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In this article, we investigate how threat perceptions and emotions can jointly impact individuals' attitudes toward drone strikes. We argue that conditions of threat can increase public support for the use of drone strikes. We further contend that the effect of threat perceptions on support for drone strikes is mediated by negative, emotional reactions, particularly anger. We test our arguments in France, the United States, and Turkey using data generated from nationally representative online surveys, in which individuals were randomly assigned to a control group, a condition in which they read about terrorist threat (with or without a reminder of democratic values), or a condition in which they read about economic threats. Our findings have implications for long-standing notions about the roles of rational calculations and psychological processes in influencing support for aggressive foreign policy.

This study explores what effect different campaign information frames have on voters' evaluations of Sarah Palin using data from an online experiment. We show that descriptions highlighting more stereotypically feminine attributes cause individuals to perceive Palin as holding more feminine traits, while those highlighting more masculine attributes lead to higher assessments of her masculine traits. Those that mix feminine and masculine attributes lead to higher assessments of Palin's masculine traits and null effects on her feminine traits. We show that Palin benefits the most in overall evaluations by being perceived as high on both masculine and feminine traits.

In this article, we investigate how threat perceptions and emotions can jointly impact individuals' attitudes toward drone strikes. We argue that conditions of threat can increase public support for the use of drone strikes. We further contend that the effect of threat perceptions on support for drone strikes is mediated by negative, emotional reactions, particularly anger. We test our arguments in France, the United States, and Turkey using data generated from nationally representative online surveys, in which individuals were randomly assigned to a control group, a condition in which they read about terrorist threat (with or without a reminder of democratic values), or a condition in which they read about economic threats. Our findings have implications for long-standing notions about the roles of rational calculations and psychological processes in influencing support for aggressive foreign policy.

We argue that conditions of threat (compared to times of well-being) can induce individuals to place less value on democratic forms of governance. We test our argument in the context of Mexican politics and with respect to two types of threat that are arguably the most pressing issues today: crime and economic. Our data come from a national experiment implemented in the spring of 2009 and a national survey, the AmericasBarometer, conducted in 2010. The experimental evidence supports our contention that threats can cause democratic decay among the mass public; the survey evidence provides a window into the generalizability of our findings. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractIn this article, we develop and test three propositions related to the status of a primary counterpoint of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement—"Blue Lives Matter" (BlueLM). Employing correlational and causal analyses on a wide array of data, including public opinion, news and social media, internet searches, and merchandise sales, our findings are threefold: first, we offer evidence that Whiteness is associated with attitudinal and behavioral indicators of support for BlueLM; second, we present evidence that support for BlueLM is systematically linked to White racial prejudice; and third, we demonstrate that BlueLM activity is caused by BLM protest following a high-profile police killing of a Black man, which comports with the conceptualization of BlueLM as engaging in a process of "competitive victimhood" against BLM. Together, these findings suggest that BlueLM is a new incarnation of an ongoing history of White countermobilization against organized Black claims-making activity.

AbstractIndividuals often experience anger after exposure to news about a terrorist attack. Are the coping strategies available to them effective in reducing anger, and with what consequences for policy attitudes? We argue that because terrorism is a complex problem, people should feel better distancing themselves from the threat than engaging in confrontive strategies against it, and this should lead to less extreme attitudes. Across three experimental studies, we induced anger about terrorism and then randomly assigned participants to different opportunities to cope with their anger. The findings show that an emotion-focused coping strategy of distancing oneself from the threat is more effective at reducing anger than a problem-focused coping strategy involving support for confrontational strategies to address it. Furthermore, only distancing strategies reduced extreme stances on terrorism policy. These findings help us understand why some people may disengage from politics, even when angered by it.

Terrorist attacks routinely produce rallies for incumbent men in the executive office. With scarce cases, there has been little consideration of terrorism's consequences for evaluations of sitting women executives. Fusing research on rallies with scholarship on women in politics, we derive a gender-revised framework wherein the public will be less inclined to rally around women when terrorists attack. A critical case is UK Prime Minister Theresa May, a right-leaning incumbent with security experience. Employing a natural experiment, we demonstrate that the public fails to rally after the 2017 Manchester Arena attack. Instead, evaluations of May decrease, with sharp declines among those holding negatives views about women. We further show May's party loses votes in areas closer to the attack. We then find support for the argument in a multinational test. We conclude that conventional theory on rally events requires revision: women leaders cannot count on rallies following major terrorist attacks.

Research on evaluations of leaders has frequently found that female leaders receive lower ratings in times of national security crisis. However, less is known about countervailing factors. We contend that partisanship and leadership experience in relevant domains are two factors that can counteract the negative effects of terrorist threat on evaluations of female political leaders. To test this expectation, we implemented a national study in 2012 containing terrorist threat and non-threat conditions, and then asked participants to evaluate political leaders. The results show that Republican leaders, including women, are unaffected by terrorist threat; in contrast, Democratic leaders are punished during times of terrorist threat, but this negative effect is smaller for then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton compared to Nancy Pelosi, who lacks similar experience. In short, Republican partisanship is a strong countervailing factor, while leadership experience in national security more modestly countervails.