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Small state studies are fragmented into several disconnected streams of literature. This necessitates a more comprehensive perspective. Over the past two generations, small state studies have gone through alternating trends, all assuming a small state in being. This article brings into view other streams of literature not based on this assumption. The existence of small states cannot be taken for granted. Small states tend to go through life cycles in which they are sometimes latent, sometimes actual. Once a small state has been formed, the need for political survival demands economic sustainability as well as a foundation of an identifying coherence. Challenges arise from globalization & supranational integration, as well as from societal demands. The outcome may tend toward turbulence in some cases, stability in others. We are likely to understand these processes better in a historical, comparative perspective. 73 References. Adapted from the source document.

The article surveys and analyzes the foreign policies and relevant domestic political conditions of the Baltic states since 1918, emphasizing the period after 11 March 1990. The general argument is that small states located near a great power can choose between alliance with their more powerful neighbor, alliance with his chief rival, or some kind of neutrality. Above all, rim states must pay attention to great-power diplomacy. In the interwar years none of the Baltic states seemed to appreciate that their situation necessitated such thinking and such choices. None used the Western powers to counter-balance the Soviet Union or Germany. Only Lithuania drew on the Soviet Union as a partner. A policy of neutrality remained untried. Between the wars, what governed their foreign policies, besides their lack of appreciation of great power politics, was a concentration on their own local affairs. After March 1990, an `interregnum period' followed, with internal strife about the proper direction of foreign policy. Four phases of alternating confrontation and negotiation characterized Moscow-Baltic relations in the period up to the aborted coup. The achievement of independence in September 1991 brought a concentration on domestic concerns. Today the unintegrated Russian-speaking and Polish minorities contribute to domestic instability, which easily spills over into foreign affairs. The last section discusses the Baltic states' security policies and possible future security arrangements, accentuating the need for a subregional solution including all coastal states on the Baltic Sea.

HOW MANY DEVELPMENTS IN THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF THE BALTIC STATES AFFECT THEIR SECURITY? THIS ARTICLE TAKES A SIMPLE APPROACH. AFTER SETTING OUT A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE, IT GIVES A DESCRIPTION, THAN AN ANALYSIS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DOMESTIC FACTORS FOR BALTIC SECURITY. IT EXAMINES THE BALTIC DOMESTIC SYSTEMS, POLITICAL TRENDS TODAY, AND, AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATE. IT CONCLUDES THAT THE SOUTH-EAST BALTIC COAST MUST BECOME A MULTILATERALIZED SECURITY AREA, NO LONGER A SPHERE OF INTEREST RESERVED TO ONE POWER.

Examines political systems of and relations with minorities within each state since 1990; some focus on Russian demands that the area remain within their defense perimeter.

The article raises the question of the optimal strategy for ensuring the long-term security of small, contiguous neighbors of great powers. The main options available to the small state may be called `accommodation' and `intransigence'. The author seeks to determine whether the small state's choice makes a difference to the great power next door. One of several possible avenues to an answer is to look for observable changes in great power policy which may conceivably be attributed to the small state's policy. Thus, the author evaluates possible effects of Turkish and Norwegian accommodative policies vis-a-vis the USSR in the 1964-88 period, by comparing the Soviet deployment of ground forces near these two neighbors. Data are drawn primarily from The Military Balance. The data show different patterns over time on the two NATO flanks: In the north there is no sign of change, whereas in the south there are easily observable reductions stretching over most of Turkey's most accommodative period. The author suggests in conclusion that accommodation is probably an inappropriate choice for Norway given strategic conditions in the north, while it may have fitted the south flank well during this period.