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AbstractIn this paper we theoretically derive an internationalRybczynski matrix. Its elements indicate the aggregate output change in a country when endowment with one or more factors in the same or another country is increased. This allows us to characterize the production structure in 11 countries of theEuropeanUnion. Starting from a baseline case with free trade in final goods only, we analyze two types of interaction between countries: international trade of intermediate inputs and internationally mobile capital.

In this paper we theoretically derive an international Rybczynski matrix. Its elements indicate the aggregate output change in a country when endowment with one or more factors in the same or another country is increased. This allows us to characterize theproduction structure in 11 countries of the European Union. Starting from a baseline case with free trade in final goods only, we analyze two types of interaction between countries: international trade of intermediate inputs and internationally mobile capital.

In the traditional model of international trade, labour market reforms in one country are often viewed as beggar-thy-neighbour policies, because they negatively affect the competitiveness and employment levels of the country's trading partners. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that this is not the case. By addressing labour market reforms in the context of intra-industry trade, this article explains how such reforms, while boosting employment, ultimately reduce a country's terms of trade, thereby benefitting the country's trading partners. The authors call for more international policy coordination to achieve optimal outcomes.

This paper characterizes analytically the optimal tariff of a large one-sector economy with monopolistic competition and firm heterogeneity in general equilibrium, thereby extending the small-country results of Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (JIE, 2009) and the homogeneous firms framework of Gros (JIE, 1987). The optimal tariff internalizes a markup distortion and a terms of trade externality. It is larger the higher the dispersion of firm-level productivities, and the bigger the country's relative size or relative average productivity. Furthermore, in the two-country Nash equilibrium, tariffs turn out to be strategic substitutes. Small or poor economies set lower Nash tariffs than large or rich ones. Lower transportation costs or smaller fixed market entry costs induce higher equilibrium tariffs and larger welfare losses relative to the case of zero tariffs. Similarly, cross-country productivity or size convergence increases the global welfare loss due to non-cooperative tariff policies. These results suggest that post WWII trends have increased the relative merits of the WTO.

This paper provides new evidence on the objectives and determinants of different typesof innovations and patents, environmental as opposed to other innovations and patents,and different variants of environmental innovations and patents. We investigate howfirm-specific and sector-specific driving forces differ by innovation type. Moreover, weoutline the functions that different innovation types have for environmental and innovationpolicies. We find that eco-innovators put relatively more attention to cost reduction, inparticular the reduction of energy and resource costs, compared to other innovators.Cost pressure and reliable, predictable and strict framework conditions of environmentalpolicy turns out to be an important driver for more incremental, firm-level eco-innovationscontributing to the diffusion of principally known technologies among firms. By contrast,more far-reaching patented eco-innovations are driven by the opportunity to create newmarkets and by government subsidies.

Does higher income cause democracy? Accounting for the dynamic nature and highpersistence of income and democracy, we find a statistically significant positive relationbetween income and democracy for a postwar period sample of up to 150 countries. Ourresults are robust across different model specifications and instrument sets.

AbstractWe propose a simple method to identify the effects of unilateral and non‐discriminatory trade policies on bilateral trade within a theoretically consistent empirical gravity model. Specifically, we argue that structural gravity estimations should be performed with data that include not only international trade flows but also intra‐national trade flows. The use of intra‐national sales allows identification of the effects of non‐discriminatory trade policies such as most favoured nation tariffs, even in the presence of exporter and importer fixed effects. A byproduct of our approach is that it can be used to recover estimates of the trade elasticity, a key parameter for quantitative trade models. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our techniques in the case of most favoured nation tariffs and "time to export" as representative non‐discriminatory determinants of trade on the importer and on the exporter side, respectively. Our methods can be extended to quantify the impact on trade of any country‐specific characteristics as well as any non‐trade policies.