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AbstractLegislative checks give whoever wields them influence over policy making. It is argued in this article that this influence implies the ability not only to affect legislative content, but also to direct public resources toward private ends. Rational politicians should use access to checks to make themselves better off – for example, by biasing policy toward private interests or creating opportunities to draw directly from the public till. Disincentives exist only to the extent that those able to observe or block corruption do not themselves benefit from it. Political opponents thus can use checks to stymie each other, but legislative checks controlled by political allies create conditions for collusion and corruption. Testing this claim against data from a sample of 84 countries, the results presented in this article show strong support for the hypothesised relationship between institutional checks and corruption.

In this paper we consider how government quality mediates the relationship between fiscal decentralization and regional disparities. Previous work has argued that fiscal decentralization has the potential to reduce income differences across regions but that this potential may not be realized because of governance problems associated with sub-national authorities. Our empirical evidence based on a sample of 24 OECD countries over the period 1984 to 2006 lends a measure of support to this idea. We find that fiscal decentralization promotes regional convergence in high government quality settings but, worryingly, it leads to wider regional disparities in countries with poor governance. Resumen: En este artículo consideramos cómo la calidad de la gobernanza interviene en la relación entre la descentralización fiscal y las disparidades regionales. Los estudios anteriores sostienen que la descentralización fiscal tiene el potencial de reducir las diferencias de ingresos entre regiones, pero que este potencial no se logra manifestar debido a problemas de gobernanza asociados con las autoridades subnacionales. Nuestras pruebas empíricas, con base en una muestra de 24 países de la OCDE durante el período 1984 a 2006 apoyan en cierta medida esta idea. Hallamos que la descentralización fiscal fomenta la convergencia regional en escenarios con una alta calidad de gobernanza, pero que, de forma preocupante, conduce a disparidades regionales más amplias en países con una pobre gobernanza ; The authors would like to thank the participants of the Regional Studies AssociationWinter Conference 2012 and three anonymous referees for their kind and helpful comments. We would also like to acknowledge financial support from projects ECO2010-21668-C03-02 and ECO2012-31081 (Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia) as well as 2009SGR-2013 and XREPP (Direcció General de Recerca). The usual disclaimers apply

In this paper we consider how government quality mediates the relationship between fiscal decentralization and regional disparities. Previous work has argued that fiscal decentralization has the potential to reduce income differences across regions but that this potential may not be realized because of governance problems associated with sub-national authorities. Our empirical evidence based on a sample of 24 OECD countries over the period 1984 to 2006 lends a measure of support to this idea. We find that fiscal decentralization promotes regional convergence in high government quality settings but, worryingly, it leads to wider regional disparities in countries with poor governance. Resumen: En este artículo consideramos cómo la calidad de la gobernanza interviene en la relación entre la descentralización fiscal y las disparidades regionales. Los estudios anteriores sostienen que la descentralización fiscal tiene el potencial de reducir las diferencias de ingresos entre regiones, pero que este potencial no se logra manifestar debido a problemas de gobernanza asociados con las autoridades subnacionales. Nuestras pruebas empíricas, con base en una muestra de 24 países de la OCDE durante el período 1984 a 2006 apoyan en cierta medida esta idea. Hallamos que la descentralización fiscal fomenta la convergencia regional en escenarios con una alta calidad de gobernanza, pero que, de forma preocupante, conduce a disparidades regionales más amplias en países con una pobre gobernanza ; The authors would like to thank the participants of the Regional Studies AssociationWinter Conference 2012 and three anonymous referees for their kind and helpful comments. We would also like to acknowledge financial support from projects ECO2010-21668-C03-02 and ECO2012-31081 (Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia) as well as 2009SGR-2013 and XREPP (Direcció General de Recerca). The usual disclaimers apply

En el presente capítulo se analizan la estructura y evolución de las disparidades fiscales regionales en Uruguay durante el período que se extiende de 2006 a 2013. A su vez, se considera el rol de la implementación de un nuevo sistema de transferencias ecualizadoras con el objeto de lograr y consolidar un territorio con un mayor nivel de homogeneidad o cohesión fiscal de los diferentes gobiernos departamentales (GD) de Uruguay

In this paper we consider how government quality mediates the relationship between fiscal decentralization and regional disparities. Previous work has argued that fiscal decentralization has the potential to reduce income differences across regions but that this potential may not be realized because of governance problems associated with sub-national authorities. Our empirical evidence based on a sample of 24 OECD countries over the period 1984 to 2006 lends a measure of support to this idea. We find that fiscal decentralization promotes regional convergence in high government quality settings but, worryingly, it leads to wider regional disparities in countries with poor governance. Resumen: En este artículo consideramos cómo la calidad de la gobernanza interviene en la relación entre la descentralización fiscal y las disparidades regionales. Los estudios anteriores sostienen que la descentralización fiscal tiene el potencial de reducir las diferencias de ingresos entre regiones, pero que este potencial no se logra manifestar debido a problemas de gobernanza asociados con las autoridades subnacionales. Nuestras pruebas empíricas, con base en una muestra de 24 países de la OCDE durante el período 1984 a 2006 apoyan en cierta medida esta idea. Hallamos que la descentralización fiscal fomenta la convergencia regional en escenarios con una alta calidad de gobernanza, pero que, de forma preocupante, conduce a disparidades regionales más amplias en países con una pobre gobernanza ; The authors would like to thank the participants of the Regional Studies AssociationWinter Conference 2012 and three anonymous referees for their kind and helpful comments. We would also like to acknowledge financial support from projects ECO2010-21668-C03-02 and ECO2012-31081 (Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia) as well as 2009SGR-2013 and XREPP (Direcció General de Recerca). The usual disclaimers apply

The construction sector, whether privately or publicly financed, is characterized by potentially large rents and government intervention making it vulnerable to corruption. Consistent with this, both case-study and survey evidence has been provided highlighting the problem of malfeasance in this sector. In this article, we test the proposition that a bigger construction sector is likely to be inimical to clean government based on a panel of 42 countries over the period 1995-2011. We control for a range of potentially confounding variables and the expectation that corrupt public officials may favor the development of this sector because it increases the volume of rents available to them. Our empirical evidence shows that a larger construction sector will tend to increase perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain.