Suchergebnisse

This article explores the role of visuality and narrative in the forging of the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the United Nations Security Council P5 + 1. We advance strategic narrative theory by explaining how narrative alignment between longstanding antagonists can occur through protagonists' coordination of communication–a methodology of orchestration–across public and private spaces of diplomacy. Analysis of news, policy and social media materials as well as interviews with protagonists allows us to trace the gestures and performances through which actors sought to reinforce or overcome an identity narrative of Iran as untrustworthy and dangerous. We draw on Foucault's concept of alethurgy to show how verification mechanisms were constructed to ensure Iran's actions (if not its intentions) could be brought into public view. US and Iranian leaders' political will was significant, and sanctions and sabotage exerted considerable pressure on Iran. This article demonstrates how communication can enable alignment and peace-making rather than confusion and conflict in world affairs.

In 1947, the United States of America launched the European Recovery Programme to support the post-war reconstruction of Europe. The Marshall Plan, as it became known after U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, was one of the major success stories of US foreign policy in the twentieth century. The notion of an EU Recovery Programme for Ukraine provoked interest – and division in Ukraine. The enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007 demonstrated the EU's capacity to mount grand economic and political projects. However, since then, the EU has faced difficulties exerting influence and constructing a coherent narrative of its role in the European neighbourhood and the wider world. Would a more transformative aid and development programme for its Ukrainian neighbour offer an opportunity for the EU as well as Ukraine? In this article we use a series of elite interviews conducted across Ukraine in 2016-17 to explore how such a notion is understood. We find that Ukrainian elites have mixed feelings about existing EU aid programmes; many respondents resented the conditions the EU imposes, but nor do they want or expect aid to be given unconditionally. Whilst many aspire for Ukraine to reach EU standards of law and prosperity, Ukrainian elites favour self-help in their efforts to forge a stable sovereign state. Both the EU and Russia are understood as metonymies – as standing for two sets of values and geopolitical futures – and neither quite fit what Ukrainians seek. We conclude that whilst a Marshall Plan-style action could have benefits, it is not desired as a basis for a shared narrative and basis of cooperation and development. ; В1947 году Соединенные Штаты Америки развернули Программу европейского оздоровления с целью поддержки восстановления послевоенной Европы. План Маршалла, названный в честь Госсекретаря США Джорджа Маршалла, стал одним из наиболее существенных достижений в американской внешней политике двадцатого столетия. Идея европейской программы, направленной на оздоровление Украины, вызывает как интерес, так и несовместимость мнений украинцев. Расширение ЕС в 2004 и 2007 годах продемонстрировало способность Европы осуществлять масштабные экономические проекты. Однако с тех пор ЕС испытывает трудности в распространении своего влияния и формулировке понятного нарратива относительно своей роли в европейском соседстве и на мировой арене. Сможет ли более конструктивная помощь Украине, а также программа развития для украинского соседа предоставить новые возможности как для ЕС, так и для Украины? В этой статье мы анализируем серию интервью, взятых у представителей элиты из разных регионов Украины в 2016-2017 годах с целью получить ответ на поставленный вопрос. Результаты анализа показывают, что представители украинской элиты демонстрируют смешанные чувства относительно существующих программ помощи Украине со стороны ЕС; многие респонденты возмущены условиями, выдвигаемыми ЕС, однако они и не ожидают отсутствия условий как таковых. Значительная часть украинской элиты стремятся к тому, чтобы Украина достигла европейских стандартов в законодательстве и благополучии граждан, но одновременно отдают предпочтение самостоятельному построению независимого государства. И Украина, и Россия воспринимаются метонимично – как носители двух систем ценностей и геополитических устремлений; и ни одна из этих систем не удовлетворяет требования украинцев. В итоге мы утверждаем, что, хотя действия, подобные Плану Маршалла, могут быть полезны, их вряд ли можно рассматривать как объединяющий общественный нарратив и основу для сотрудничества и развития. ; У 1947 році Сполучені Штати Америки започаткували Програму європейського оздоровлення задля підтримки відбудови післявоєнної Європи. План Маршалла, названий на честь Держсекретаря США Джорджа Маршалла, став одним із найвагоміших досягнень в американській зовнішній політиці двадцятого століття. Ідея європейської програми, спрямованої на оздоровлення України, викликає як інтерес, так і несумісність думок українців. Розширення ЄС у 2004 і 2007 роках продемонструвало здатність ЄС здійснювати масштабні економічні та політичні проекти. Однак з тих пір ЄС зазнала труднощів у розповсюдженні свого впливу і формулюванні зрозумілого наративу щодо своєї ролі в європейському сусідстві та у широкому світі. Чи зможе конструктивніша допомога та програма розвитку для українського сусіда надати нові можливості як для ЄС, так і для України? У цій статті ми аналізуємо серію інтерв'ю, взятих у представників еліти з різних регіонів України в 2016-2017 роках з метою отримати відповідь на поставлене запитання. Результати аналізу показують, що представники української еліти мають змішані почуття щодо існуючих програм допомоги Україні з боку ЄС; багато респондентів обурені умовами, висунутими ЄС, проте вони й не очікують на відсутність умов як таких. Численні представники української еліти прагнуть досягнення Україною європейських стандартів у законодавстві і добробуті громадян, але водночас надають перевагу самостійній розбудові незалежної держави. І Україна, і Росія сприймаються метонімічно – як носії двох систем цінностей та геополітичних прагнень; і жодна з цих систем не задовольняє вимоги українців. У висновку ми стверджуємо, що хоча дії, подібні до плану Маршалла, можуть бути корисними, їх навряд чи можна розглядати як об'єднуючий суспільний наратив та основу для співробітництва та розвитку.

In 1947, the United States of America launched the European Recovery Programme to support the post-war reconstruction of Europe. The Marshall Plan, as it became known after U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, was one of the major success stories of US foreign policy in the twentieth century. The notion of an EU Recovery Programme for Ukraine provoked interest – and division in Ukraine. The enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007 demonstrated the EU's capacity to mount grand economic and political projects. However, since then, the EU has faced difficulties exerting influence and constructing a coherent narrative of its role in the European neighbourhood and the wider world. Would a more transformative aid and development programme for its Ukrainian neighbour offer an opportunity for the EU as well as Ukraine? In this article we use a series of elite interviews conducted across Ukraine in 2016-17 to explore how such a notion is understood. We find that Ukrainian elites have mixed feelings about existing EU aid programmes; many respondents resented the conditions the EU imposes, but nor do they want or expect aid to be given unconditionally. Whilst many aspire for Ukraine to reach EU standards of law and prosperity, Ukrainian elites favour self-help in their efforts to forge a stable sovereign state. Both the EU and Russia are understood as metonymies – as standing for two sets of values and geopolitical futures – and neither quite fit what Ukrainians seek. We conclude that whilst a Marshall Plan- style action could have benefits, it is not desired as a basis for a shared narrative and basis of cooperation and development.

This article takes a strategic narrative approach to explaining the current and likely future contestation between Russia and the West. We argue that Russia projects a strategic narrative that seeks to reinforce Russia's global prestige and authority, whilst promoting multilateral legal and institutional constraints on the other more powerful actors, as a means to ensure Russia stays among the top ranking great powers. To illustrate this we analyze Russia's identity narratives, international system narratives and issue narratives present in policy documents and speeches by key players since 2000. This enables the identification of remarkably consistency in Russia's narratives and potential points of convergence with Western powers around commitment to international law and systemic shifts to an increasingly multipolar order. However, we explain why the different meanings attributed to these phenomena generate contestation rather than alignment about past, present and future global power relations. We argue that Russia's historical-facing narratives and weakened material circumstances have the potential to hamper its adaptation to rapid systemic change, and to make attempts to forge closer cooperation with third parties challenging.

This article takes a strategic narrative approach to explaining the current and likely future contestation between Russia and the West. We argue that Russia projects a strategic narrative that seeks to reinforce Russia's global prestige and authority, whilst promoting multilateral legal and institutional constraints on the other more powerful actors, as a means to ensure Russia stays among the top ranking great powers. To illustrate this we analyze Russia's identity narratives, international system narratives and issue narratives present in policy documents and speeches by key players since 2000. This enables the identification of remarkably consistency in Russia's narratives and potential points of convergence with Western powers around commitment to international law and systemic shifts to an increasingly multipolar order. However, we explain why the different meanings attributed to these phenomena generate contestation rather than alignment about past, present and future global power relations. We argue that Russia's historical-facing narratives and weakened material circumstances have the potential to hamper its adaptation to rapid systemic change, and to make attempts to forge closer cooperation with third parties challenging.

This article takes a strategic narrative approach to explaining the current and likely future contestation between Russia and the West. We argue that Russia projects a strategic narrative that seeks to reinforce Russia's global prestige and authority, whilst promoting multilateral legal and institutional constraints on the other more powerful actors, as a means to ensure Russia stays among the top ranking great powers. To illustrate this we analyze Russia's identity narratives, international system narratives and issue narratives present in policy documents and speeches by key players since 2000. This enables the identification of remarkably consistency in Russia's narratives and potential points of convergence with Western powers around commitment to international law and systemic shifts to an increasingly multipolar order. However, we explain why the different meanings attributed to these phenomena generate contestation rather than alignment about past, present and future global power relations. We argue that Russia's historical-facing narratives and weakened material circumstances have the potential to hamper its adaptation to rapid systemic change, and to make attempts to forge closer cooperation with third parties challenging.

- As the 2010 UK General Election saw an increased use of social media by politicians, activists, journalists and citizens, a number of consultancy firms began "semantic polling" – the employment of natural language processing technology to "read" and codify vast datasets gathered online, and then the use of this data to illustrate and understand public opinion. - The semantic polling techniques employed are largely experimental and vary widely between firms. There is also very limited methodological transparency. This is problematic as academic research suggests that statements about public opinion made in media can actually drive as well as reflect popular attitudes. - Both those carrying out semantic analysis and those in the media reporting it have a responsibility to offer appropriate explanations about the meaning and limitations of the conclusions, and the methods used in data analysis. They can do this by: increasing media literacy among citizens; increasing data literacy among journalists and editors; developing structures for self-regulation; and developing institutions that ensure a greater level of methodological transparency.

During the last decade, a media-security nexus has emerged that has exacerbated pervasive feelings of the precariousness of citizenship among British Muslims. Legally, citizenship became reversible while political and media discourses and religious discrimination compounded by racism created deep unease about belonging, identity and the very possibility of multicultural citizenship. With diminishing prospects for effective participation in formal political processes, except through the domineering framework of counter-terrorism, young British Muslims sought alternative arenas and modes of political debate and engagement. They expressed their dissent from the suffocating politics of security in informal ways that were deemed efficacious in their own terms. While a sense of loss of status and respect, and deep disappointment at how fellow Muslims were being vilified, was present among older generations, young British Muslims responded in politically creative ways that can be described as 'dissenting citizenship'. This article reflects on findings from an ESRC-funded collaborative ethnography, Shifting Securities, conducted across 12 cities in Britain between 2004 and 2007 that investigated how a very diverse, multi-ethnic group of some 239 British people experienced citizenship and security in a time of relentless news of terrorism, conflict and natural disaster catastrophes and 'creeping securitisation' in day-to-day life in Britain. Our research suggests that dissenting rather than disaffected citizenship is a growing trend particularly among multi-ethnic youth who aspire to work critically within and revitalise mainstream politics to safeguard their citizenship status via local and translocal personalised forms of political action rather than engage in conventional forms of national party politics. Adapted from the source document.

This paper advances the study of microblogging and political events by investigating how one high-profile broadcast acted as a stimulus to real-time commentary from viewers using Twitter. Our case study is a controversial, high-ratings episode of BBC Question Time, the weekly British political debate show, in October 2009, in which Nick Griffin, leader of the far-right British National Party, appeared as a panelist. The "viewertariat" emerging around such a political event affords the opportunity to explore interaction across media formats. We examine both the structural elements of engagement online and the expressions of collective identity expressed in tweets. Although many concerns noted in previous studies of online political engagement remain (inequality in the propensity to comment, coarseness of tone), we find certain notable characteristics in the sample, especially a direct link between the quantity of tweets and events on the screen, an ability to preempt the arguments offered by panelists, and ways in which viewertariat members add new content to the discussion. Furthermore, Twitter users commenting online express a range of overlapping identities. These complexities challenge broadcasting and political institutions seeking to integrate new, more organic models of engagement.