Suchergebnisse

This article argues that the study of political monitoring can be used to help situate the study of independent regulatory authorities (IRAs). Building upon previous work on the management of common pool resources and other literature on monitoring as a component of governance in larger systems, it looks broadly at liberal democracies' use of IRAs as monitoring mechanisms. Identifying fundamental concepts and theoretical components in the study of political monitoring, this article argues that they can be used as a lens through which policy analysts can observe and compare IRAs, and thus move beyond descriptive analysis. While focusing on monitoring, as one of the functions of IRAs, it highlights theoretical concerns about how to best institutionalise policy-implementation mechanisms, especially in the area of market interventions and the governance of public goods.

As with other areas of comparative political inquiry, analyses of political corruption must carefully negotiate around numerous methodological issues. In this article, we focus primarily on problems of operationalization & measurement of corruption. We evaluate the major examples of cross-country measures of corruption that have recently emerged & review research that has incorporated the new measures. We end with a discussion of an alternative method for the cross-national measurement & analysis of corruption, one that might also facilitate the goal of establishing universal principles & causal claims about political corruption. 2 Tables, 1 Appendix, 63 References. Adapted from the source document.

A growing literature exists on constituency service and pork barrel politics in the United States. Comparative research on an electoral connection between representatives and their constituents has been limited, generally confined to the British case. The research reported here takes an initial step in broadening comparative research on pork barrel politics beyond the American and British cases. Although a case study of the Federal Republic of Germany, this article maintains a strong comparative perspective through its analysis of different types of electoral systems - single- and multimember districts. Our analysis tests the hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, single-member district systems possess stronger incentives than multimember districts for the distributive allocation of pork barrel projects. Through a close-ended mail questionnaire of representatives of the 1983-1986 German Bundestag, this research produces significant evidence to corroborate empirically this theoretical argument. We conclude that district type affects representatives' perceptions of pork barrel allocations as a special type of constituency service.

While it has been frequently asserted that the use of courts is responsive to political and social contexts, the evidence is inconclusive at best. In the case of political context the dearth of evidence may reflect focusing on the U.S. case, where there is relatively limited variation in relevant characteristics. In the case of social context it may reflect a failure to focus on periods of substantial transition. In the present study we examine court usage in Spain between 1960 and 1980. During this period Spain experienced rapid economic growth with its attendant social change and dramatic political transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Both the movement toward democracy and social development are found to be positively linked to increases in legal mobilization.

THE AUTHORS EXAMINE COURT USAGE IN SPAIN BETWEEN 1960 AND 1980. DURING THIS PERIOD SPAIN EXPERIENCED RAPID ECONOMIC GROWTH WITH ITS ATTENDANT SOCIAL CHANGE AND DRAMATIC POLITICAL TRANSITION FROM AUTHORITARIANISM TO DEMOCRACY. BOTH THE MOVEMENT TOWARD DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT ARE FOUND TO BE POSITIVELY LINKED TO INCREASES IN LEGAL MOBILIZATION.