by the Soviet Union. Concludes by emphasizing that the United States is no longer legitimately seen as the leader of the free world, and that it never, even in it's Cold War relations, adhered to international law to claim it's legitimacy in foreign policy.