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Behavioural economics is helping illuminate the limits of rational individual choice. At the same time, even as research identifies failures in rationality, policy must inquire about the possibility and legitimacy of government intervention. In 'Nudging' Healthy Lifestyles: The UK Experiments with the Behavioural Alternative to Regulation and the Market, Adam Burgess critically describes the introduction of behavioural approaches into UK policy making. In particular, Burgess is concerned with the wholesale adoption of nudge-style programmes to promote healthier living among citizens. Unsurprisingly, the UK developments find equivalent developments in the United States. In January 2009, President Barack Obama suggested that "the principles governing regulation … be revisited." Envisioning a 'behavioural dream team' of economists and psychologists to help lead the way, President Obama appointed Cass Sunstein, the co-author of Nudge, as Administrator of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.1 President Obama further ordered the US Office of Management and Budget to "clarify the role of the behavioral sciences in formulating regulatory policy." The parallels between the countries are striking. The new UK leadership has consulted with Nudge's other co-author, Richard Thaler. The new leadership has guided top administrators to read behavioural research and a "Behavioural Insight Team" has been newly formed within the Prime Minister's Cabinet Office. More operationally, each of the governments has adopted initiatives to nudge citizens to better behaviour, physically and financially.

AbstractSocial enforcement, the decentralized action by organizational actors of monitoring, identifying, and reporting legal violations, is widely recognized as a key factor in ensuring good governance. This article reports on an experimental survey conducted in the US and Israel examining the behavior of individuals when confronting workplace unlawful conduct. The study provides novel insights into the relationships between state based, organization based, and employee based enforcement. It finds that the likelihood and the manner of reporting will vary depending on the type of illegality and are strongly correlated to perceptions of legitimacy, job security, and voice within the workplace. Comparing illegalities, employees prefer to report clear violations by rank and file employees rather than violations by managers. At the same time, external reporting to government or media entities is most likely when violations involve the organization as a whole or implicate top management. The study also finds cultural and gender differences in reporting patterns. Finally, the study provides support for the understanding that social norms are more predictive of social enforcement than expected organizational costs.