Suchergebnisse

The comparative record of cabinet stability shows interesting variation across the three most consolidated post-communist democracies: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Whereas each cabinet has been remarkably stable in post-communist Hungary, no cabinet has survived in its original composition in Poland. The cabinets that have been formed in the Czech Republic show a mixture of stability and instability: the conservative coalition government formed after the 1996 Czech elections collapsed after a little more than a year in office paving the way for early elections. In contrast, the single-party government formed by the Social Democratic Party (CSSD) after the 1998 polls has proved to be stable. In this article it is argued that cabinet stability both within and across the states can be consistently explained by the theory of dominant and central players.

The formation of seven minority governments in India between 1989 & 1998 constitutes a puzzle for game theoretic models of cabinet formation. In contrast with the prediction of such models, only one of these governments was formed by the party that occupied the ideological center. This article seeks to resolve the puzzle by drawing on the neo-institutionalist critique of game theoretic models that highlights the importance of institutional constraints in the cabinet formation game. In so doing, the article also argues that the politics of cabinet formation in India is not sui generis but can be understood in terms of comparative theory. 5 Tables, 2 Figures, 42 References. Adapted from the source document.

After the 1998 general elections to the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic, the largest party, the Social Democrats, formed a minority government. The formation of this government was puzzling for at least four reasons. First, according to the so-called Opposition Pact, the minority government was supported from the outside by the conservative Civic Democratic Party, the principal opponent of the Social Democrats in the party system. Second, the grand legislative coalition was not followed by the sharing of executive portfolios between the two largest parties. Third, the two parties entered into this agreement only weeks after they had explicitly stated their unwillingness to govern together. Fourth, neither theories of coalition formation nor those of minority government formation provide an accurate prediction for this outcome. This article provides a solution for these puzzles based on a game theoretic analysis.

This article argues against the apparent aversion to apply positive political models in the comparative literature on non-Western politics. To provide an example of the utility of such models, the article draws on Peter Van Roozendaal's game theoretical model of cabinet stability to account for the instability of coalition governments in India. It argues that government durability in this non-Western democracy can be modeled as the function of the motivations and incentives of two sets of key actors, the dominant and the central parties, the same way as it can in a Western context.

This article argues against the apparent aversion to apply positive political models in the comparative literature on non-Western politics. To provide an example of the utility of such models, the article draws on Peter Van Roozendaal's game theoretical model of cabinet stability to account for the instability of coalition governments in India. It argues that government durability in this non-Western democracy can be modeled as the function of the motivations & incentives of two sets of key actors: the dominant & the central parties, the same way as it can in a Western context. 3 Tables, 1 Appendix. Adapted from the source document.

The national party system of India has undergone a major transformation since the 1989 elections. The predominant party system that had been in place since 1952 gave way to a pattern of genuine multi-party competition. While the party system has become extremely fragmented, the stable presence of three competing poles lends it an aura of orderliness. This paper analyzes the nature of the new Indian party system with reference to Sartori's theoretical framework. It seems that the Indian party system hinges somewhere on the borderline between polarized and moderate pluralism.