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available online 9 January 2014 : http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421513012524 ; International audience ; Demand side management (DSM) in electricity markets could improve energy efficiency and achieve environmental targets through controlled consumption. For the past 10 years or so DSM programmes have registered significant results. However, detailed analysis of its real impact as observed by a large number of pilot studies suggests that such programmes need to be fine-tuned to suit clearly identified conditions. This study aims to provide recommendations for the instruments to be used to prompt demand response with a view to maximizing energy and environmental efficiencies of various countries. The present study suggests that different DSM models should be deployed depending on the specific generation mix in any given country. Beside the natural benefits from cross-borders infrastructures, DSM improves the flexibility and reliability of the energy system, absorbing some shock on generation mix. We show efficiency increases with demand response but at a decreasing rate. So, according to rebound and report effects, simple DSM tools could be preferred.

available online 9 January 2014 : http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421513012524 ; International audience ; Demand side management (DSM) in electricity markets could improve energy efficiency and achieve environmental targets through controlled consumption. For the past 10 years or so DSM programmes have registered significant results. However, detailed analysis of its real impact as observed by a large number of pilot studies suggests that such programmes need to be fine-tuned to suit clearly identified conditions. This study aims to provide recommendations for the instruments to be used to prompt demand response with a view to maximizing energy and environmental efficiencies of various countries. The present study suggests that different DSM models should be deployed depending on the specific generation mix in any given country. Beside the natural benefits from cross-borders infrastructures, DSM improves the flexibility and reliability of the energy system, absorbing some shock on generation mix. We show efficiency increases with demand response but at a decreasing rate. So, according to rebound and report effects, simple DSM tools could be preferred.

available online 9 January 2014 : http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421513012524 ; International audience ; Demand side management (DSM) in electricity markets could improve energy efficiency and achieve environmental targets through controlled consumption. For the past 10 years or so DSM programmes have registered significant results. However, detailed analysis of its real impact as observed by a large number of pilot studies suggests that such programmes need to be fine-tuned to suit clearly identified conditions. This study aims to provide recommendations for the instruments to be used to prompt demand response with a view to maximizing energy and environmental efficiencies of various countries. The present study suggests that different DSM models should be deployed depending on the specific generation mix in any given country. Beside the natural benefits from cross-borders infrastructures, DSM improves the flexibility and reliability of the energy system, absorbing some shock on generation mix. We show efficiency increases with demand response but at a decreasing rate. So, according to rebound and report effects, simple DSM tools could be preferred.

This study aims to identify the support practices that enable a successful family business succession process. Using 17 small- and medium-sized family businesses, the authors attempt to analyse the specifics of family business succession processes and identify the support practices appropriate to each phase of the process. The results show that advice and consultation are necessary during the pre-family business succession phase. Furthermore, the results reveal that training is needed to acquire and update knowledge and information during the family business succession phase. Finally, the results confirm that mentoring can ensure social and cognitive transfer in the post-family business succession process. This paper presents a theoretical innovation, as it is the first research study to attempt to understand how supportive practices can contribute to the success of the succession process.

Four countries in the Maghreb region of North Africa — Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia are facing the common challenge of a rapid increase in energy demand, in particular for electricity, linked to population growth and rising standards of living. Peak demand in these countries has increased in recent years, at an estimated average of 6 percent annually between 2004 and 2013. Electricity generation capacity has been ramped up significantly each year to cope with this rapid increase in demand. It is estimated that the Maghreb will need to double its installed generation capacity by 2020 if it is to keep pace with the rising demand. This study focuses on four countries of the Maghreb, namely Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya. However, given the political situation and the lack of information in Libya, the analyses are often confined to three countries: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. This report is divided into six sections that focus on the following topics: 1) Energy challenges facing the Maghreb; 2) Overview of air-conditioning systems in the region; 3) Analysis of the current market; 4) Outlook on market developments and challenges; 5) Policies, measures, and tools to enhance energy efficiency; and 6) Recommendations for transforming the air-conditioning market in the Maghreb—a way forward.

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. Florence School of Regulation, EUI working paper ; RSCAS 2012/31 ; It is puzzling today to explain both the diversity and the rationale of regulators' practice vis-à-vis network monopolies. We argue that two fundamental characteristics should be considered when defining the most appropriate regulatory tools. First, it is the bounded endowment of regulators set by governments and legislators which determines their abilities (staff, budget, administrative powers) to implement any of the regulatory tools. Ranked from the easiest to the most demanding to implement, these various tools are: a- cost plus, b- price/revenue cap, c- output or performance-based regulation, d- menu of contracts and e- yardstick competition. Second, the regulators also have to take into account that the network monopolies perform multiple tasks with heterogeneous regulatory characteristics (in terms of controllability, ex ante predictability and ex post observability). These characteristics of tasks determine what type of regulatory tool is more likely to better regulate each task. The regulatory tools then perform well only when they are implemented for tasks that are controllable and predictable enough. It is the kind of observability of these tasks which determines the best incentive tool to implement. Lastly, conclusions for the regulation of networks are derived. A workable regulation of network relies on a reasonable alignment of the regulatory tools with the regulatory characteristics of tasks and the regulators resource endowment.

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. Florence School of Regulation, EUI working paper ; RSCAS 2012/31 ; It is puzzling today to explain both the diversity and the rationale of regulators' practice vis-à-vis network monopolies. We argue that two fundamental characteristics should be considered when defining the most appropriate regulatory tools. First, it is the bounded endowment of regulators set by governments and legislators which determines their abilities (staff, budget, administrative powers) to implement any of the regulatory tools. Ranked from the easiest to the most demanding to implement, these various tools are: a- cost plus, b- price/revenue cap, c- output or performance-based regulation, d- menu of contracts and e- yardstick competition. Second, the regulators also have to take into account that the network monopolies perform multiple tasks with heterogeneous regulatory characteristics (in terms of controllability, ex ante predictability and ex post observability). These characteristics of tasks determine what type of regulatory tool is more likely to better regulate each task. The regulatory tools then perform well only when they are implemented for tasks that are controllable and predictable enough. It is the kind of observability of these tasks which determines the best incentive tool to implement. Lastly, conclusions for the regulation of networks are derived. A workable regulation of network relies on a reasonable alignment of the regulatory tools with the regulatory characteristics of tasks and the regulators resource endowment.

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. Florence School of Regulation, EUI working paper ; RSCAS 2012/31 ; It is puzzling today to explain both the diversity and the rationale of regulators' practice vis-à-vis network monopolies. We argue that two fundamental characteristics should be considered when defining the most appropriate regulatory tools. First, it is the bounded endowment of regulators set by governments and legislators which determines their abilities (staff, budget, administrative powers) to implement any of the regulatory tools. Ranked from the easiest to the most demanding to implement, these various tools are: a- cost plus, b- price/revenue cap, c- output or performance-based regulation, d- menu of contracts and e- yardstick competition. Second, the regulators also have to take into account that the network monopolies perform multiple tasks with heterogeneous regulatory characteristics (in terms of controllability, ex ante predictability and ex post observability). These characteristics of tasks determine what type of regulatory tool is more likely to better regulate each task. The regulatory tools then perform well only when they are implemented for tasks that are controllable and predictable enough. It is the kind of observability of these tasks which determines the best incentive tool to implement. Lastly, conclusions for the regulation of networks are derived. A workable regulation of network relies on a reasonable alignment of the regulatory tools with the regulatory characteristics of tasks and the regulators resource endowment.