The Reapportionment Revolution and Bias in U. S. Congressional Elections
In: American journal of political science, Band 43, Heft 3, S. 812
ISSN: 1540-5907
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In: American journal of political science, Band 43, Heft 3, S. 812
ISSN: 1540-5907
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 43, Heft 3, S. 812-841
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: American journal of political science, Band 40, Heft 2, S. 478
ISSN: 1540-5907
In: American political science review, Band 90, Heft 1, S. 21-33
ISSN: 1537-5943
Most scholars agree that members of Congress are strongly motivated by their desire for reelection. This assumption implies that members of Congress adopt institutions, rules, and norms of behavior in part to serve their electoral interests. Direct tests of the electoral connection are rare, however, because significant, exogenous changes in the electoral environment are difficult to identify. We develop and test an electoral rationale for the norm of committee assignment "property rights." We examine committee tenure patterns before and after a major, exogenous change in the electoral system—the states' rapid adoption of Australian ballot laws in the early 1890s. The ballot changes, we argue, induced new "personal vote" electoral incentives, which contributed to the adoption of "modern" congressional institutions such as property rights to committee assignments. We demonstrate a marked increase in assignment stability after 1892, by which time a majority of states had put the new ballot laws into force, and earlier than previous studies have suggested.
In: American political science review, Band 90, Heft 1, S. 21-33
ISSN: 0003-0554
Most scholars agree that members of Congress are strongly motivated by their desire for reelection. This assumption implies that members of Congress adopt institutions, rules, and norms of behavior in part to serve their electoral interests. Direct tests of the electoral connection are rare, however, because significant, exogenous changes in the electoral environment are difficult to identify. We develop and test an electoral rationale for the norm of committee assignment "property rights". We examine committee tenure patterns before and after a major, exogenous change in the electoral system - the states' rapid adoption of Australian ballot laws in the early 1890s. The ballot changes, we argue, induced new "personal vote" electoral incentives, which contributed to the adoption of "modern" congressional institutions such as property rights to committee assignments. We demonstrate a marked increase in assignment stability after 1892, by which time a majority of states had put the new ballot laws into force, and earlier than previous studies have suggested. (American Political Science Review / FUB)
World Affairs Online
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 40, Heft 2, S. 478-497
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 40, S. 478-497
ISSN: 0092-5853
Examines direct and indirect causes of the incumbency advantage and impact of having an inexperienced challenger, 1948-90.
In: Political analysis: PA ; the official journal of the Society for Political Methodology and the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 31, Heft 3, S. 325-331
ISSN: 1476-4989
AbstractKatz, King, and Rosenblatt (2020, American Political Science Review 114, 164–178) introduces a theoretical framework for understanding redistricting and electoral systems, built on basic statistical and social science principles of inference. DeFord et al. (2021, Political Analysis, this issue) instead focuses solely on descriptive measures, which lead to the problems identified in our article. In this article, we illustrate the essential role of these basic principles and then offer statistical, mathematical, and substantive corrections required to apply DeFord et al.'s calculations to social science questions of interest, while also showing how to easily resolve all claimed paradoxes and problems. We are grateful to the authors for their interest in our work and for this opportunity to clarify these principles and our theoretical framework.
In: Political analysis: PA ; the official journal of the Society for Political Methodology and the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 31, Heft 3, S. 335-336
ISSN: 1476-4989
AbstractWe are grateful to DeFord et al. for the continued attention to our work and the crucial issues of fair representation in democratic electoral systems. Our response (Katz, King, and Rosenblatt Forthcoming) was designed to help readers avoid being misled by mistaken claims in DeFord et al. (Forthcoming-a), and does not address other literature or uses of our prior work. As it happens, none of our corrections were addressed (or contradicted) in the most recent submission (DeFord et al. Forthcoming-b).
In: American political science review, Band 114, Heft 1, S. 164-178
ISSN: 1537-5943
We clarify the theoretical foundations of partisan fairness standards for district-based democratic electoral systems, including essential assumptions and definitions not previously recognized, formalized, or in some cases even discussed. We also offer extensive empirical evidence for assumptions with observable implications. We cover partisan symmetry, the most commonly accepted fairness standard, and other perspectives. Throughout, we follow a fundamental principle of statistical inference too often ignored in this literature—defining the quantity of interest separately so its measures can be proven wrong, evaluated, and improved. This enables us to prove which of the many newly proposed fairness measures are statistically appropriate and which are biased, limited, or not measures of the theoretical quantity they seek to estimate at all. Because real-world redistricting and gerrymandering involve complicated politics with numerous participants and conflicting goals, measures biased for partisan fairness sometimes still provide useful descriptions of other aspects of electoral systems.
In: British journal of political science, Band 34, Heft 4, S. 657-674
ISSN: 1469-2112
Voting power indexes such as that of Banzhaf are derived, explicitly or implicitly, from the assumption that all votes are equally likely (i.e., random voting). That assumption implies that the probability of a vote being decisive in a jurisdiction with n voters is proportional to 1/√n. In this article the authors show how this hypothesis has been empirically tested and rejected using data from various US and European elections. They find that the probability of a decisive vote is approximately proportional to 1/n. The random voting model (and, more generally, the square-root rule) overestimates the probability of close elections in larger jurisdictions. As a result, classical voting power indexes make voters in large jurisdictions appear more powerful than they really are. The most important political implication of their result is that proportionally weighted voting systems (that is, each jurisdiction gets a number of votes proportional to n) are basically fair. This contradicts the claim in the voting power literature that weights should be approximately proportional to √n.
In: British journal of political science, Band 34, Heft 4, S. 657-674
ISSN: 0007-1234
Analyzes historical electoral data as a basis for possible reform of the Electoral College system in the US. The belief that the Electoral College may be biased in favor of one party is surmised through a study of the relationship between the average vote share of a party's candidate & the likelihood of winning a majority of the Electoral College. Next, the effect of the Electoral College on the voting power of individual citizens, namely their influence on election outcome, is compared with a popular vote system. The results of these analyses do not defend reform of the Electoral College system. 4 Figures. L. Collins Leigh
In: Perspectives on political science, Band 32, Heft 3, S. 171
ISSN: 1045-7097
In: Political analysis: PA ; the official journal of the Society for Political Methodology and the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 10, Heft 1, S. 84-100
ISSN: 1476-4989
Katz and King have previously developed a model for predicting or explaining aggregate electoral results in multiparty democracies. Their model is, in principle, analogous to what least-squares regression provides American political researchers in that two-party system. Katz and King applied their model to three-party elections in England and revealed a variety of new features of incumbency advantage and sources of party support. Although the mathematics of their statistical model covers any number of political parties, it is computationally demanding, and hence slow and numerically imprecise, with more than three parties. In this paper we produce an approximate method that works in practice with many parties without making too many theoretical compromises. Our approach is to treat the problem as one of missing data. This allows us to use a modification of the fast EMis algorithm of King, Honaker, Joseph, and Scheve and to provide easy-to-use software, while retaining the attractive features of the Katz and King model, such as thetdistribution and explicit models for uncontested seats.