Suchergebnisse

The world has been struck by a mutating systemic financial crisis that is unprecedented in terms of financial losses and fiscal costs, geographic reach, and speed and synchronisation. The crisis from August 2007 to date can be divided into three main phases: the financial turmoil from August 2007 to the collapse of Lehman Brothers; the global financial crisis from September 2008 until spring 2010; and the euro area sovereign debt crisis from spring 2010 to the current period. While each phase has brought significant challenges, the current sovereign debt crisis has been the most critical stage for the euro area. It has brought unprecedented challenges for the monetary union and triggered extraordinary adjustments in both monetary policy and institutional arrangements at the euro area level. The purpose of this article is to outline the features of each crisis phase, to describe the actions taken by the European Central Bank (ECB) during each phase and to explain the rationale for such measures. It also discusses the need to strengthen further the economic union in order to guarantee the sustainability of the monetary union of the euro area. In this respect, it is argued that the recent institutional adjustments made at the EU level would have been necessary independently of the financial crisis.

AbstractThe world has been struck by a mutating systemic financial crisis that is unprecedented in terms of financial losses and fiscal costs, geographic reach, and speed and synchronization. The crisis from August 2007 to date can be divided into three main phases: the financial turmoil from August 2007 to the collapse of Lehman Brothers; the global financial crisis from September 2008 until spring 2010; and the eurozone sovereign debt crisis from spring 2010 to the current period. While each phase has brought significant challenges, the current sovereign debt crisis has been the most critical stage for the eurozone. It has brought unprecedented challenges for the monetary union and triggered extraordinary adjustments in both monetary policy and institutional arrangements at the eurozone level. The purpose of this article is to outline the features of each crisis phase, to describe the actions taken by the European Central Bank (ECB) during each phase and to explain the rationale for such measures. It also discusses the need to strengthen further the economic union in order to guarantee the sustainability of the monetary union of the eurozone. In this respect, it is argued that the recent institutional adjustments made at the European Union level would have been necessary independently of the financial crisis.

AbstractThe monetary policy framework of the Eurosystem has received considerable attention in recent years: there is a well‐established and rich literature on the price stability objective, as well as the two‐pillar strategy of the ECB. This is less the case for the regular monetary policy preparations and the decision‐making process. This article provides an insider's roadmap to the procedures to prepare monetary policy decisions by the Governing Council of the ECB. The architecture of the Eurosystem permits the processing and analysis of a vast amount of national and aggregate economic, financial and monetary data and assists the Governing Council in taking monetary policy decisions – and this each month. Our aim is to describe the role of a variety of committees and sub‐committees that prepare and support the monetary policy decision‐making process. A federal organization is at the heart of this process. At the top of the pyramid of information there is a two‐tiered committee structure with the Executive Board taking the lead in bringing together most of the economic, financial and monetary analyses, and the Governing Council utilizing that information, for its monthly economic and monetary analyses.

The ECB's monetary policy has received considerable attention in recent years. This is less the case, however, for its regular monetary policy preparation and decision-making process. This paper reviews how the factors usually considered as critical for the success of a central banking system and the federal nature of the Eurosystem are intertwined with its overall design and the functioning of its committee architecture. In particular, it examines the procedures for preparing monetary policy decisions and the role of the decision-making bodies and the committees therein. We suggest that technical committees, involving all national central banks (NCBs), usefully contribute to the regular processing of a vast amount of economic, financial and monetary data, as well as to the consensus building at the level of the Governing Council. A federal organisational structure, including a two-tier committee structure with the Executive Board taking the lead in preparing the monetary policy decisions and the Governing Council in charge of the decisions with collective responsibility for them, as well as committee work at the various hierarchical levels, contributes to the efficiency of the ECB's monetary policy decision-making, and thereby facilitates the maintenance of price stability in the euro area. A fully-fledged committee structure has also contributed to the smooth integration of non-euro area Member States into the Eurosystem's monetary policy decision-making process.

The paper provides a systematic comparison of the Eurosystem, the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan. These monetary authorities exhibit somewhat different status and tasks, which reflect different historical conditions and national characteristics. However, widespread changes in central banking practices in the direction of greater independence and increased transparency, as well as changes in the economic and financial environment over the past 15-20 years, have contributed to reduce the differences among these three world's principal monetary authorities. A comparison based on simple "over-the-counter" policy reaction functions shows no striking differences in terms of monetary policy implementation.

AbstractHow fast should the new Member States of the European Union (NMS) relinquish their domestic monetary and exchange rate autonomy? While the Maastricht convergence criteria are attracting significant attention (particularly the inflation and deficit criteria), we think the debate should also examine the status of their economic structures and the progress of integration within the EU. Diverse aspects of the monetary integration of the NMS into the euro area are examined. We find less structural convergence is associated with less income convergence. The exchange rate regimes have a bearing on the speed of real convergence: for some NMS, and for some more time, exchange rate flexibility may still serve as a useful shock absorber.

This paper examines diverse aspects of the monetary integration of the ten new Member States (NMS) which joined the EU on 1 May 2004 into the euro area. Most NMS have undergone a rapid and deep transformation in all areas with considerable progress in their processes of reform and convergence, and more is underway. While trade integration with the other 15 EU Member States (EU15) has progressed quickly, convergence in output specialisation to EU standards has been slow, especially if measured in real terms. This may influence negatively the pace of real convergence. Most NMS lag significantly behind in building up and deepening their financial systems. There is also evidence that exchange rate flexibility may still be serving as a useful shock absorber for some NMS, and so far the evidence indicates that real exchange rates have moved, broadly speaking, in line with long term fundamental equilibria. On the positive side, many NMS are quite advanced relative to the euro area in the process of labour market and institutional reform (their labour market structures are more flexible than those of the euro area countries). There is also some evidence that a few NMS have a significant degree of business-cycle synchronisation with the euro area: hence, they may become less likely to be affected by different economic shocks. This, however, is not true for all NMS. The monetary policy institutions of the NMS have also converged to some degree - goals and institutional settings of central banks are now much more similar than before. A case-by-case approach to adopting the euro, based on country-specific conditions, seems natural due to the differences between the countries.