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In this article, the authors explore why academics tend to oppose the market. To this intent the article uses normative political theory as an explanatory mechanism, starting with a conjecture originally suggested by Robert Nozick. Academics are over-represented amongst the best students of their cohort. School achievement engenders high expectations about future economic prospects. Yet markets are only contingently sensitive to school achievement. This misalignment between schools and markets is perceived by academics – and arguably by intellectuals in general – as morally unacceptable. To test this explanation, the article uses an online questionnaire with close to 1500 French academic respondents. The data resulting from this investigation lend support to Nozick's hypothesis.

According to minimalist theories of democracy, the reason why civil conflicts are less frequent in democracies is that opposition parties can reasonably expect to win the next elections: they then prefer to wait than to rebel. In dictatorships, waiting until the dictator dies is generally much costlier. This waiting time, however, is considerably shortened when the dictator is old. Therefore, the risk of domestic conflict should decrease along with the age of autocratic leaders. Based on 160 countries from 1960 to 2008, our empirical analysis shows that the leader's age decreases the likelihood of violent rebellion in dictatorships, but not in democratic regimes.

According to the Downs spatial model of electoral competition, in bipartisan systems political parties' manifestos are closer to the median voter's concerns, while in multiparty democracies partisan concerns are more covered in parties' platforms. Based on data in political manifestos and public opinion in 23 European countries from 2004 to 2012, we show that the Downsian model provides correct predictions. Two more specific points are uncovered in this article: first, unlike the previous studies and the original model, we focus on the people's most important issue, instead of on their preferences. Second, we analyse seven different issues, and we show that the Downsian model works only on the issues which reflect the left-right continuum.

International audience ; Le texte évalue les conséquences du changement de la réglementation française de 2001en ce qui concerne le cumul des mandats, qui a limité la possibilité de tenir simultanément plusieurs mandats électifs. La comparaison avant et après la mise en œuvre de la nouvelle loi permet de conclure que (i) les candidats aux élections législatives se sont adaptés aux nouvelles règles en réduisant les mandats locaux détenus; (ii) les candidats ont également montré une tendance à changer la nature des mandats exercés. Ces résultats mettent en lumière les modalités d'application de la loi qui lui donneront toute son efficacité.

In democracies, civil wars are less likely to occur. According to the minimal approach to democracy, the reason is that opposition parties can reasonably expect to win the next elections. They therefore prefer to wait than to rebel. In dictatorships, waiting until the dictator dies is generally much more costly. This waiting period, however, is considerably shortened when the dictator is old. Therefore, the risk of domestic conflict should decrease along with the age of leaders. Based on 149 countries from 1946 to 2001, our empirical analysis shows that the leader's age decreases the likelihood of civil war in dictatorships, but not in democratic regimes. More precisely, this is true in weakly institutionalized dictatorships, but not in authoritarian regime types which provide institutional ways of controlling and replacing the incumbent.

According to the Downs spatial model of electoral competition, in bipartisan systems political parties' manifestos are closer to the median voter's concerns, while in multiparty democracies partisan concerns are more covered in parties' platforms. Based on data in political manifestos and public opinion in 23 European countries from 2004 to 2012, we show that the Downsian model provides correct predictions. Two more specific points are uncovered in this article: first, unlike the previous studies and the original model, we focus on the people's most important issue, instead of on their preferences. Second, we analyse seven different issues, and we show that the Downsian model works only on the issues which reflect the left-right continuum.

International audience ; Le texte évalue les conséquences du changement de la réglementation française de 2001en ce qui concerne le cumul des mandats, qui a limité la possibilité de tenir simultanément plusieurs mandats électifs. La comparaison avant et après la mise en œuvre de la nouvelle loi permet de conclure que (i) les candidats aux élections législatives se sont adaptés aux nouvelles règles en réduisant les mandats locaux détenus; (ii) les candidats ont également montré une tendance à changer la nature des mandats exercés. Ces résultats mettent en lumière les modalités d'application de la loi qui lui donneront toute son efficacité.

The article assesses the consequences of the 2001 change in French regulation regarding the cumul des mandats, or multi-holding mandates, which restricted the opportunity to simultaneously hold several elective mandates. Comparing before and after the implementation of the new Law, empirical descriptions show that (i) candidates in legislative elections adapted to the new rules by reducing the local mandates held; (ii) candidates also showed a tendency to change the nature of the mandates held. These results can give some insight into the future consequences of the law currently being debated. Adapted from the source document.

International audience ; Le texte évalue les conséquences du changement de la réglementation française de 2001en ce qui concerne le cumul des mandats, qui a limité la possibilité de tenir simultanément plusieurs mandats électifs. La comparaison avant et après la mise en œuvre de la nouvelle loi permet de conclure que (i) les candidats aux élections législatives se sont adaptés aux nouvelles règles en réduisant les mandats locaux détenus; (ii) les candidats ont également montré une tendance à changer la nature des mandats exercés. Ces résultats mettent en lumière les modalités d'application de la loi qui lui donneront toute son efficacité.

In democracies, civil wars are less likely to occur. According to the minimal approach to democracy, the reason is that opposition parties can reasonably expect to win the next elections. They therefore prefer to wait than to rebel. In dictatorships, waiting until the dictator dies is generally much more costly. This waiting period, however, is considerably shortened when the dictator is old. Therefore, the risk of domestic conflict should decrease along with the age of leaders. Based on 149 countries from 1946 to 2001, our empirical analysis shows that the leader's age decreases the likelihood of civil war in dictatorships, but not in democratic regimes. More precisely, this is true in weakly institutionalized dictatorships, but not in authoritarian regime types which provide institutional ways of controlling and replacing the incumbent.