Suchergebnisse

This research note summarises the findings from a survey that asked Irish associations about their lobbying activity with respect to European Union legislation. The authors received 164 responses after having contacted 401 associations. The resulting data show that Irish associations engage in substantial legislative lobbying, also at the EU level. In fact, Irish associations have surprisingly good access to even the highest political levels in Ireland and the EU. Especially the associations active in policy fields with strong EU competences focus their lobbying activity on EU legislation. The resulting lobbying is characterised mainly by inside tactics, although there is variation across types of associations, with non-governmental organisations engaging in more outside lobbying than business or professional associations. Adapted from the source document.

We argue that in intergovernmental negotiations in the European Union, large Member States, countries with a good alternative to negotiated agreement and governments facing domestic constraints are more likely to resort to a hard bargaining strategy than less powerful Member States. We test this prediction with data from a survey with high-level officials from all EU Member States for the case of the negotiations concerning the EU Financial Perspective 2007--13. The evidence provides support for our argument and casts doubt on studies that suggest either that there are no differences in bargaining strategies across EU member countries or that the main differences exist between old and new EU Member States. Adapted from the source document.

We introduce a series of arguments that explain how country characteristics influence the choice of bargaining strategies. The country characteristics that we consider are a country's power resources, preferences and culture. We derive a series of hypotheses from these variables, and present their implications for intergovernmental negotiations in the European Union (EU). We also discuss the methodological difficulties inherent in studying negotiation behaviour: the secrecy surrounding the negotiations; the biases introduced by asking participants; and the difficulty of inferring from role plays to real-world negotiations. While recognizing these difficulties, we conclude that research on this topic is essential to arrive at a better understanding of how the negotiation process influences negotiation outcomes. Adapted from the source document.

Most practitioners and scholars concur that the Irish EU presidency of 2004 was an effective mediator in the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of 2003/4. The presidency is generally credited with having facilitated a compromise in these complex negotiations that allowed for agreement on the Constitutional Treaty. Building on this assessment, we argue that Ireland's neutrality on the most controversial issues under negotiation was a necessary condition enabling it to function as an effective mediator in these negotiations. When empirically examining our argument, we show that only a neutral mediator could effectively make use of the mediation tactics employed by the Irish presidency in the IGC. This argument and its empirical examination have implications for the literatures on international mediation and the EU presidency. Adapted from the source document.

Two conditions have to be met for bargaining in Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) in the EU to be efficient. On the one hand, an effective preparation of the negotiations is essential to provide governments with the necessary information to engage in issue linkages. On the other hand, mediation provided by the EU's Presidency is indispensable for the finding of compromises & for the elaboration of a final package deal. Systematic evidence from the IGCs of 2000 & of 2003-04 confirms the explanatory power of the article's argument. As a result of largely ineffective preparation & mediation during the IGC of 2000, the Treaty of Nice (2001) could not (or only provisionally) resolve many of the issues that had led to the convocation of the negotiations. In contrast, largely effective preparation & mediation enabled the far-reaching compromises included in the Constitutional Treaty (2004). References. Adapted from the source document.

"Ein Vergleich der Ergebnisse der letzten sechs Regierungskonferenzen in der Europäischen Union (EU) zeigt, dass die Regierungen der Mitgliedsstaaten unterschiedlich erfolgreich im Erreichen substantieller Kompromisse durch "issue linkages" sind. Eine Diskussion der supranationalen und der intergouvernementalen Verhandlungstheorie zeigt, dass beide keine zufriedenstellende Erklärung für diese Variation geben können. Stattdessen betonen die Autoren, dass das Problem, dass alle Teilnehmer an Verhandlungen einen Anreiz haben, nicht kollektive, sondern individuelle Gewinne zu maximieren, oft zu Effizienzverlusten führt. Für die Regierungskonferenzen haben die EU Mitgliedsstaaten zwei Prozeduren geschaffen, um dieses Problem zu bewältigen: eine Vorbereitungsphase geht den eigentlichen Verhandlungen voraus und die Präsidentschaft des Ministerrates übernimmt die Rolle eines ehrlichen Vermittlers während der Verhandlungen. Eine zu kurze Zeitspanne, um die Verhandlungen vorzubereiten, eine nicht neutrale Präsidentschaft, oder äußere Schocks, die die Fähigkeit einer Präsidentschaft zum Führen der Verhandlungen vermindern, können gleichwohl Effizienzverluste in Regierungskonferenzen verursachen, da unter diesen Bedingungen die zwei Prozeduren nicht zu effizienterem Verhandeln beitragen können. In einer Analyse aller Regierungskonferenzen von der Einheitlichen Europäischen Akte bis zum Verfassungsvertrag finden die Autoren ihr Argument bestätigt." (Autorenreferat)