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Retributive responses play a role in human behavior. Are they triggered primarily by supposed intentions or by observed consequences of actions? Experimental studies were conducted of retributive responses in situations in which the individual actor may inflict harmful consequences without intending to and intend harmful consequences without inflicting them. Results indicate that retributive responses are more strongly influenced by observed consequences than ascribed intentions. However, individual retributive motivations seem to be overshadowed by concerns that are nonretributive altogether, in that they focus on end-state distributions independently of who brought them about.

Retributive responses play a role in human behavior. Are they triggered primarily by supposed intentions, or by observed consequences of actions? Experimental studies were conducted of retributive responses in situations in which the individual actor might inflict harmful consequences without intending to & intend harmful consequences without inflicting them. Results indicate that retributive responses are more strongly influenced by observed consequences than ascribed intentions. However, individual retributive motivations seem to be overshadowed by concerns that are nonretributive altogether, in that they focus on end-state distributions independently of who brought them about. 3 Tables, 1 Figure, 1 Appendix, 15 References. Adapted from the source document.

We study experimentally when, why, and how people intervene in others' choices. Choice Architects (CAs) construct opportunity sets containing bundles of time-indexed payments for Choosers. CAs frequently prevent impatient choices despite opportunities to provide advice, believing Choosers benefit. They violate common behavioral welfare criteria by removing impatient options even when all payoffs are delayed. CAs intervene not by removing options they wish they could resist when choosing for themselves (mistakes-projective paternalism), but rather as if they seek to align others' choices with their own aspirations (ideals-projective paternalism). Laboratory choices predict subjects' support for actual paternalistic policies. (JEL C92, D12, D15)

AbstractThe provision of trader feedback is critical to the functioning of many markets. We examine the influence of group identity on the volunteering and informativeness of feedback. In a market experiment conducted simultaneously in Germany and the United States, we manipulate the interaction of traders based on natural social and induced home market identities. Traders are more likely to provide feedback information on a trader with whom they share a common group identity, and the effect is more pronounced for social identity than for home market identity. Both kinds of group identity promote rewarding good performance and punishing bad performance.