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AbstractThe doctrine of performance management has been promoted as an alternative to rule‐based governance. Analyzing performance management as a system of rules, this article examines how performance management is adopted through rules. The question is examined based on a systematic counting and content coding of national rules within the domain of primary education in Denmark from 1989 to 2010. Contrary to the prescriptions of the performance management doctrine, the analysis shows a clear increase in the number of rules. This reflects the creation of many new rules about performance measurement without a proportionate repeal of production rules constraining the autonomy of public service providers and their managers. The result is congruent with the expectations derived from the literature on rule dynamics, which emphasizes rules as the carriers of learning and interests. The article thereby demonstrates the utility of analyzing performance management as a system of rules.

This article examines the impact of politics on governmental rule production. Traditionally, explanations of rule dynamics have focused on nonpolitical factors such as the self‐evolvement of rules, environmental factors, and decision maker attributes. This article develops a set of hypotheses about when, why, and how political factors shape changes in the stock of rules. Furthermore, we test these hypotheses on a unique, new data set based on all Danish primary legislation and administrative rules from 1989 to 2011 categorized into 20 different policy domains. The analysis shows that the traditional Weberian "rules breed rules" explanations must be supplemented with political explanations that take party ideology and changes in the political agenda into account. Moreover, the effect of political factors is indistinguishable across changes in primary laws and changes in administrative rules, a result that challenges the depiction of the latter rule‐making process as more or less disconnected from the political domain.

This article provides a comprehensive analysis of stability and punctuations in public spending within and across two different countries -- Denmark and the United States. The theoretical starting point is the classic model of budget incrementalism and Jones and Baumgartner's model of disproportionate information processing. First, despite the clear differences in institutional setup, we show that public spending spanning many decades in Denmark and the United States are characterized by a similar distribution of small-, medium-, and large-scale spending changes. What is more intriguing is that we show how this aggregate result obscures (1) substantial variation between categories of public spending and (2) similar tendencies within similar spending categories across the two countries. These findings suggest that we need to unpack the overall budgets for detecting the particular sources of stability and change in government spending. Hence, the article offers important comparative findings that not only challenge the empirical validity of classic budgetary incrementalism but also advocate an increased focus on more disaggregated spending dynamics than employed in previous studies of the model of disproportionate information processing. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractAn extensive body of research documents how governing parties generally suffer electoral defeats. Varying explanations have been offered, most of which touch upon the liabilities of policy responsibility. Although media coverage is generally acknowledged as one of these liabilities, few empirical studies have examined how news content affect government support. Based on the fact that voters get their information about politics, policies and societal issues from the media, this article studies how the constant stream of negative news influences incumbent support over a 20‐year period in Denmark. Modeling a previously untested argument on the cost of ruling, it shows that the accumulation of bad news throughout tenure exerts a substantial effect on government support.

More than 50 years of policy research has provided evidence of negative feedback where self‐correcting mechanisms reinforce stability in public policies over time. While such mechanisms are at the heart of understanding change and stability in public policies, little attention has been given to the responses of individual policy‐makers to public policies as a potential driver of negative feedback. Based on a unique survey dataset of spending preferences of local government politicians covering more than 90 Danish municipalities, three years, seven policy issues, and around 3,000 entries, we find that the expressed spending preferences of politicians are indeed negatively affected by previous spending levels. Moreover, such negative feedback effects are stronger, the less the political attention to the issue and even disappear at high levels of attention. Our analysis thus provides important evidence on the micro foundations and conditions of negative feedback in public policy.

Despite coalition governments being the most widespread form of government, many aspects of coalition politics are still poorly understood. This is especially true for questions relating to the role of the prime minister party within the coalition. Being the prime minister party seems to imply considerable influence, but little evidence actually exists as to the factors shaping the influence of the prime minister. This paper offers a new approach to studying the factors conditioning the influence of the prime minister party in a coalition. The approach is focused on the extent of issue overlap between the party manifesto of the prime minister party and the first government speech after the election. This approach makes it possible to actually analyze the factors shaping the influence of the prime minister party. The results show that the PM party is constrained by the issue emphasis of its coalition partners but less so when it holds dissolution power and more, also when it has many coalition partners when controlling for the seat share of the PM party. The paper, thus, both offers a new approach to study the coalition compromise and new evidence on the factors shaping the influence coming from holding the PM position.

It has been shown empirically across countries and political systems, and for different levels of government, that the distribution of budget changes follows a non-Gaussian distribution, a power function. This implies that budgets are very stable, yet occasionally are punctuated by very large changes. To explain this strong empirical generalization, Jones and Baumgartner (2005a) developed the Dynamic Model of Choice for Public Policy, which today is the dominant explanation of stability and change in public budgets. Based on formal analysis, this article investigates the implications and scope conditions of this model. Furthermore, using US budget data, the article reveals aspects of the model that do not closely fit the empirical pattern. The article concludes with an examination of three model revisions that may improve the fit between the model and the empirical distributions of budget decisions.

The literature on political actors' media appearances has repeatedly documented the so-called incumbency bonus (that parties and politicians in government have more media coverage than those in the opposition). This bias is normally attributed to news criteria that reflect political power, such as relevance and the elite status of actors. Supplementing existing perspectives, this study puts forward a new explanation of the incumbency bonus. The article argues that variations in the media dominance of incumbents are the result of the interplay between journalistic norms and political context. Outside election campaigns, political news is driven by the 'watch dog' norm. Thus the media focus on societal problems, which produces a critical emphasis on incumbent actors. But when party competition intensifies, either during campaigns or when issues become salient, the norm of objective and impartial journalism results in a more balanced coverage where challengers increase their presence. The argument receives support through multivariate models of incumbent and challenger appearances in Danish radio news broadcasts over a twenty-year period. Finally, in terms of democratic implications, the importance of the watchdog norm challenges the assumption that the incumbency bonus constitutes an electoral asset. Since media dominance is closely related to government responsibility for all kinds of problems, incumbent support is found to dwindle with increased media appearances.