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Based on the history of the whaling regime, suggests that environmental regimes that foster scientific discourse among states can contribute more to the legitimacy and practical application of collective decision-making than those fostering moral or interest-based discourses.

Heterogeneities among states, among non-state actors and between state and non-state actors explain the timing, process, form and effectiveness of international regulation of intentional oil pollution. Understanding the progressive movement toward rules that reduced intentional oil discharges depends on identifying different varieties of heterogeneity and their unique influences on the process and outcomes of cooperation. Success at reducing discharges by tanker operators, who had few incentives to provide the public good of a cleaner ocean, depended on rules that took advantage of existing heterogeneities in preferences and capacities to build a regulatory structure that coerced compliance by preventing most violations and deterring the rest.

Whether a treaty elicits compliance from governments or nonstate actors depends upon identifiable characteristics of the regime's compliance systems. Within the international regime controlling intentional oil pollution, a provision requiring tanker owners to install specified equipment produced dramatically higher levels of compliance than a provision requiring tanker operators to limit their discharges. Since both provisions entailed strong economic incentives for violation and regulated the same countries over the same time period, the variance in compliance clearly can be attributed to different features of the two subregimes. The equipment requirements' success stemmed from establishing an integrated compliance system that increased transparency, provided for potent and credible sanctions, reduced implementation costs to governments by building on existing infrastructures, and prevented violations rather than merely deterring them.

How to create consensus among government, industry, and individuals regarding rule compliance; international focus.

Climate change poses a grave security threat to national borders, habitats, and vulnerable people. Plagued by asymmetries in both states' vulnerability to climate impacts and their capacity to mitigate them, climate change presents states with a "wicked" problem that poses significant obstacles to interest-based solutions. Yet, most global climate change policy involves rationales and mechanisms grounded in an interest-based logic of consequences: information-sharing, reciprocity, and exchange. We argue that strategies that promote ethics-based discourse and policies offer considerable promise for hastening stronger global climate governance. We argue that successes in human security norm-building, including bans on land mines, cluster munitions, and nuclear weapons, provide climate scholars and practitioners with alternative governance models that rely on activating a logic of appropriateness and spearhead faster, more effective climate action. We identify five strategies that previous scholars have shown fostered efforts to promote a logic of appropriateness in human rights, humanitarian law, and disarmament. We examine the empirical experience of those strategies and particularly highlight the recent success of efforts to negotiate a treaty banning nuclear weapons. Given the success of these strategies in other issue areas, we argue scholars of climate change could fruitfully focus greater attention on political efforts that promote strong global ethical norms for climate action.

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Framework Convention on Climate Change seeks to reduce the costs for industrialized states of reducing greenhouse gas emissions while supporting abatement efforts in developing countries. Implementing an effective CDM system (whether under the Kyoto Protocol or any agreement that replaces it) will require recognizing that projects may fail because of intentional nonperformance by participants, the withholding of necessary cooperation by nonparticipants, adverse external events, or any combination of these. Maximizing the benefits to the climate change regime will require establishing project criteria and monitoring procedures that distinguish project-related from participant-related risk. Rather than adopting an exclusively adversarial approach focused on identifying and punishing those causing project failure, effective implementation will benefit from facilitative measures to avert failures before they occur and will reward projects that succeed under adversity. The CDM system's ultimate success also will require progressively evaluating and refining the system as a whole, as well as individual projects.