Understanding Partisan Cue Receptivity: Tests of Predictions from the Bounded Rationality and Expressive Utility Perspectives
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 82, Heft 3, S. 1061-1077
ISSN: 1468-2508
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In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 82, Heft 3, S. 1061-1077
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: The public opinion quarterly: POQ, Band 83, Heft 3, S. 584-597
ISSN: 1537-5331
Partisan affective polarization is believed, by some, to stem from vitriolic elite political discourse. We explore this account by replicating several 2014 studies that examine partisan prejudice. Despite claims of elevated partisan affective polarization from pundits, this extensive replication offers no evidence of an increase in the public's partisan prejudice between 2014 and 2017. Divides in feeling thermometer ratings of the two political parties remained stable, and there was no overall increase in measures of partisan prejudice between periods. This is consistent with results from the 2012 and 2016 ANES. Moreover, the most affectively polarized members of the public became no more likely to hold prejudicial attitudes toward the other party. Despite an intervening campaign with elevated elite hostility and rampant postelection discord, the limits on partisan prejudice identified in prior research remain in place. This stability is important for understanding the nature and malleability of partisan affect.
In: British journal of political science, Band 49, Heft 3, S. 1045-1069
ISSN: 1469-2112
The right–left dimension is ubiquitous in politics, but prior perspectives provide conflicting accounts of whether cultural and economic attitudes are typically aligned on this dimension within mass publics around the world. Using survey data from ninety-nine nations, this study finds not only that right–left attitude organization is uncommon, but that it is more common for culturally and economically right-wing attitudes to correlatenegativelywith each other, an attitude structure reflecting a contrast between desires for cultural and economicprotection vs. freedom. This article examines where, among whom and why protection–freedom attitude organization outweighs right–left attitude organization, and discusses the implications for the psychological bases of ideology, quality of democratic representation and the rise of extreme right politics in the West.
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 707, Heft 1, S. 189-207
ISSN: 1552-3349
News outlets are increasingly nationalizing their presentation of news stories, framing and presenting local news in a broad national context. We investigate how supply-side and curation-side factors of the news cycle contribute to the nationalization of news coverage. Through the computational analysis of 1.05 million Google news results on four days in July–August 2020, that corresponded to 1,581 news stories published on the George Floyd protests in Portland, Oregon, and Kenosha, Wisconsin, we examine the relationship between the nationalization of news coverage, stories' search rank in Google News, and the geographic distance between the news event and the stories' reading audience. Further, we explore the role of Google News in curating locally focused news. Our findings help to map the media ecosystem in a digital age, highlighting the influence of algorithmic power in politics and showing that excessive circulation of national news may have a profound negative impact on news diversity and social justice.
In: Jaidka, K., Fischer, S., Lelkes, Y., Wang, Y. (In Press). News Nationalization in a Digital Age: An examination of how local protests are covered and curated online. Forthcoming in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
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The present study explores the dramatic projection of one's own views onto those of Jesus among conservative and liberal American Christians. In a large-scale survey, the relevant views that each group attributed to a contemporary Jesus differed almost as much as their own views. Despite such dissonance-reducing projection, however, conservatives acknowledged the relevant discrepancy with regard to "fellowship" issues (e.g., taxation to reduce economic inequality and treatment of immigrants) and liberals acknowledged the relevant discrepancy with regard to "morality" issues (e.g., abortion and gay marriage). However, conservatives also claimed that a contemporary Jesus would be even more conservative than themselves on the former issues whereas liberals claimed that Jesus would be even more liberal than themselves on the latter issues. Further reducing potential dissonance, liberal and conservative Christians differed markedly in the types of issues they claimed to be more central to their faith. A concluding discussion considers the relationship between individual motivational processes and more social processes that may underlie the present findings, as well as implications for contemporary social and political conflict.
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In: Political psychology: journal of the International Society of Political Psychology
ISSN: 1467-9221
AbstractPolitical psychologists often examine the influence of psychological dispositions on political attitudes. Central to this field is the ideological asymmetry hypothesis (IAH), which asserts significant psychological differences between conservatives and liberals. According to the IAH, conservatives tend to exhibit greater resistance to change, a stronger inclination to uphold existing social systems, and heightened sensitivity to threats and uncertainty compared with their liberal counterparts. Our review and reanalysis, however, question the empirical strength of the IAH. We expose major concerns regarding the construct validity of the psychological dispositions and political attitudes traditionally measured. Furthermore, our research reveals that the internal validity of these studies is often compromised by endogeneity and selection biases. External and statistical validity issues are also evident, with many findings relying on small effect sizes derived from nonrepresentative student populations. Collectively, these data offer scant support for the IAH, indicating that simply amassing similar data is unlikely to clarify the validity of the hypothesis. We suggest a more intricate causal model that addresses the intricate dynamics between psychological dispositions and political attitudes. This model considers the bidirectional nature of these relationships and the moderating roles of individual and situational variables. In conclusion, we call for developing more sophisticated theories and rigorous research methodologies to enhance our comprehension of the psychological underpinnings of political ideology.
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Political theorists have long argued that enlarging the political sphere to include a greater diversity of interests would cure the ills of factions in a pluralistic society. While the scope of politics has expanded dramatically over the past 75 y, polarization is markedly worse. Motivated by this paradox, we take a bottom–up approach to explore how partisan individual-level dynamics in a diverse (multidimensional) issue space can shape collective-level factionalization via an emergent dimensionality reduction. We extend a model of cultural evolution grounded in evolutionary game theory, in which individuals accumulate benefits through pairwise interactions and imitate (or learn) the strategies of successful others. The degree of partisanship determines the likelihood of learning from individuals of the opposite party. This approach captures the coupling between individual behavior, partisan-mediated opinion dynamics, and an interaction network that changes endogenously according to the evolving interests of individuals. We find that while expanding the diversity of interests can indeed improve both individual and collective outcomes, increasingly high partisan bias promotes a reduction in issue dimensionality via party-based assortment that leads to increasing polarization. When party bias becomes extreme, it also boosts interindividual cooperation, thereby further entrenching extreme polarization and creating a tug-of-war between individual cooperation and societal cohesion. These dangers of extreme partisanship are highest when individuals' interests and opinions are heavily shaped by peers and there is little independent exploration. Overall, our findings highlight the urgency to study polarization in a coupled, multilevel context.
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In: Perspectives on politics, Band 20, Heft 3, S. 808-827
ISSN: 1541-0986
Recent events have raised concern about potential threats to democracy within Western countries. If Western citizens who are open to authoritarian governance share a common set of political preferences, then authoritarian elites can attract mass coalitions that are willing to subvert democracy to achieve shared ideological goals. With this in mind, we explored which ideological groups are most open to authoritarian governance within Western general publics using World Values Survey data from fourteen Western democracies and three recent Latin American Public Opinion Project samples from Canada and the United States. Two key findings emerged. First, cultural conservatism was consistently associated with openness to authoritarian governance. Second, within half of the democracies studied, including all of the English-speaking ones, Western citizens holding a protection-based attitude package—combining cultural conservatism with left economic attitudes—were the most open to authoritarian governance. Within other countries, protection-based and consistently right-wing attitude packages were associated with similarly high levels of openness to authoritarian governance. We discuss implications for radical right populism and the possibility of splitting potentially undemocratic mass coalitions along economic lines.
In: Annual Review of Political Science, Band 22, S. 129-146
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In: Journalism & mass communication quarterly: JMCQ, Band 94, Heft 3, S. 833-861
ISSN: 2161-430X
We examine three under-studied factors in selective exposure research. Linking issue publics and motivated reasoning literatures, we argue that selectivity patterns depend on (a) whether an individual is an issue public member; (b) the availability of balanced, pro-, and counter-attitudinal content; and (c) the evidence for a message claim (numerical vs. narrative). Using an online experiment ( N = 560), we track information selection about climate change and health care. Most notably, on both issues, issue publics selected more balanced content with numerical evidence, compared with non-issue publics. We discuss the implications of our findings for the selective exposure literature.
Using a general model of opinion dynamics, we conduct a systematic investigation of key mechanisms driving elite polarization in the United States. We demonstrate that the self-reinforcing nature of elite-level processes can explain this polarization, with voter preferences accounting for its asymmetric nature. Our analysis suggests that subtle differences in the frequency and amplitude with which public opinion shifts left and right over time may have a differential effect on the self-reinforcing processes of elites, causing Republicans to polarize more quickly than Democrats. We find that as self-reinforcement approaches a critical threshold, polarization speeds up. Republicans appear to have crossed that threshold while Democrats are currently approaching it.
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In: Jaidka, Kokil and Zhou, Alvin and Lelkes, Yphtach and Egelhofer, Jana Laura and Lecheler, Sophie (2021). Beyond anonymity: Social identifiability with personal anonymity improves social media discussion quality (September 30, 2021). Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication. Available at SSRN:
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In: Annual review of political science, Band 22, Heft 1, S. 129-146
ISSN: 1545-1577
While previously polarization was primarily seen only in issue-based terms, a new type of division has emerged in the mass public in recent years: Ordinary Americans increasingly dislike and distrust those from the other party. Democrats and Republicans both say that the other party's members are hypocritical, selfish, and closed-minded, and they are unwilling to socialize across party lines. This phenomenon of animosity between the parties is known as affective polarization. We trace its origins to the power of partisanship as a social identity, and explain the factors that intensify partisan animus. We also explore the consequences of affective polarization, highlighting how partisan affect influences attitudes and behaviors well outside the political sphere. Finally, we discuss strategies that might mitigate partisan discord and conclude with suggestions for future work.