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Pressure from the media affects the daily work of bureaucrats and induces 'media stress', with potentially critical effects on the quality of public policy. This article analyses how bureaucrats' daily work has been adapted to the media ('mediatised') and which groups of bureaucrats experience the most media-stress. Reporting the results of an original and large-scale survey (N=4,655) this article demonstrates that levels of media-stress vary among different groups of civil servants. In turn, its analysis suggests that media-stress is more pronounced in the Netherlands than in Norway, is more concentrated in the lower rungs of administrative hierarchies and is related to media pressures on organisations. By untangling the underlying logic of mediatisation and the dynamics of media-stress, this article makes an important contribution to extant scholarship and also provides a series of practical recommendations.

Scholars have argued that government agencies face a complex web of reputational concerns regarding how they are perceived by multiple audiences who prioritise different dimensions of their work. Drawing on social identity theory, we argue that civil servants are concerned about the reputation of the agency for which they work, but also about other actors in the political–administrative system. Focusing on hierarchy, socialisation, and independence, we hypothesised six possible relationships, which we tested via a multilevel analysis of a survey of more than 2,000 Norwegian agency employees. This reveals that bureaucratic reputation depends not only on how external audiences perceive the agency, but also on how agency employees perceive themselves, particularly in terms of their professional background and organisational affinity. This article therefore highlights the multiple identities of civil servants and the multifaceted aspects of reputational concern; and argues that future research should pay attention to these hitherto neglected intersections of reputation.

Political appointees from different parties from that of their minister—cross‐partisan appointees (CPAs)—are increasingly found in the core executive. Ministerial advisory scholarship has overlooked CPAs, while the coalition governance literature sees them as 'spies' and 'coalition watchdogs'. This article argues theoretically and demonstrates empirically that this conceptualization is overly limited. The empirical basis is a large‐N survey of political appointees from two Norwegian coalitions, and a qualitative follow‐up survey of CPAs. The results show that CPAs monitor on behalf of their party, provide cross‐partisan advice to their minister and perform many of the same tasks as regular partisan appointees, including exercising independent decision‐making power. In this research context, most CPAs act as coalition liaison officers who, rather than create tension and negative dynamics, contribute to building trust between coalition partners.

Political appointees from different parties from that of their minister—cross-partisan appointees (CPAs)—are increasingly found in the core executive. Ministerial advisory scholarship has overlooked CPAs, while the coalition governance literature sees them as 'spies' and 'coalition watchdogs'. This article argues theoretically and demonstrates empirically that this conceptualization is overly limited. The empirical basis is a large-N survey of political appointees from two Norwegian coalitions, and a qualitative follow-up survey of CPAs. The results show that CPAs monitor on behalf of their party, provide cross-partisan advice to their minister and perform many of the same tasks as regular partisan appointees, including exercising independent decision-making power. In this research context, most CPAs act as coalition liaison officers who, rather than create tension and negative dynamics, contribute to building trust between coalition partners. ; Norges forskningsråd 258956. ; publishedVersion

Political appointees from different parties from that of their minister—cross-partisan appointees (CPAs)—are increasingly found in the core executive. Ministerial advisory scholarship has overlooked CPAs, while the coalition governance literature sees them as 'spies' and 'coalition watchdogs'. This article argues theoretically and demonstrates empirically that this conceptualization is overly limited. The empirical basis is a large-N survey of political appointees from two Norwegian coalitions, and a qualitative follow-up survey of CPAs. The results show that CPAs monitor on behalf of their party, provide cross-partisan advice to their minister and perform many of the same tasks as regular partisan appointees, including exercising independent decision-making power. In this research context, most CPAs act as coalition liaison officers who, rather than create tension and negative dynamics, contribute to building trust between coalition partners.

Political appointees in executive government have received increased scholarly attention in recent years. However, few studies have covered non-Westminster systems, and apart from classifications that systemize variation in assignments, theorizing about appointees has been limited. Using large-N survey data, the article finds three distinct roles among political appointees in Norway: 'stand in', 'media adviser' and 'political coordinator'. The article then combines insights from research on political appointees with insights from core executive studies (CES) to explain why political appointees perform one role or another. The empirical results support the notion that roles of appointees within the core executive depend on where they sit, supporting the asymmetric power model within CES. The results also show that appointees' roles within the executive depend on their personal experience, supporting the notion of a resource exchange between ministers and their appointees in the mould of the resource-dependency perspective within CES. ; Norges forskningsråd 258956 ; acceptedVersion

Political appointees in executive government have received increased scholarly attention in recent years. However, few studies have covered non‐Westminster systems, and apart from classifications that systemize variation in assignments, theorizing about appointees has been limited. Using large‐N survey data, the article finds three distinct roles among political appointees in Norway: 'stand in', 'media adviser' and 'political coordinator'. The article then combines insights from research on political appointees with insights from core executive studies (CES) to explain why political appointees perform one role or another. The empirical results support the notion that roles of appointees within the core executive depend on where they sit, supporting the asymmetric power model within CES. The results also show that appointees' roles within the executive depend on their personal experience, supporting the notion of a resource exchange between ministers and their appointees in the mould of the resource‐dependency perspective within CES.

Den norske staten står overfor omfattende endringer. Denne antologien tar for seg aktuelle utfordringer fra ulike sektorer; innvandring og integrering, krisehåndtering, byutvikling, samferdsel, helsepolitikk og forskning. Etter forfatteres syn bør ikke forskernes deltagelse i samfunnsdebatten begrense seg til å skrive kronikker, men gi rom for å tilby forskningsbaserte forslag til hvordan man kan løse samfunnsproblemer. Omtalen er utarbeidet av BS

AbstractCommunication professionals are increasingly found within government ministries. Based on classic work on bureaucracy and recent literature on mediatization and personalization, this article develops two ideal types: the government information provider and government spin doctor. These ideals are constituted by six dimensions: recruitment criteria, values, loyalties, reputational concerns, interactions, and tasks. A study of nonpartisan communication professionals in Norwegian ministries is used to illustrate the empirical relevance of the ideal types. The analysis shows that for loyalties and reputational concerns, Norwegian communication professionals resemble the government information provider. Regarding interactions and tasks, they resemble the government spin doctor. For recruitment criteria and values, the picture is mixed. The empirical application thereby illustrates a fruitful aspect of the framework as certain configurations will bring forth inbuilt tension in communication professionals' role. The framework allows a fine‐grained approach to extend ongoing debates of appropriate and inappropriate practices of communication professionals in ministries.

Ministers increasingly rely on advisers for support and advice. In many countries, these political aides are labelled differently. Generally, they serve as close confidants to their political masters and operate in the 'shadowland' between politics and bureaucracy. Scholarship has dragged the ministerial advisers out of the dark and described their background and functions. Still, the field of scholarship has a Westminster bias, is characterized by single case studies, and remains under‐theorized. The lack of comparative focus and theoretical underpinnings can be explained by the complex nature of ministerial advisers. This introductory article suggests a definition for ministerial advisers and reviews the extant literature on these important actors. The main argument is that the extent and relevance of ministerial advisers in executive government merits integration into mainstream public administration and political science theory and research.

Ministers increasingly rely on advisers for support and advice. In many countries, these political aides are labelled differently. Generally, they serve as close confidants to their political masters and operate in the 'shadowland' between politics and bureaucracy. Scholarship has dragged the ministerial advisers out of the dark and described their background and functions. Still, the field of scholarship has a Westminster bias, is characterized by single case studies, and remains under-theorized. The lack of comparative focus and theoretical underpinnings can be explained by the complex nature of ministerial advisers. This introductory article suggests a definition for ministerial advisers and reviews the extant literature on these important actors. The main argument is that the extent and relevance of ministerial advisers in executive government merits integration into mainstream public administration and political science theory and research. ; acceptedVersion

Scholars claim that civil servants are increasingly having to engage in media management and be aware of how events are presented in the press, with this media awareness being said to threaten civil servants' traditional bureaucratic values. In this article, we argue that media awareness is unevenly spread in public bureaucracies, and rather is contingent on individual and organizational characteristics. More specifically, we present the hypotheses that media awareness depends on the amount of media related work, the amount of media attention on the organization in which they work, as well as the civil servants' fundamental views on the role of the media in society. To test the hypotheses, the article utilizes a large-N survey of civil servants in Norwegian ministries and agencies. The results show that the vast majority of civil servants care about how issues appear in the press. Further on, we find that civil servants' media awareness coexists with traditional bureaucratic values, offering some relief to scholars who fear the disruptive effects of the media in public administration. As the hypotheses suggest, we find that this media awareness is linked to civil servants' actual media-related work. However, the analysis shows that civil servants working in organizations with a lot of media attention are, in fact, are less aware of the media.

Public bureaucracies have mostly been invisible in research on political communication, but more recently, there has been an increasing interest in their communicative efforts. In this chapter, we review the literature and synthesise the scholarship on Nordic public bureaucracies in relation to political communication. Three research areas are put to the fore: 1) Mediatisation: how and to what extent bureaucracies prioritise the media and what consequences it has for activities, routines, and resource allocations across organisational contexts; 2) Reputation management: why and how bureaucracies make use of communication to build, maintain, and protect their reputation; and 3) Crisis communication: public actors' abilities to provide information and support to citizens and communities before, during, and after crises. Although highly interconnected in practice, these strands of literature have largely been three separate academic discussions. We therefore suggest that a first step to consolidate research on communication and public bureaucracies would be to combine the knowledge research has gained in terms of media management, reputation management, and crisis communication. Such an effort would provide a much broader, but also detailed, knowledge on the motives, organising, content, and consequences of public bureaucracies and their communicative efforts. ; publishedVersion