Suchergebnisse

Nations have two methods of increasing their security: building arms and forming alliances. Both methods present different political costs that must be incurred to raise security. Building arms requires shifting economic resources to the military. Forming alliances requires abandoning interests that conflict with those of the ally. Each of these strategies produces domestic opposition. A nation's response to a threat to its security must weigh the relative attractiveness of arms versus allies, both in terms of their effects on internal politics and on their external benefits. Three cases are examined in the light of this argument. The response of Austria and France to the unification of Germany in the 1860s is the central case. Theories of alliance formation based on neorealism and the offense-defense balance predict that Austria and France should have allied against the mutual threat of Prussia. This article argues that they did not form an alliance because arming separately presented lower political costs. World Wars I and II likewise are analyzed from the perspective of the argument above.

This article presents and tests two arguments about how the democratic institutions of the United States influence arms control bargaining. Principal-agent models of elections with retrospective voters form the basis of a formal model linking elections and arms control. It implies that the United States offers additional concessions as economic conditions deteriorate, but also that this effect declines as conditions get worse. Congress' control of the defense budget provides a way to affect the Soviets' reservation level for negotiations. But if the Soviets anticipate congressional actions, the only effects are reduced Soviet concessions immediately before critical votes on defense and a response to the outcome of the vote. An empirical examination of U.S. and Soviet bargaining behavior during the 1970s supports these hypotheses. The United States increases its concessions as inflation heightens. The Soviets reduce their concessions during periods with critical votes on defense in Congress, offer additional concessions after prodefense votes pass, and offer fewer concessions after prodefense measures fail.

THIS ARTICLE PRESENTS AND TESTS TWO ARGUMENTS ABOUT HOW THE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES INFLUENCE ARMS CONTROL BARGAINING. PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODELS OF ELECTIONS WITH RETROSPECTIVE VOTERS FORM THE BASIS OF A FORMAL MODEL LINKING ELECTIONS AND ARMS CONTROL. IT IMPLIES THAT THE UNITED STATES OFFERS ADDITIONAL CONCESSIONS AS ECONOMIC CONDITIONS DETERIORATE, BUT ALSO THAT THIS EFFECT DECLINES AS CONDITIONS GET WORSE. CONGRESS' CONTROL OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET PROVIDES A WAY TO AFFECT THE SOVIETS' RESERVATION LEVEL FOR NEGOTIATIONS. BUT IF THE SOVIETS ANTICIPATE CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS, THE ONLY EFFECTS ARE REDUCED SOVIET CONCESSIONS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE CRITICAL VOTES ON DEFENSE AND A RESPONSE TO THE OUTCOME OF THE VOTE. AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF U.S. AND SOVIET BARGAINING BEHAVIOR DURING THE 1970S SUPPORTS THESE HYPOTHESES. THE UNITED STATES INCREASES ITS CONCESSIONS AS INFLATION HEIGHTENS. THE SOVIETS REDUCE THEIR CONCESSIONS DURING PERIODS WITH CRITICAL VOTES ON DEFENSE IN CONGRESS, OFFER ADDITIONAL CONCESSIONS AFTER PRO-DEFENSE VOTES PASS, AND OFFER FEWER CONCESSIONS AFTER PRO-DEFENSE MEASURES FAIL.

This article considers the effects of arms races on the occurrence of wars. Existing evidence on the link between arms races and wars suggests that arms races do not necessarily cause wars, but that some arms races end in war and others do not. Why? This article proposes an answer to this question by examining the motivations of each racing nation to go to war by expressing those motivations in utility terms. Swings in military superiority between the racing powers provoked by the race create a motivation for war to exploit temporary advantages. Risk-acceptant actors are more likely to initiate arms race wars, and risk-averse actors are more likely to resist their threats. The conclusions of the argument are tested and supported robustly but not strongly.

This paper analyzes the implications of social choice theory for the study of world politics. A view of the world system as a social choice mechanism leads to the observation that the outcomes of world politics are determined neither by structure nor by preferences alone, but rather by their interaction. Structural change occurs only when the actors cannot achieve their preferences through the current system. Three particular social choice mechanisms are analyzed to determine which conditions of Arrow's theorem they violate. The argument is illustrated by examining two salient theoretical works, Waltz's Theory of International Politics and Gilpin's War and Change in World Politics. The critique of Waltz illustrates that structure alone cannot determine outcome; the critique of Gilpin examines how structural change occurs in world politics and underlines the importance of preferences in such changes.