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China and the US both recognise that an armed conflict between them would include cyber warfare. But there is a curious and risky failure to connect the tactical military advantages of cyber attacks with the strategic hazards. (Survival / SWP)

Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Preface -- Contents -- Figures and Tables -- Summary -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Chapter One: Introduction and Research Methodology -- Chapter Two: Characteristics of the Black Market -- Structure -- Participants -- Business Conduits -- Language -- Products -- Pricing -- Reliability and Integrity -- Sensitivity to External Events -- Resilience -- Chapter Three: The Black Market and Botnets -- Sophistication -- Cost Trends Over Time -- Chapter Four: Zero-Day Vulnerabilities in the Black and Gray Markets -- Participants and Structure -- Prices -- Trends for the Zero-Day Market -- Chapter Five: Are Hacker Black Markets Mature? -- Chapter Six: Projections and Predictions for the Black Market -- Most-Agreed-Upon Projections and Predictions -- Agreed-Upon Projections and Predictions for Shifts in Targets -- Agreed-Upon Projections and Predictions for Shifts in Attack Characteristics -- Agreed-Upon Projections and Predictions for Shifts in Participants -- Contested Projections and Predictions -- Chapter Seven: Conclusions -- Chapter Eight: For Future Research -- Appendixes -- A. Text of the Black Market Timeline -- B. Glossary -- Bibliography -- Selected Interviews and Personal Communications.

For its operational planning and budget programming, the Department of Defense (DoD) needs frequent access to current, detailed data on authorized force structures for all the services. Having users aggregate this information themselves was difficult, time consuming, and error prone. Hence, DoD launched the Global Force Management Data Initiative (GFM DI). While most of the data from the GFM DI are unclassified, the fact that it facilitates data aggregation raised concerns about what a potential adversary might be able to do with access to it and whether it would be better to classify such data and store it exclusively on the secure network. The authors address this question by looking at why material should or should not be classified, concluding that classification is warranted only (1) if it reduces the amount of information available to adversaries, (2) if the information kept from adversaries would tell them something they did not know, (3) if they could make better decisions based on this information, and (4) if such decisions would harm the United States. Using this framework, the authors balance the risks GFM DI poses against the costs to DoD of not having this information readily available to its own analysts. The authors conclude that overall classification is not necessary but suggest that some limited subsets may warrant additional protection

Al Qaeda, the jihadist network personified by Osama bin laden, seeks a restored caliphate free of Western influence. It uses terror as its means. But how does terrorism serve the ends of al Qaeda? Understanding its strategic logic might suggest what U.S. targets it may seek to strike and why. This monograph posits four hypotheses to link means and ends. The coercion hypothesis suggests that terrorists are interested in causing pain, notably casualties, to frighten the United States into pursuing favorable policies (e.g., withdrawing from the Islamic world). The damage hypothesis posits that te

DBK alone is meaningless. Military relevance comes from the ability to hit what you can see. To do this it is necessary to analyze the synergy of DBK and a new class of autonomous weapons in a canonical scenario -- what might have occurred if Saddam Hussein's lunge in October 1994 had not stopped short of the Kuwait border. Although DBK can deter, the assumption in this case is that it did not; the issue is whether DBK mated to autonomous weapons can let the United States win in a timely manner, without major deployment or without having to buy new platforms. Autonomous weapons -- sensor-fuzed weapons (SFW), brilliant anti-tank submunition (BAT) and wide-area munitions (WAM) -- are those needing far less human guidance than earlier weapons and promising a high Pk if placed within range.

It is still easy to underestimate how much the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War?and then the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001?transformed the task of American foreign and defense policymaking. In place of predictability (if a sometimes terrifying predictability), the world is now very unpredictable. In place of a single overriding threat and benchmark by which all else could be measured, a number of possible threats have arisen, not all of them states. In place of force-on-force engagements, U.S. defense planners have to assume "asymmetric" threats?ways not to