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This authoritative account explores the facts that lie behind the Weapons of Mass Destruction programmes in Iraq. Graham Pearson shows how these programmes were gradually uncovered through the efforts of UN specialist exerts, then by UNSCOM and UNMOVIC and finally by the Iraq Survey Group

"The danger of biological warfare has rightly received increasing attention during the past decade. Although 143 State Parties have signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), there have been reports of around a dozen states possessing or seeking to possess biological weapons. There is even a view that the potential threat from biological and chemical weapons is greater than that from nuclear weapons. Biological warfare programme are also being considered for counter-insurgency use and tactical applications in the regional conflicts. Even small groups appear to have the means to launch a biological attack, an example of which was the attack with the nerve gas, sarin, in a Tokyo subway, in 1994, Defence against biological attacks has so far received little attention.This article begins with an assessment of the potential biological threat and considers the vulnerabilities of states facing such threat. It then considers the role of political-military coalitions in meeting the challenges of the aggressor and goes on to evaluate and identify the vulnerabilities of coalition partners. It also addresses the measures necessary to minimise those vulnerabilities, by active and passive defence, and examines the role biotechnology in such protective measures. It then briefly surveys the biological warfare defence capabilities of different countries. It concludes with a discussion of policy initiatives useful for addressing gaps by promoting cooperation among the interested parties. The key elements of protective measures against biological and toxin weapons attack are hazard assessment, detection, physical protection, identification and diagnosis, and medical countermeasures. Biotechnology is vital for further advances in all these areas for both civil and military requirements

Yes ; Article IV of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention sets out the obligation for States Parties to implement the BTWC through appropriate national measures. Although some States have enacted such legislation, others have not and the Aum Shinrikyo incident in Tokyo in March 1995 underlined the importance of appropriate penal legislation both to implement the BTWC (and the Chemical Weapons Convention) and to criminalise any development, production, stockpiling or acquisition of such weapons for terrorist or criminal purposes. This Briefing Paper reviews the development of the language relating to Article IV of the BTWC by the four Review Conferences, notes the requirements of the Chemical Weapons Convention and then addresses the opportunity provided by the Ad Hoc Group negotiations to strengthen the BTWC through stronger implementation measures.

The unravelling of the human genetic code whose first draft was announced in June 2000 has rightly blood been hailed as a momentous achievement, opening thc book of life, certain to be the dominant technology of the 21st century, which will inform all about medicine and biology. and lead us to a total understanding of life. Simultaneously, concerns have been expressed about thc implications of this work. In the past, major new technologies have been used intensively for hostile purposes. What is thc challenge that biotechnology poses in this regard'? This review paper looks at the enormous changes in civil society that thc genomics revolution could bring. Against this background, thc growing concerns about its potential misuses have been reviewed. Thc strengths and weaknesses or the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) are then touched upon. The BTWC presently lacks an adequate verification mechanism. Although biotechnology has been used by human beings since prehistoric times (eg. making of bread. cheese. wines) its scientific understanding came only in the latter part of the 19th century. Thc decisive turning point in the field came in the 1970s with the advent of genetic engineering. In the military context classical agents like anthrax and toxin remain the threat today. Although thc current level or sophistication for many biological agents is low, there is enormous potential for making more sophisticated weapons. It might be possible to specifically target the genetic makeup of different ethnic groups. The limited varieties of staple crops and the limited strains of modern animals make agriculture particularly open to attack. Another serious possibility is the impact of genomics in neuroscience. With a better understanding of cellular receptor systems and bioregulators, it is not inconceivable that new means would be evolved for disturbing the functions of the nervous system. Thc genomics revolution can be used for peaceful purposes. However, a key requirement is the political will to bring into force a Protocol to strengthen thc BTWC.

The Fourth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention was held November 25 to December 6, 1996. It successfully re-emphasized the norm against biological warfare, usefully broadening this to include molecular biology and applications resulting from genome studies. It also emphasized that use in any way and under any circumstances would be a violation of Article I. Disappointingly, compliance concerns regarding Iraq and the former Soviet Union were less strongly addressed. Article IV and the importance of national legislation as a potential counter to possible terrorist use was underlined. The importance of the existing confidence-building measures (CBMs) was confirmed and the work of the Ad Hoc Group was strongly endorsed, with a change to a negotiating format being explicitly stated, although without setting the target date of 1998 for completion. Article X was re-emphasized, with special note made of the advances made at the Rio Summit, Agenda 21, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and of the initiatives being taken by the World Health Organization to counter new, emerging, and re-emerging infectious diseases. This article addresses the issues, outcomes, and unfinished business of the Fourth Review Conference.