Suchergebnisse

We study the effect of large-scale land acquisitions on the risk of ethnic tensions for a sample of 133 countries for the 2000-2012 period. Running a series of fractional response models, we find that more land grabbing activity is associated with a higher risk of ethnic tensions, indicating that the negative effects of land deals outweigh their potential benefits. In addition to that, we also show that democratic institutions may moderate the relationship between land deals and ethnic tensions. That is, non-democratic countries face a substantially higher risk of ethnic tensions as the level of large-scale land acquisitions increases; by contrast, strongly democratic countries tend to see lower ethnic tension risk.

This contribution investigates the relationship between economic freedom and international migration. We argue that higher levels of economic freedom in the source countries of migration may discourage migration by generating more economic security, providing more economic opportunities and stimulating overall economic activity. Using a panel dataset on migration from 91 developing and emerging to the 20 most attractive OECD destination countries for the 1980-2010 period, we find that more economic freedom at home discourages high-skilled migration but does not matter to low-skilled migration. The negative association between economic freedom and high-skilled emigration also holds when we estimate (dynamic) panel models that allow for endogeneity in the economic freedom-migration nexus. Our findings suggest that high-skilled individuals are especially responsive to the economic incentives arising from economic freedom. This is especially true for those components of economic freedom associated with the provision of economic security in the form of wellprotected property rights, sound money and limited government involvement in the economic life.

We study the effect of large-scale land acquisitions on the risk of ethnic tensions for a sample of 133 countries for the 2000-2012 period. Running a series of fractional response models, we find that more land grabbing activity is associated with a higher risk of ethnic tensions, indicating that the negative effects of land deals outweigh their potential benefits. In addition to that, we also show that democratic institutions may moderate the relationship between land deals and ethnic tensions. That is, non-democratic countries face a substantially higher risk of ethnic tensions as the level of large-scale land acquisitions increases; by contrast, strongly democratic countries tend to see lower ethnic tension risk.

In this contribution we study the relationship between income inequality and economic freedom for a panel of 100 countries for the 1971-2010 period. From a panel causality study we find that income inequality has a negative causal effect on economic freedom, while causation does not run in the opposite direction. We argue that the negative effect of inequality on economic liberty is due to the elite's political power stemming from its disproportionate control over a country's economic resources. The elite uses this power to curtail economic freedom to defend its economic interests by discouraging innovation, competition and protecting its rents. Running a series of dynamic panel estimations, we show that the negative effect of income inequality on economic freedom is robust to different sets of controls and estimation techniques. Finally, we show that the dynamics of the inequality-freedom nexus are to some extent conditional upon a country's political regime. When inequality is low, democracies enjoy comparatively higher levels of economic liberty, in line with the interests of a large middle-class. By contrast, economic freedom is lower in democracies (compared to strongly autocratic regimes with the same income distribution) when inequality is high. We argue that the latter finding corresponds to a system of political capitalism or captured democracy, where a powerful economic elite cooperates with politicians and bureaucrats for their mutual benefit.

In this contribution we study the relationship between income inequality and economic freedom for a panel of 100 countries for the 1971-2010 period. From a panel causality study we find that income inequality has a negative causal effect on economic freedom, while causation does not run in the opposite direction. We argue that the negative effect of inequality on economic liberty is due to the elite's political power stemming from its disproportionate control over a country's economic resources. The elite uses this power to curtail economic freedom to defend its economic interests by discouraging innovation, competition and protecting its rents. Running a series of dynamic panel estimations, we show that the negative effect of income inequality on economic freedom is robust to different sets of controls and estimation techniques. Finally, we show that the dynamics of the inequality-freedom nexus are to some extent conditional upon a country's political regime. When inequality is low, democracies enjoy comparatively higher levels of economic liberty, in line with the interests of a large middle-class. By contrast, economic freedom is lower in democracies (compared to strongly autocratic regimes with the same income distribution) when inequality is high. We argue that the latter finding corresponds to a system of political capitalism or captured democracy, where a powerful economic elite cooperates with politicians and bureaucrats for their mutual benefit.

This contribution examines the role of capitalism in anti-American terrorism. It uses two theoretical frameworks, both of which contrast the pacifying effects of higher levels of capitalist development with the potentially destabilizing effects of a transition towards capitalism, but differ with respect to their definition of capitalism, capitalism's interaction with anti-American terrorism, and its empirical operationalization. Using panel data for 149 countries between 1970 and 2007 and providing further system-level time-series evidence, this contribution finds no support for hypotheses derived from the classical capitalist peace literature. There is no evidence that anti-American terrorism increases with external economic liberalization or that it decreases with higher levels of economic openness. By contrast, hypotheses derived from economic norms theory find empirical support. Conceptualizing capitalism as social market-capitalism, this article finds that higher levels of market-capitalism are associated with less anti-American terrorism, while the process of marketization fuels it. Consistent with expectations from economic norms theory, the destabilizing effects of the marketization process may stem from the violent opposition of antimarket interest groups that have benefited from the pre-market order to the economic-cultural change initiated by a transition towards a market economy. These interest groups deliberately target the USA as the main proponent of market-capitalism, globalization, and modernity, where anti-American terrorism serves the purpose of consolidating their societal position, rolling back pro-market reforms and limiting the perceived Americanization of their communities. This contribution's findings suggest that the USA may ultimately become a less likely target of transnational terrorism through the establishment of market economies, but should not disregard the disruptive economic-cultural effects of the marketization process in non-market economies.

This contribution studies the impact of modernization on the onset of Islamist conflict. To capture the multi-dimensional phenomenon of modernization, we create a unique modernization index. Our empirical analysis for 154 countries for the 1971-2006 period provides robust evidence that modernization rather than economic underdevelopment or a lack of democracy increases the likelihood of the onset of Islamist conflict. This relationship especially matters to Islamist groups that aim at a regime change, i.e., the establishment of an Islamic state, while separatist groups seem to be more strongly affected by minority discrimination. We argue that from a rational-economic point of view the adverse effects of modernization lower the opportunity costs of conflict and raise its benefits. Additionally, an Islamist framing of modernization grievances affects the cost-benefit considerations of potential Islamist militants in ways that make violence even more likely (e.g., by offering spiritual rewards). An Islamist interpretation of modernization grievances furthermore provides Islamist militants with a political objective (the establishment of an Islamic state) to remedy the perceived ills of modernization.

Since the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington D.C., the fight against international terrorism has been a dominant issue in the political arena. Policy-makers (still) face the challenge to develop sound strategies for fighting this type of terrorist activity. Unfortunately, there is no universal strategy to counter terrorism. This is partly due to the diverse and clandestine nature of terrorist groups, and partly due to misperceptions, lack of precise knowledge as well as divergent interests and prioritization on part of policy-makers. The present chapter aims at providing a systematic overview on how to deal with (international) terrorism, taking on a law and economics perspective. More specifically, we will examine how the rule of law - both nationally and internationally (i.e., in terms of the international law) - interacts with international terrorism and how it can be sustained under the extreme conditions of terrorism.