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As papers presented at recent disciplinary conferences & articles published in major political science journals reveal, the field of judicial politics is undergoing a sea of change. Variants of the social-psychological paradigm, which have long dominated thinking about law & courts, are giving way to approaches grounded in assumptions in rationality. More to the point, ever-growing numbers of scholars are now invoking the strategic account to understand judicial politics. In what follows, we investigate this "strategic revolution." We begin by providing an intellectual history of the field, with special emphasis on why judicial specialists resisted strategic analysis for so long & why they are now (re)turning to it in ever-increasing numbers. Next, we consider the ways that analysts have begun to put the strategic account to work. This is an important task, for debates are already emerging over the "best" way to invoke the account to study judicial politics. We take the position that there is no one "right" way but rather four different approaches -- all of which have the potential to provide us with important insights into law & courts. 2 Tables, 4 Figures, 156 References. Adapted from the source document.

Draws on the rational choice tradition to explain the emergence of, & changes in, social norms, arguing that the choice of which norms are enforced by a community is determined by the interests of the actors with a bargaining advantage. Social norms are therefore a by-product of strategic conflict among those seeking distributional dominance, emphasizing the importance of resource asymmetries. The effect of ideological commitment & nonmaterial preferences on bargaining over changing norms is discussed, along with the problems involved in enforcement. The power of the bargaining approach is illustrated by a case study of changes in marriage norms among the Galole Orma, a pastoral clan of Kenya's Tana River District. It is shown that the influence of cultural beliefs on both powerful & subordinate groups hampered normal enforcement, underscoring the argument that rational choice accounts of social norms incorporate both power asymmetries & distributional consequences. 35 References. J. Lindroth

The nature & implications of the political economy/rational choice approach to institutional analysis are discussed in an introduction to a collection of essays explaining social institutions (each abstracted). Institutions are characterized as either formal or informal, based on the presence of legal backing & the provision of legal authority by the state. The rational choice framework of institutional analysis allows consideration of issues such as power, social context, history, community values, ideology, & social norms. Institutions influence social outcomes by establishing the rules of social interaction, which are enforced through (1) the provision of information concerning the available choices of social actors, & (2) the threat of sanctions in the event of noncompliance. Social institutions determine social expectations & beliefs, thereby impacting social life. The insights of the contributions are briefly reviewed. T. Sevier