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We propose a model of motivated skepticism that helps explain when and why citizens are biased‐information processors. Two experimental studies explore how citizens evaluate arguments about affirmative action and gun control, finding strong evidence of a prior attitude effect such that attitudinally congruent arguments are evaluated as stronger than attitudinally incongruent arguments. When reading pro and con arguments, participants (Ps) counterargue the contrary arguments and uncritically accept supporting arguments, evidence of a disconfirmation bias. We also find a confirmation bias—the seeking out of confirmatory evidence—when Ps are free to self‐select the source of the arguments they read. Both the confirmation and disconfirmation biases lead to attitude polarization—the strengthening of t2 over t1 attitudes—especially among those with the strongest priors and highest levels of political sophistication. We conclude with a discussion of the normative implications of these findings for rational behavior in a democracy.

While such concepts as "belief systems" and "levels of conceptualization" have played a central role in research on "issue voting" and other important questions, political scientists have paid relatively little attention to the processes by which human organisms process the signs and symbols they encounter in political (or in survey interview) situations, or to how people selectively attend to those stimuli. The research reported here takes from cognitive psychology and information processing the concept of a "schema" which organizes and structures those stimuli in varying ways and to varying degrees. Utilizing various measures of stimulus recall and recognition, it compares the reaction to political and non-political stimuli of persons putatively possessing a well-developed political schema ("politicos") and those lacking such a schema ("apoliticals"). The results suggest that the concept offers a promising approach for research on problems of political perception and response.