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While we generally take it for granted that governments should provide social welfare and other benefits to their citizens, justification of these services depends on special moral requirements people owe to their compatriots, as opposed to inhabitants of other countries, who may be far more needy. While widely discussed defenses of compatriot preferences can be seen to be flawed, the latter may be justified through a public goods argument. Security and other public goods are not only necessary for acceptable lives but are provided through the cooperative activity of compatriots, coordinated and enforced by the state. Because the necessary public goods require general cooperation throughout society, all individuals who are required to comply should have rights to participate in decisions about the form in which they are provided. Because these political rights must be substantive rather than merely formal, they justify requirements of distributive justice and so compatriot preferences. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2009.]

While we generally take it for granted that governments should provide social welfare and other benefits to their citizens, justification of these services depends on special moral requirements people owe to their compatriots, as opposed to inhabitants of other countries, who may be far more needy. While widely discussed defenses of compatriot preferences can be seen to be flawed, the latter may be justified through a public goods argument. Security and other public goods are not only necessary for acceptable lives but are provided through the cooperative activity of compatriots, coordinated and enforced by the state. Because the necessary public goods require general cooperation throughout society, all individuals who are required to comply should have rights to participate in decisions about the form in which they are provided. Because these political rights must be substantive rather than merely formal, they justify requirements of distributive justice and so compatriot preferences.

Although at one time the nocturnal council, discussed in Book XII of the Laws, was widely viewed as inconsistent with institutions presented in the earlier books, Glenn Morrow apparently solved this problem, in Plato's Cretan City, and his interpretation is accepted by most recent scholars. I revisit the case for inconsistency. As interpreted by Morrow, the nocturnal council is charged with attempting to improve the laws of Magnesia, through application of philosophic knowledge. However, textual evidence demonstrates that, at one point while he was writing the work, Plato was committed to the rule of all but unchanging laws, and to the extent laws were subject to revision, the nocturnal council played no role in this process. Unlike other inconsistencies in the Laws, this is a major conflict. Although we cannot be sure how to explain it, the most likely explanation posits a change of plans on Plato's part, the philosophical implications of which he did not fully work out. Adapted from the source document.

Although at one time the nocturnal council, discussed in Book XII of the Laws, was widely viewed as inconsistent with institutions presented in the earlier books, Glenn Morrow apparently solved this problem, in Plato's Cretan City, and his interpretation is accepted by most recent scholars. I revisit the case for inconsistency. As interpreted by Morrow, the nocturnal council is charged with attempting to improve the laws of Magnesia, through application of philosophic knowledge. However, textual evidence demonstrates that, at one point while he was writing the work, Plato was committed to the rule of all but unchanging laws, and to the extent laws were subject to revision, the nocturnal council played no role in this process. Unlike other inconsistencies in the Laws, this is a major conflict. Although we cannot be sure how to explain it, the most likely explanation posits a change of plans on Plato's part, the philosophical implications of which he did not fully work out.

Klosko reviews Democratic Faith by Patick J. Deneen.

A review essay on books by (1) Henry S. Richardson, Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning about the Ends of Policy (Oxford, UK: Oxford U Press, 2002); (2) Ian Shapiro, The State of Democratic Theory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton U Press, 2003); (3) Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom (Oxford, UK: Oxford U Press, 2003); & (4) Robert E. Goodin, Reflective Democracy (Oxford, UK: Oxford U Press, 2003).