Suchergebnisse

Following spatial choice theory and MAP methodology, we employ the data drawn from recent nationwide public opinion surveys to probe the latent political choice space in American political competition. Our analyses demonstrate that, in addition to the traditional left–right ideology continuum, there is a second distinct dimension in American political choice space. More importantly, the results from our regression analyses suggest that the second dimension seems to be driven by a cleavage among different reform prospects, ranging from low-politics reformism, to politics-as-usual approach, to high-politics style of change.

Despite the increasing interest in policy agenda research in recent years, very few studies have focused their attention on the relevant processes at the local level. Drawing on agenda‐setting research, particularly Kingdon's multiple‐streams framework, this study examines the key forces and factors, as well as their relative importance, in local agenda setting, problem identification, and alternative policy selection. Data are collected from 271 in‐depth interviews with local policy stakeholders in three U.S. Gulf Coast areas. Interview materials are coded using a protocol focused on capturing stakeholders' perceptions of the key elements and forces in local policy dynamics. Our interview data indicate that (i) governmental actors and various interest groups have relatively more influence in shaping local agendas than the general public, experts, and election‐related actors, while the mass media are found to have little agenda‐setting power in local policy processes; (ii) budgetary consideration and various forms of feedback to local government are more important than objective problem indicators and focusing events in setting local policy priorities; (iii) policy alternatives that are deemed compatible with existing policies and regulations are more likely to be selected than those relying on other criteria such as technical feasibility, value acceptability, and future constraints; and (iv) consensus and coalition building is perceived as the most important political factor in local policy processes. Limitations of our study and recommendations for future research are discussed in the concluding section.

To what degree are Chinese citizens concerned about the seriousness of global warming and climate change (GWCC) and what are the key factors that shape their concern? Drawing theoretical insights from extant literature and using recent data from a national representative public survey (N = 3,748) and provincial environmental and economic statistics, this study, the first of its kind, examines the variations and determinants of Chinese GWCC concern. Our data show that in China, compared to other countries, average public concern about GWCC is relatively low, and concern varies greatly among Chinese citizens, across different provinces and between coastal and inland areas. Statistical analyses reveal that the levels of Chinese GWCC concern are significantly influenced by individual sociodemographic characteristics, personal post-materialist values, and regional economic dependency on carbon-intensive industries. Specifically, women and younger Chinese with greater post-materialist values are more concerned about GWCC than their counterparts, and citizens from provinces with higher economic dependency on carbon-intensive industries tend to be less concerned about GWCC than people from provinces with lower carbon dependency. We discuss key policy implications and make suggestions for future research in the conclusion. (China Q/GIGA)

AbstractRecollection bias (RB) refers to the phenomenon whereby after an adverse event people report that their risk assessment about a similar future event is presently no higher than their recollection of their pre‐event risk assessment. While previous research has outlined this theoretical construct and generated important empirical findings, there were some limitations. We design and employ a new national representative survey to address these limitations in this study. We examine the existence and persistence of RB among the general public in the context of a number of domestic and international terrorist attacks. We further examine the socioeconomic and political base of RB and the influences of RB on a wide range of citizens' counterterrorism policy preferences. Our data analyses reveal strong evidence showing the occurrence of RB and its persistence across various forms of terrorism risk. With regard to the socioeconomic and political base, we find that females, older people, political conservatives, and Republicans are less likely to be subject to RB. For the effects of RB on public counterterrorism policy preferences, our analyses demonstrate that this bias significantly dampens public support for a wide range of preventive policy measures and government anti‐terrorism spending. Overall, our study, based on a national representative sample and an extended survey design, provides robust evidence of RB in terrorism risk assessment, and adds further evidence to support the idea that RB is likely a generalizable phenomenon. Implications and suggestions for future research are discussed in the conclusion.

Drawing on past literature and using data from a two‐wave survey, we expand existing research to examine how individual social‐economic‐political characteristics and psychometric factors shape citizens' terrorism risk perception, and how such risk perception and citizens' perception of government competence affect policy preference for government counterterrorism spending. Using the two‐wave panel data, we also assess whether there is decay over time in the public's overall risk perception and in their overall policy preference for counterterrorism spending. We further examine the key factors driving changes between the two waves in individual respondents' risk perception and spending preference. Results reveal that risk perception is influenced by both social‐economic‐political characteristics and psychometric factors, with the latter showing stronger predictive power, and that higher levels of risk perception and greater perceived government competence lead to stronger support for counterterrorism spending. We find no significant decay between the two waves in either the overall level of risk perception or the overall level of spending preference, but at the individual level, changes in risk perception are positively associated with changes in psychometric variables, and changes in spending preference are predicted by changes in perceived risk and changes in perceived government competence.

With the recent of exposure of intelligence gathering by government agencies, public trust in government has suffered yet another blow. But are the levels of public trust in government reflected by trust in specific agencies? Using the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as a case study, Scott E. Robinson, Xinsheng Liu, James W. Stoutenborough, and Arnold Vedlitz find that members of the public make judgments about the trustworthiness of individual agencies that can differ from their feelings of trust in government. They also find that those that pay closer attention to issues of homeland security trust the DHS to a greater extent.

Research reveals that levels of reported trust in government are at a relatively low level-among the lowest in the period studied. At the same time, reported approval for specific administrative agencies varies widely, with some agencies receiving little support and others a great deal. This raises an important question: what factors drive trust in specific agencies? This article investigates the question in relation to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). We find that reported assessments of DHS are driven by political attitudes, policy salience, religiosity, and demographic characteristics, even when controlling for trust in government in general. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractPublic trust in government agencies plays an important role in the formation of public opinion about public policy issues. However, the association between public trust in regulatory agencies and public support for policy development in emergent biotechnologies such as gene drive is not well understood. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are tasked with coordinating and regulating biotechnology. Drawing on past literature, this study examines how public trust in these federal agencies is associated with public opinion on various options for gene drive policy. Using data from a nationally representative public opinion survey (n = 1220) conducted in 2021, our statistical analyses show that respondents who report higher levels of trust in regulatory agencies are more likely to support policy proposals that promote gene drive research and ultimately, may lead to regulatory policies that allow gene drive to be researched and employed to manage agricultural pests, establishing a pathway for scientists, developers, producers, and consumers alike to realize the benefits of this technology.

AbstractWith limited understanding of most new biotechnologies, how do citizens form their opinion and what factors influence their attitudes about these innovations? In this study, we use gene drive biotechnology in agricultural pest management as an example and theoretically propose that given low levels of knowledge and awareness, citizens' acceptance of, or opposition to, gene drive is significantly shaped by two predisposition factors: individuals' general orientation toward science and technology, and their specific benefit‐risk assessment frame. Empirically, we employ data collected from a recent US nationally representative public opinion survey (N = 1220) and conduct statistical analyses to test the hypotheses derived from our theoretical expectations. Our statistical analyses, based on various model specifications and controlling for individual‐level covariates and state‐fixed effects, show that citizens with a more favorable general orientation toward science and technology are more likely to accept gene drive. Our data analyses also demonstrate that citizens' specific gene drive assessment frame—consisting of a potential benefit dimension and a potential risk dimension, significantly shapes their attitudes as well—specifically, people emphasizing more on the benefit dimension are more likely to accept gene drive, whereas those who place more importance on the risk dimension tend to oppose it. We discuss contributions of our study and make suggestions for future research in the conclusion.