Abstract Argument about legal fees in the early modern period. Part 2: jurisdiction and types of procedure. Part II of this investigation, following ZRG GA 132 (2015), pp. 152-218, describes the practice of the courts. What were the possibilities for procurators to sue for their fees if the parties did not pay them? Most aspects of procedural law were quite unknown until now: The Rescripts of the Aulic Council and the Mandata de solvendo of the Wismar Tribunal were complete different ways for the procurators to get their fees. Not surprisingly, the Wismar procedures seem the more powerful and effective ones, enabling the administrative and jurisdictional organization of the Swedish territory to sue in a promising way. On the other hand, the procedures at the Imperial courts show, up to the end of the Old Empire in the summer of 1806, the typical weakness, even if some effective bureaucracy can be observed.
Argument about legal fees in the early modern period. Part 1: Methodic foundation, advocates' contracts and payment modalities. Early modern records of proceedings consist mainly of advocates' legal papers. Nevertheless, one does know just a little about the procurators and advocates and their cooperation with the legal parties, especially if they were no aristocrats, but subjects. However, if the parties did not pay their advocate and the advocates then asserted their fee claim in court, a number of records of proceedings have regularly survived and provide full information about the advocate's and client's relation. Next to the proxy, there was the commission as actual advocates' contract. Regardless of the normative standards, the procurators drafted their contracts mostly as continuing obligations in addition with a yearly fixed fee. The contribution analyses and compares the practical contracting at the Imperial Chamber Court with the Imperial Aulic Council and the Wismar Court of Appeal. Herein the Arrha, an additional item on the invoice, and the attempt to assert contingency fees come into focus. Methodically, the paper pleads in favour of the history of legal practice, which in its valuations renounces itself mostly from the standards of normative sources.