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A number of theorists have recently proposed versions of the 'policy cycle' as a framework for understanding contemporary public policy processes. This has provoked critical responses from writers who dismiss the policy cycle as an inaccurate general description of public policy and an impractical normative model for decision making. In this article, I use an historical and interpretative method to explore the senses in which a policy cycle coheres with the experiences and values of policy analysts working in contemporary bureaucratic contexts. Drawing on Radin's notion of post-Machiavellian policy analysis, I suggest that the policy cycle has the potential to capture some of the fundamental features of current policy formulation, including the existence of numerous decision makers, the high degree of competition and contestability among sources of policy advice, and the substantial impact of previous policies on new efforts. Through interviews with senior Australian public servants, I argue that the model should not be interpreted as a rigorous, formulistic guide to the policy process. I also suggest that writers must be careful to distinguish between normative and descriptive uses of the policy cycle, and that more needs to be done to clarify how the policy cycle can improve policy making in contexts where political representatives do not give bureaucrats room to undertake good analytical work.

A number of theorists have recently proposed versions of the 'policy cycle' as a framework for understanding contemporary public policy processes. This has provoked critical responses from writers who dismiss the policy cycle as an inaccurate general description of public policy and an impractical normative model for decision making. In this article, I use an historical and interpretative method to explore the senses in which a policy cycle coheres with the experiences and values of policy analysts working in contemporary bureaucratic contexts. Drawing on Radin's notion of post-Machiavellian policy analysis, I suggest that the policy cycle has the potential to capture some of the fundamental features of current policy formulation, including the existence of numerous decision makers, the high degree of competition and contestability among sources of policy advice, and the substantial impact of previous policies on new efforts. Through interviews with senior Australian public servants, I argue that the model should not be interpreted as a rigorous, formulistic guide to the policy process. I also suggest that writers must be careful to distinguish between normative and descriptive uses of the policy cycle, and that more needs to be done to clarify how the policy cycle can improve policy making in contexts where political representatives do not give bureaucrats room to undertake good analytical work.

What impact do income and other demographic factors have on a voter's partisan choice? Using post-election surveys of 14,000 voters in 10 Australian elections between 1966 and 2001, I explore the impact that individual, local, and national factors have on voters' decisions. In these 10 elections, the poor, foreign-born, younger voters, voters born since 1950, men, and those who are unmarried are more likely to be left-wing. Over the past 35 years, the partisan gap between men and women has closed, but the partisan gap has widened on three dimensions: between young and old; between rich and poor; and between native-born and foreign-born. At a neighborhood level, I find that, controlling for a respondent's own characteristics, and instrumenting for neighborhood characteristics, voters who live in richer neighborhoods are more likely to be right-wing, while those in more ethnically diverse or unequal neighborhoods are more likely to be left-wing. Controlling for incumbency, macroeconomic factors do not seem to affect partisan preferences - Australian voters apparently regard both major parties as equally capable of governing in booms and busts.

Which electorates receive targeted funding, and does targeted funding swing votes? To answer these questions, I analyze four discretionary programs funded by the Australian federal government during the 2001-2004 election cycle. Controlling for relevant demographic characteristics of the electorate, those electorates held by the governing coalition received a larger share of discretionary funding, and a larger number of program grants. Among government seats, funding does not appear to have been directed towards those that were more marginal. More discretionary funding-particularly on road-building-was associated with a larger swing towards the government in the 2004 election.

Which electorates receive targeted funding, and does targeted funding swing votes? To answer these questions, I analyze four discretionary programs funded by the Australian federal government during the 2001-2004 election cycle. Controlling for relevant demographic characteristics of the electorate, those electorates held by the governing coalition received a larger share of discretionary funding, and a larger number of program grants. Among government seats, funding does not appear to have been directed towards those that were more marginal. More discretionary funding-particularly on road-building-was associated with a larger swing towards the government in the 2004 election.

What impact do income and other demographic factors have on a voter's partisan choice? Using post-election surveys of 14,000 voters in 10 Australian elections between 1966 and 2001, I explore the impact that individual, local, and national factors have on voters' decisions. In these 10 elections, the poor, foreign-born, younger voters, voters born since 1950, men, and those who are unmarried are more likely to be left-wing. Over the past 35 years, the partisan gap between men and women has closed, but the partisan gap has widened on three dimensions: between young and old; between rich and poor; and between native-born and foreign-born. At a neighborhood level, I find that, controlling for a respondent's own characteristics, and instrumenting for neighborhood characteristics, voters who live in richer neighborhoods are more likely to be right-wing, while those in more ethnically diverse or unequal neighborhoods are more likely to be left-wing. Controlling for incumbency, macroeconomic factors do not seem to affect partisan preferences - Australian voters apparently regard both major parties as equally capable of governing in booms and busts.

Abstract
How are hourly wages affected by the Earned Income Tax Credit? Using variation in state EITC supplements, I find that a 10 percent increase in the generosity of the EITC is associated with a 5 percent fall in the wages of high school dropouts and a 2 percent fall in the wages of those with only a high school diploma, while having no effect on the wages of college graduates. Given the large increase in labor supply induced by the EITC, this is consistent with most reasonable estimates of the elasticity of labor demand. Although workers with children receive a much larger EITC than childless workers, and the effect of the credit on labor force participation is larger for those with children, the hourly wages of both groups are similarly affected by an EITC increase. As a check on this strategy, I also use federal variation in the EITC across gender-age-education groups, and find that those demographic groups that received the largest EITC increases also experienced a drop in their hourly wages, relative to other groups.

Each year, the Australian taxation system requires two-thirds of the adult population to spend an average of eight hours (Tran-Nam et al, 2000) telling the government basically what it already knows. Much of the information in our tax returns is already held in government databanks — to a large extent, the current process involves us producing figures that are then cross-checked against them. While the administrative burden of small business regulations has been accorded serious attention in policy debates, less notice has been taken of the administrative burden that falls on individual taxpayers. This article argues that by following the example of New Zealand, we could significantly reduce the administrative burden on ordinary taxpayers.

Each year, the Australian taxation system requires two-thirds of the adult population to spend an average of eight hours (Tran-Nam et al, 2000) telling the government basically what it already knows. Much of the information in our tax returns is already held in government databanks — to a large extent, the current process involves us producing figures that are then cross-checked against them. While the administrative burden of small business regulations has been accorded serious attention in policy debates, less notice has been taken of the administrative burden that falls on individual taxpayers. This article argues that by following the example of New Zealand, we could significantly reduce the administrative burden on ordinary taxpayers.