Suchergebnisse

In the first round of the 2012 French presidential election, Marine Le Pen drew a record score of 17.9% of the valid votes. Her success was attributed to the 'de-demonization' strategy she implemented to soften the party's image, make it credible on other issues than immigration, and diversify its electoral audience. Survey data from 1988 to 2012 show a more complex picture. Marine Le Pen's supports are ideologically and socially very similar to her father's. The only difference is her larger audience among women, especially in the service proletariat. If this erosion of the traditional 'radical right gender gap' is confirmed, it could considerably enlarge the National Front's electoral influence. Adapted from the source document.

Note critique de l'ouvrage ; L'ouvrage présente les premiers résultats de l'enquête « Perception des inégalités et sentiment de justice » (PISJ). Menée par une équipe de sociologues, sous la direction de Michel Forsé et Olivier Galland, elle a été rendue possible grâce au financement conjoint de l'Institut deFrance (Fondation Simone et Cino Del Duca) et de l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques et réalisée par l'Institut de sondage Lavialle (GfKISL) en septembre-octobre 2009 (.).

Focusing on electoral support for the extreme Left and the extreme Right on the eve of the 2007 French presidential election, this article refutes the "convergence of the extremes" theory. It draws on data from the 2007 CEVIPOF French Electoral Panel to compare the profiles of voters for Jean-Marie Le Pen and Olivier Besancenot. Combining sociological, psycho-political, and economic models for explaining voter choice, it shows how different Le Pen and Besancenot voters are in their partisan and ideological attachments, as well as their social affinities and their positions on candidates and issues. Divergent social and political logics explain the electoral support for these two candidates: their voters do not occupy the same political space, they do not have the same social background, and they do not hold the same values.

Note critique de l'ouvrage ; L'ouvrage présente les premiers résultats de l'enquête « Perception des inégalités et sentiment de justice » (PISJ). Menée par une équipe de sociologues, sous la direction de Michel Forsé et Olivier Galland, elle a été rendue possible grâce au financement conjoint de l'Institut deFrance (Fondation Simone et Cino Del Duca) et de l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques et réalisée par l'Institut de sondage Lavialle (GfKISL) en septembre-octobre 2009 (.).

Focusing on electoral support for the extreme Left and the extreme Right on the eve of the 2007 French presidential election, this article refutes the "convergence of the extremes" theory. It draws on data from the 2007 CEVIPOF French Electoral Panel to compare the profiles of voters for Jean-Marie Le Pen and Olivier Besancenot. Combining sociological, psycho-political, and economic models for explaining voter choice, it shows how different Le Pen and Besancenot voters are in their partisan and ideological attachments, as well as their social affinities and their positions on candidates and issues. Divergent social and political logics explain the electoral support for these two candidates: their voters do not occupy the same political space, they do not have the same social background, and they do not hold the same values.

According to the thesis put forward by the sociologist Seymour M. Lipset in his book, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, the electoral game is essentially a reflection of the class struggle: "In virtually every economically developed country, the lower-income groups vote mainly for parties of the Left, while the higher-income groups vote mainly for parties of the right." However, almost thirty years later he is one of the first people, along with Terry Clark, to predict the disappearance of social classes and of the privileged link between left-wing parties and people from working-class backgrounds. [First paragraph]