Fiscal stimulus and labor market policies in Europe
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 37, Heft 3, S. 483-499
ISSN: 0165-1889
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In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 37, Heft 3, S. 483-499
ISSN: 0165-1889
In the traditional model of international trade, labour market reforms in one country are often viewed as beggar-thy-neighbour policies, because they negatively affect the competitiveness and employment levels of the country's trading partners. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that this is not the case. By addressing labour market reforms in the context of intra-industry trade, this article explains how such reforms, while boosting employment, ultimately reduce a country's terms of trade, thereby benefitting the country's trading partners. The authors call for more international policy coordination to achieve optimal outcomes.
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Several contributions have recently assessed the size of fiscal multipliers both in RBC models and New Keynesian models. None of the studies considers a model with frictional labour markets which is a crucial element, particularly at times in which much of the fiscal stimulus has been directed toward labour market measures. We use an open economy model (more specifically, a currency area calibrated to the European Monetary Union) with labour market frictions in the form of labour turnover costs and workers' heterogeneity to measure fiscal multipliers. We compute short and long run multipliers and open economy spillovers for five types of fiscal packages: pure demand stimuli and consumption tax cuts return very small multipliers; income tax cuts and hiring subsidies deliver larger multipliers, as they reduce distortions in sclerotic labour markets; short-time work (German Kurzarbeit) returns negative short-run multipliers, but stabilises employment. Our model highlights a novel dimension through which multipliers operate, namely the labour demand stimulus which occurs in a model with non-walrasian labour markets.
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We study the design of optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model with labor turnover costs in which wages are set according to a right to manage bargaining where the firms' counterpart is given by currently employed workers. Our model captures well the salient features of European labor market, as it leads to sclerotic dynamics of worker flows. The coexistence of those types of labor market frictions alongside with sticky prices gives rise to a non-trivial trade-off for the monetary authority. In this framework, firms and current employees extract rents and the policy maker finds it optimal to use state contingent inflation taxes/subsidies to smooth those rents. Hence, in the optimal Ramsey plan, inflation deviates from zero and the optimal volatility of inflation is an increasing function of firing costs. The optimal rule should react to employment alongside inflation.
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We study the design of optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model with labor turnover costs in which wages are set according to a right to manage bargaining where the firms' counterpart is given by currently employed workers. Our model captures well the salient features of European labor market, as it leads to sclerotic dynamics of worker flows. The coexistence of those types of labor market frictions alongside with sticky prices gives rise to a non-trivial trade-off for the monetary authority. In this framework, firms and current employees extract rents and the policy maker finds it optimal to use state contingent inflation taxes/subsidies to smooth those rents. Hence, in the optimal Ramsey plan, inflation deviates from zero and the optimal volatility of inflation is an increasing function of firing costs. The optimal rule should react to employment alongside inflation.
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 4849
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 4322
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In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 94, S. 142-189
ISSN: 0165-1889
This paper characterizes long-run and short-run optimal fiscal policy in the labor selection framework. In a calibrated non-Ramsey decentralized equilibrium, labor market volatility is inefficient. Keeping fixed the structural parameters, the Ramsey government achieves efficient labor market volatility; doing so requires labor-income tax volatility that is orders of magnitude larger than the "tax-smoothing" results based on Walrasian labor markets, but a few times smaller than the results based on search and matching markets. We analytically characterize selection-model-consistent wedges and ine ciencies in order to understand optimal tax volatility.
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This paper characterizes long-run and short-run optimal fiscal policy in the labor selection framework. In a calibrated non-Ramsey decentralized equilibrium, labor market volatility is inefficient. Keeping fixed the structural parameters, the Ramsey government achieves efficient labor market volatility; doing so requires labor-income tax volatility that is orders of magnitude larger than the "tax-smoothing" results based on Walrasian labor markets, but a few times smaller than the results based on search and matching markets. We analytically characterize selection-model-consistent wedges and inefficiencies in order to understand optimal tax volatility.
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This paper characterizes long-run and short-run optimal fiscal policy in the labor selection framework. In a calibrated non-Ramsey decentralized equilibrium, labor market volatility is inefficient. Keeping fixed the structural parameters, the Ramsey government achieves efficient labor market volatility; doing so requires labor-income tax volatility that is orders of magnitude larger than the "tax-smoothing" results based on Walrasian labor markets, but a few times smaller than the results based on search and matching markets. We analytically characterize selection-model-consistent wedges and inefficiencies in order to understand optimal tax volatility.
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 7120
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This paper characterizes long-run and short-run optimal fiscal policy in the labor selection framework. In a calibrated non-Ramsey decentralized equilibrium, labor market volatility is inefficient. Keeping fixed the structural parameters, the Ramsey government achieves efficient labor market volatility; doing so requires labor-income tax volatility that is orders of magnitude larger than the tax-smoothing results based on Walrasian labor markets, but a few times smaller than the results based on search and matching markets. We analytically characterize selection-modelconsistent wedges and inefficiencies in order to understand optimal tax volatility.
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In: The Canadian journal of economics: the journal of the Canadian Economics Association = Revue canadienne d'économique, Band 48, Heft 5, S. 1917-1943
ISSN: 1540-5982
AbstractRecent theoretical literature studies how labour market reforms in one country can affect labour market outcomes in other countries, thereby rationalizing widely held policy beliefs and empirical evidence. But what is the quantitative relevance of such spillover effects? This paper combines two recent workhorse models: the canonical search‐and‐matching framework and the heterogeneous firms international trade model. Qualitatively, the framework confirms that labour market reforms in one country benefit its trading partners, replicating the stylized facts. However, when wages are bargained flexibly, the model quantitatively underestimates the correlation of structural unemployment rates across countries. Introducing some degree of real wage rigidity remedies this problem.
In: Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, Band 48, Heft 5, S. 1917-1943
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