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Many studies have examined the formation of interstate rivalries, but few provide a theoretical mechanism capable of explaining why some neighboring states experience protracted conflict while others do not. To address this question, we theoretically link bargaining theories of conflict with issue-based explanations of conflict to offer a novel application of the commitment problem mechanism. We argue that when neighboring states disagree over border territory endowed with a potential source of power (i.e. strategic or economic value), it is difficult for either side to commit credibly in the future to comply with agreements made today. Consequently, neighboring states may be reluctant to make concessions that could enhance their adversary's future bargaining power. This reluctance, in turn, increases the likelihood of bargaining failure, thereby also increasing the likelihood that the dispute festers and the relationship evolves into a rivalry. Using recently reported data on border settlement and three measures of rivalry, we find systematic evidence for our theoretical expectations. Unsettled borders increase the likelihood of rivalry onset. This relationship, however, seems driven by border territory containing strategic and economic endowments – the exact type of territory that theoretically drives commitment problems. We therefore conclude that not all territory matters for the onset of contiguous rivalries.

Motivations for conflict management are rarely discussed in terms of commitments that potential third-parties have toward one or both disputants. The current study addresses this lacuna by examining how alliance designs affect conflict management behavior. Specifically, we argue that third-party states' willingness to manage interstate conflicts depends on both the existence and depth of an alliance relationship. We test this argument using data on conflict management within militarized interstate disputes during the period 1946-2000. We find that allies are more likely than non-allies to manage their partner's disputes. Underneath this aggregate relationship, however, we also find that the depth of alliance commitments strongly influences this behavior. Deeper commitments - both across and within alliance types - increase the likelihood of conflict management significantly. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThis study examines how different conflict-management attempts over a broad time period affect the dynamics of one dimension of international–civil militarized conflict (I-CMC): the hostility–peace levels of relationships between states involved in those conflicts as well as the frequency and severity of their interactions. Using new data compilations on these conflicts and the management efforts embedded in them, we assess how effective each of the approaches and various contextual influences are in moderating state–state hostilities as well as the relative effectiveness (e.g., mediation versus military intervention). Our empirical analysis confirms that conflict-management efforts generally, and with respect to different management types, do not alter the overall hostile–peaceful relationships between states involved in I-CMCs. The empirical results on micro effects of conflict management produced clearer impacts from conflict-management approaches and contextual factors. In terms of mitigating conflict frequency, negotiation, military intervention, and peace operations had some negative effects on the time density of future militarized disputes. All approaches (the above three and mediation) were able to delay the onset of new disputes. Various contextual factors enhanced or mitigated the effects of conflict-management approaches.

This study examines international-civil militarized conflicts (I-CMCs), those that lie at the intersection of violent intra- and interstate conflict. The data compilation identifies I-CMCs and the different conflict management approaches specifically used to manage them (i.e., negotiation, mediation, legal, peacekeeping, sanctions, and military intervention). We describe the patterns of conflict management in I-CMCs over the period 1946–2010, with respect to both serious civil and interstate conflicts. Among the key findings are that conflict management in general is very frequent (about 18 attempts per interstate confrontation and much more for serious internal conflict) and mediation is by far the most frequent approach.

We introduce a dataset that focuses on the delimitation of interstate borders under international law—the International Border Agreements Dataset (IBAD). This dataset contains information on the agents involved in (e.g. states, third-parties, and colonial powers), methods used during (e.g. negotiation, mediation, arbitration, adjudication, administrative decrees, post-war conferences, and plebiscites), and outcomes of (e.g. full and intermediate agreements) the border settlement process during the period 1816–2001. Our focus on international legal agreements and the process that produces them makes the IBAD valuable for those that study not only territorial conflict, but also international conflict, cooperation, law, and conflict management.

How does border settlement—that is, the management of salient territorial conflict—affect the prospects for negative peace? Using recently released data on dyadic interstate relationships during the period 1946–2001, we build on territorial peace research to argue, predict, and find three connections between border settlement and negative peace. More specifically, border settlement: (a) increases the likelihood that a dyad is at negative peace; (b) raises the likelihood that dyads transition from rivalry to negative peace relationships; and (c) consolidates negative peace—by impeding transitions toward rivalry relationships. We confirm each of these findings with a commonly used measure of border settlement, as well as an alternative indicator of unsettled borders: civil wars. These findings cumulatively support our argument, demonstrate the importance of studying relationships outside the rivalry context, and suggest that border settlement plays a critical role in the emergence and consolidation of negative peace.

Research on interstate mediation tends to assume (implicitly) that regional factors have little effect on the occurrence of mediation. We relax this assumption and advance an explicit regional theory of mediation in which regional ties create a type of bias that motivates both (potential) third parties to mediate conflicts within their region and disputants to select or accept these regional actors as mediators more frequently than non-regional actors. This bias first appears when states belong to the same region. In such situations, the potential third party and disputants likely understand one another better and share common security concerns. Yet regional membership does not explain the variation in mediation behavior within regions. To account for this, we argue that regionally more powerful states, as well as those that share (regional) institutional memberships with the disputants, have greater incentives to mediate than some regional counterparts. We empirically test the effect of these characteristics on the likelihood of mediation in militarized interstate disputes during the period 1946–2000. Our findings uncover support for our argument and suggest that accounting for regional bias is important in explaining mediation patterns in interstate conflict.

Research on interstate mediation tends to assume (implicitly) that regional factors have little effect on the occurrence of mediation. We relax this assumption and advance an explicit regional theory of mediation in which regional ties create a type of bias that motivates both (potential) third parties to mediate conflicts within their region and disputants to select or accept these regional actors as mediators more frequently than non-regional actors. This bias first appears when states belong to the same region. In such situations, the potential third party and disputants likely understand one another better and share common security concerns. Yet regional membership does not explain the variation in mediation behavior within regions. To account for this, we argue that regionally more powerful states, as well as those that share (regional) institutional memberships with the disputants, have greater incentives to mediate than some regional counterparts. We empirically test the effect of these characteristics on the likelihood of mediation in militarized interstate disputes during the period 1946-2000. Our findings uncover support for our argument and suggest that accounting for regional bias is important in explaining mediation patterns in interstate conflict. Adapted from the source document.

Once the Cold War ended, the international community expanded the mandates given to its peace operations. Traditional thinking suggests that this trend occurred because of an increase in the number and a shift in the type of conflicts prevalent in the international system. This "demand side" explanation argues that as predominant conflict in the system changes from interstate to intrastate, the tasks shift accordingly from traditional peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Despite the persistence of this argument, no systematic studies exist that empirically test its validity. Considering conflict and peace operation patterns since 1945, we analyze whether conflict occurrence, conflict type, negotiated agreements, and international intervention changed fundamentally after the Cold War. We find that patterns of interstate and intrastate conflicts provide some limited support for this demand side argument, but the greatest support comes from the proliferation of negotiated agreements that terminate conflicts, in which disputants often request peacebuilding assistance.