Suchergebnisse

In the 20 years since "obsolete" infrastructure was discovered as a public policy problem by the academic and policy communities (see Peterson, 1978), federal and state infrastructure programs have been proposed, debated, and, in many cases, implemented—but frequently they have not. Yet, as much as policy makers would like to learn from these programs or be informed by theories about grant designs, the literature and evaluations on these infrastructure programs do not speak with one voice; conflicting conclusions and policy recommendations abound. The purpose of this article is to sketch out some elements of an infrastructure grants research agenda that are in need of clarification, specification, and rethinking. In particular, this article examines reasons for infrastructure's relative invisibility in municipal budgeting, the design and intended effects of infrastructure grants policy by federal and state governments, and future issues surrounding infrastructure.

Cities, like states, have faced serious fiscal challenges and decisions during the economically strained 1992 year. This article is an analysis of cities' fiscal situation and policies of 1992. Specifically, cities' fiscal status, varied coping fiscal policy actions, and the relation between ending balances and fiscal policy are addressed.

This article extrapolates into the next decade the probable changes in state-local relations and emphasizes three central themes: (1) fiscal federalism, (2) localism, and (3) state-local cooperation. The principal argument is that the nature, success, and prognosis of state-local relations for the foreseeable future depend largely on the fiscal health of state and local governments and the fiscal ties between the two sets of governments. Demands for constitutional and statutory autonomy for local governments, levels of satisfaction and discord between state and local governments, and the flexibility and constraints imposed upon the revenue-generating capacity of local governments reflect the larger and more dominant variable of fiscal well-being.

Building on the theoretical tradition established by Cyert and March, March and Simon, and Wolman, local government is conceived as a social organization engaged in problem-solving activities that maintain an equilibrium between the organization and its external environment. Analyzing 234 cities' fiscal responses to disruptions in the external environment, the author concludes (1) that revenue dedication for capital purposes has not resulted in increasing capital spending, (2) that cities turn to cost-shifting mechanisms primarily because of fiscal pressures, and (3) that capital-spending plans of cities are in general more revenue-elastic than operating programs. These findings confirm the expectations that cities adjust and adapt to their external environment.

THE FEDERAL TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 PROMISED TO BE FAIR, SIMPLE, AND REVENUE-NEUTRAL TO THE FEDERAL TREASURY. TAX REFORM, HOWEVER, WAS NOT REVENUE-NEUTRAL WITH RESPECT TO ALL STATE AND LOCAL TREASURIES. INDEED, TAX REFORM ENTAILED A RESTRUCTING OF THE BALANCE OF POWER IN FEDERALSTATE-LOCAL RELATIONS. IN PARTICULAR, NEW RESTRICTIONS ON THE TAX-EXEMPT BOND AUTHORITY OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ARE REQUIRING SIGNIFICANT SHIFTS IN TRADITIONAL LOCAL DEBT POLICY. FURTHERMORE, THE SUPREME COURTHS DECISION, SOUTH CAROLINA V. BAKER, RAISES ADDITIONAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE STATUS OF STATE AND LOCAL TAX-EXEMPT BOND ISSUES. THE NATURE OF FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IS LIKELY TO BE MOLDED MORE BY THE FEDERAL TAX CODE AND BY EROSION IN STATE AUTHORITY OVER FISCAL MATTERS THAN BY FEDERAL GRANT-IN-AID PROGRAMS OF THE KIND THAT HAVE CHARACTERIZED THE PAST QUARTER CENTURY OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS.

The Tax Reform Act of 1986.