Iver B. Neuman omtaler avhandlingen til Kristian Lundby Gjerde Russia, 'double standards', and the contestation of equivalence 2000–2019: A corpus-based exploration. Iver B. Neuman reviews the PhD dissertation Russia, 'double standards', and the contestation of equivalence 2000–2019: A corpus-based exploration, by Kristian Lundby Gjerde.
Artikkelens første del viser hvordan FN blir representert på to forskjellige måter i norsk utenrikspolitisk debatt: på den ene side pragmatisk, som legitimeringsarena for ført politikk, og på den annen ideologisk, som alternativ til Nato-orientert politikk. Spenningen mellom de to kommer tydelig frem idet begrepet «FN-sporet» ble vanlig i norsk utenrikspolitisk ordskifte omkring Irak-krigen (2003), og umiddelbart ble brukt på begge måter. Del to viser at det kun er i offentlig politisk diskurs FN representeres på disse to måtene; i diplomatisk diskurs er det bare den første representasjonen som forekommer. Del tre, som er normativ, er et dobbeltangrep på den ideologiske representasjonen av FN. Første ankepunkt er et generelt forsvar av pragmatisme og en avvisning av ideologi i utenrikspolitikken. Andre ankepunkt er et konjunkturavhengig forsvar av pragmatisme; i en internasjonal orden som i tiltagende grad domineres av stormaktkonfrontasjonen mellom USA og Kina, er utfordringen for Norge nå er å kjempe for at mest mulig av internasjonal politikk avgjøres i multilateral sammenheng. Hva slags multilateral sammenheng det dreier seg om, er underordnet. Jeg konkluderer med at det er en grunn til at betydningen av FN-sporet som et alternativ til Nato-orientering blir en stadig mer marginalisert betydning i norsk debatt, nemlig at en slik posisjon fremstår som rigid og derfor ubrukelig. Abstract in English:The UN Track in Norwegian Foreign PolicyThe first part of the article discusses how two representations of the UN have traditionally vied with one another in Norwegian public debate. One is pragmatic and accentuates the UN's role as a consensus-creating and legitimating force in Norwegian foreign policy. The other is ideological and accentuates the UN as an alternative focus to NATO. Since the Iraq War of 2003, the concept of a "UN track" in Norwegian foreign policy has lent itself to both usages. While the ideological representation was quite widespread in Norwegian public debate on the left of the Labour Party and further leftwards, it is now only to be found at the very left of the political spectrum. As demonstrated in the second part of the article, in Norwegian diplomatic discourse, the UN is represented in pragmatic terms only. The third part of the article is a normative celebration of the waning of the ideological representation of the UN. Two reasons are given. Firstly, and on principle, a pragmatic approach to foreign policy making is superior to an ideological approach in that it increases room for manoeuvre. Secondly, and related to the conjuncture of present-day international relations, which is seeing a resurgence of great-power rivalry, a small power like Norway has a vested interest in maintaining as much multilateralism as possible. The interest in multilateralism as a general phenomenon takes precedence over what particular form multilateralism takes.
Artikkelen oppsummerer og vurderer Ine Marie Eriksen Søreides virke som Norges 32. utenriksminister i årene 2017–2021. Første del av artikkelen er en oversikt over Søreides handlingsrom. Innenrikspolitisk var det godt, med unntak av at Søreides sjef, statsminister Erna Solberg, la hindringer i veien for utøvelsen av hennes virke. De utenrikspolitiske rammebetingelsene var krevende. Donald Trump var den minst Europa-orienterte president USA har hatt siden Nato ble dannet. Et tiltagende aggressivt Russland skulle håndteres. Annen del er en vurdering. Søreide var svært flink til å skjøtte jobben og opprettholdt Norges spillerom. Hun tok imidlertid ingen initiativer for å øke spillerommet. Hennes svakeste side var lojalitet til egne medarbeidere. Alt i alt var Søreide den beste utenriksminister fra borgerlig side siden John Lyng (1965–1970). Abstract in EnglishIne Marie Eriksen Søreide, Norway's Foreign Minister 2017–2021This article is a summing up of Ine Marie Eriksen Søreide's work as Norway's foreign minister in the years 2017–2021. The first part assesses Søreide's room for manoeuvre. Domestically, this was excellent, although Søreide's boss, the prime minister, broke one of her bats for domestic reasons and grounded her during the Covid lockdowns. Internationally, Søreide had to deal with Donald Trump, arguably the weakest and least engaged president the United States has had since its civil war. She also had to stand up to the increasingly aggressive policy of neighbouring Russia. Søreide steered the ship of state with a steady hand. She was, however, less than loyal to her employees, and demonstrated little creativity. Still, she must be ranked as the best foreign minister from the bourgeois side of the floor over the last half century.
Del en av denne fokusartikkelen sporer og feirer utviklingen i norsk Russlands-forskning de 35 årene. Del to introduserer spenningen mellom forskeren som analytiker og forskeren som kommentator og påpeker at vi ikke vet så mye om hvem debatten snakker til ut over det utenrikspolitiske miljøet selv. Del tre diskuterer hva slags standarder akademikere som opptrer som kommentatorer kan og bør holde seg med. Kommentatorer må ha mot, evne og vilje til å gi rom for andre stemmer. Kommentatoren må også forstå forskjellen på analyse, som krever ettertenksomhet, og kommentar, som skjer i kampens hete. En kommentatorisk siste del argumenterer for at Vestens politikk fremover bør være å demme opp for Russland, snarere enn å være ettergivende eller gå inn for regimeendring. Abstract in EnglishRussologists as PunditsPart one discusses the emergence of Russia studies in Norway over the last 35 years. Part two laments our lack of knowledge regarding who the receiver of comments by researchers actually are. Part three discusses dialogism, parrhesia and phronesis as qualities needed for a researcher to be a good pundit. The article ends with a defence for continuing a policy of containment towards Russia rather than shifting to the two alternative policies, which are appeasement and roll-back.
Boken er en personlig beretning om Russland og russere skrevet av en pioneerene innen nordisk østforskning. Bokens hovedtese er at sovjetisk mentalitet aldri døde ut og nå i økende grad tar over, men at de autoritære tendensene tross alt møtes av et annet Russland av intellektuelle, dissidenter og bloggere hvis betydning ikke bør undervurderes. This book is a personal tour d'horizon written by one of the pioneers and mainstays of Nordic Soviet, Russian and East European studies through the last half century. The main thesis of the book is that Soviet mindsets never died and are in the ascendant to day, but that there also exists another Russia of intellectuals, dissident and bloggers whose impirtance should not be underestimated.
Summary This conclusion to the forum on diplomatic gifts goes on to note two historical types of such gifts. They are, first, fostering of a royal child at another royal court and, second, royal and noble marriage exchanges. Using these examples as a stepping stone, this essay goes on to formulate a co-ordination system of giver and receiver assessments of gift value, ranging from low to high. This yields four types of gifts: personalised gifts (low value to giver, high value to receiver); unique gifts (high value to both parties); culturally irrelevant gifts (high value to giver, low value to receiver) and fluff (low value to both parties). The essay hypothesises that polities that approach one another in a situation of contacts with low density will tend to aim for unique gifts, while polities whose relations are dense will aim for gifts that are of equal value to both parties.
Summary Part of diplomatic work is public, so a diplomat must be presentable — that is, clean, smart or decent enough to be seen in public. This article starts by recognising the recent spate of work on aesthetics and representation in social sciences and diplomacy studies, and questions why it occurred so late when representation has always been constitutive of diplomacy, perhaps because of Enlightenment distrust of visuals and reaction against Nazi aestheticising of politics. Part two sets out what it takes to stage a successful visual performance and points to three factors: the agent's own preparations; audience assessment; and mediatisation to a broader public. Part three analyses two successful performances of accreditation, highlighting how they succeeded because they were deemed particularly presentable by being remarkably smart and decent, respectively. In conclusion, I argue that smartness trumps decency. This offers female diplomats more options than males, but also incurs greater risks.
Summary In a rapidly globalising world, Euro-centrism — namely, the notion that the West deserves to occupy the centre stage of past and present world history — is unwarranted. It is both politically unjust and scientifically unsatisfactory, since it means that knowledge production proceeds according to habit rather than to need. The problem is not first and foremost an individual predicament. Most scholars of diplomacy study the state of which they are a national. This may be an inevitable division of labour. While individual scholars have an obligation to think about how different languages, different categorisation systems and different problems mean that a Euro-centric approach will only take us so far in understanding diplomacy as a global social form, this epistemological problem is located primarily on the level of diplomatic studies as such. The other contributors to this special issue propel our sub-field to a more multi-centric and scientifically higher level.
Artikkelen begynner med å takke de andre bidragsyterene til symposiet. Det argumenteres så for at offentlige intellektuelle kan bli lettere hørt når tilhørerne opplever at verden er i endring og er i villrede om hva som foregår, for da er de villige til å overveie om det sosiale kanskje kan forstås på andre måter enn de har gjort tidligere. Med referanse til Heideggers poeng om at å tenke når man står midt i en situasjon er noe annet enn å sette seg ned og være eftertenksom, argumenteres det også for at en intellektuell som velger å fylle kommentatrollen i mediene, simpelthen velger å være del av en annen diskurs enn en intellektuell som deltar i det vitenskapelige ordskiftet. Endelig gjøres poenget at politiske realister og poststrukturslister deler en maktrealisme de har fra Nietzsche, men at de skiller lag i sin forståelse av hva makt er.
Drawing on identity and prototype theory, the article sets out to analyse the historically dominant monumentalising ways in which polities try to shore up their own Selves by halting their Others in time. The first part of the article discusses how monuments represent Self/Other relations from ancient Mesopotamia in the East to modern Britain in the West by limning off a constitutive outside, be that as visual absence or presence. Temporality is of the essence here, with the basic idea being that the Self is in temporal motion, while the Other is literally petrified. I then postulate that the Other is halted in time in three basic ways: as visual absence, as dead and as subjugated. Crucially, however, the Second World War is actually the end point of the extraordinary stability of monumental ways in which to represent the Other. We see the tentative emergence and damning of a fourth Other, namely a previous incarnation of the Self. I conclude, with Norbert Elias, that the fading away of the Other as dead and as subjugated is significant as part of a civilisation process that works against denying the Other its future agency.
