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It goes without saying that American geopolitics and geostrategy are of a genuinely global nature and affect practically every region and every country. And Central Asia is no exception in this respect. America's influence there is of a multi-factoral and multi-level nature in every aspect-the political, military-strategic, economic, and ideological. From the very first days of independence, the Central Asian countries have been aware of America's influence (and pressure) in essentially every sphere. In Central Asia, America is confronted with other world centers of power (Russia, China, the EU, Iran, and other Islamic states), which explains the fairly frequent contradictions. American policy in Central Asia depends to a certain extent on Washington's relations with these states, but it is not determined by them. On the whole, Central Asia's policy is part of the U.S.'s broader Eurasian strategy, which covers the Caspian, the Caucasus, Russia, Afghanistan, the Middle East, South Asia, and China. It should also be said that America's Eurasian policy is part of Washington's much broader global strategy designed to perpetuate America's domination in the world economic and financial system and its military-strategic superiority. America is seeking greater geopolitical influence (in Eurasia among other places) and containment of potential rivals (China, the EU, and Russia), as well as struggling against so-called international terrorism (for control over the Islamic world). Central Asia is an important, but not the only, element of the U.S.'s global strategy. At the same time, it is critically important for the U.S.'s Eurasian geopolitics to establish control over Eurasia. For this reason, Central Asia's role and importance for Washington will become even greater. America's foreign policy is full of contradictions: its rational and well-balanced elements are combined with ideological approaches; presumptuous and even aggressive actions irritate the allies and provide the enemies with the chance to accuse the United States of Great Power arrogance and a unilateral approach to the world. This stems from the split in the American political establishment, which cannot be described as a group of like-minded people. Ideally, the administration should act as a closely-knit political and ideological team. The split in America's strategic community (and society) over the country's foreign policy affects U.S. conduct on the international arena to a certain extent. This contradiction has an institutional aspect as well: together with the State Department and the National Security Council, the structures directly responsible for America's foreign policy, the Congress, the media, and public opinion (through the lobbying system and NGOs) largely shape U.S. conduct abroad. In addition, from 2001, the Department of Defense acquired much more weight in foreign policy decision-making. This is only natural since the country has been de facto in a state of war since the end of 2001.

Russia occupies third place in terms of world oil supplies: it accounts for approximately 10% of the world reserves, or 27% of the oil supplies outside OPEC. In terms of oil production, the Russian Federation is on a par with Saudi Arabia, the world leader, and in terms of oil export volumes, it is securely in second place. Russia is the absolute leader in the gas sector: it accounts for approximately one third of the world's total reserves, one quarter of world production, and approximately 30% of world export, while its main gas transportation system has no analogies in terms of length and complexity. The unprecedented trends on the oil markets are having a decisive influence on the nature and rates of Russia's economic growth: oil and gas export is responsible for more than one third of the revenue going into the state treasury. In 2004, the Russian Federation accounted for 10.97% of the entire world oil production. According to the forecasts of the country's government, the export of Russian oil will reach 253 million tons in 2006 and 260 million in 2007. As a major fuel and electric energy exporter, on the deliveries of which the economy of several neighboring countries largely depends, Russia has a good opportunity to strengthen its own economic and political positions. The main feature of Russia's foreign policy lies in the fact that Moscow is using the economy (to be more precise, energy cooperation) as a powerful tool to reach its foreign policy goals. This concerns both Russia's relations with the West and with Asian countries (China and Japan). But Russia's energy strategy is making itself known to an even greater extent in relations with the CIS countries. This factor-energy policy as a geopolitical tool-directly affects the national, economic, and energy interests of the Central Asian countries.

Russia is also actively cooperating in the oil and gas industry with Kyrgyzstan. This cooperation is mainly expressed in an agreement between the Kyrgyzstan government and the Russian company Gazprom on the exploration and development of gas fields over a span of 25 years. At the beginning of 2004, Uzbekistan insisted on entering a new gas contract with Kyrgyzstan, but its conditions were tougher and less advantageous for the latter. The price of gas remained the same-42 dollars per 1,000 cubic meters, but in so doing Uzbekistan insisted on it being paid in full in hard currency, and not 50% in currency and 50% in goods as before. Taking into account its large foreign debt and state budget deficit, this contract was extremely disadvantageous for Kyrgyzstan. Since there was no other alternative Kyrgyzstan was forced to agree to essentially any conditions Uzbekistan put forward. This situation prompted the Kyrgyz leadership to look for alternative sources of gas supplies. For example, in May 2003, an Agreement on Cooperation in the Gas Sphere between Gazprom and the Kyrgyz Government for twenty-five years was signed. Gas is delivered via the existing major gas pipelines. Apparently, Gazprom is planning to deliver some of the gas it purchases in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to Kyrgyzstan.

Der Autor, Erster Botschaftssekretär Kasachstans in Deutschland, stellt im ersten Teil seines Beitrags ausführlich die Entwicklung der Beziehungen Kasachstans zu den USA ab 1991 und im zweiten Teil ebenso detailliert die Beziehungen Kasachstans zur Europäischen Union dar. Während die westlichen Interessen im wesentlichen kongruent sind, haben die Unterstützung des Aufbaus demokratischer Institutionen und einer funktionierenden Marktwirtschaft in Kasachstan für die Europäer strategische, für die US-Amerikaner hingegen eher taktische Bedeutung. Im ersten Teil des Beitrags wird der Frage der Nuklearwaffen besonderes Augenmerk geschenkt. (BIOst-Mrk)

Der Autor beleuchtet die ethnopolitischen Dimensionen des Bürgerkriegs in Afghanistan, analysiert die Rolle der Taliban vor diesem Hintergrund und geht auf die Haltung einzelner ausländischer Staaten zu den Taliban und deren Politik ein. Für die zentralasiatischen Republiken bedeuten die Erfolge der Taliban im benachbarten Afghanistan die Gefahr der "Afghanisierung" ihrer innenpolitischen Situation, d.h. des Zerfalls entlang ethnischer Linien. Weitere Bedrohungen für die zentralasiatischen Republiken stellen das mögliche lawinenhafte Anwachsen von Migrationsströmen im Gefolge zunehmender militärischer Konflikte in Afghanistan und die Ausweitung des Drogenhandels dar. (BIOst-Mrk)