Progressive taxation and tax morale
In: Public choice, Band 155, Heft 3, S. 293-316
ISSN: 0048-5829
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In: Public choice, Band 155, Heft 3, S. 293-316
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 14-002
SSRN
Working paper
In: Public choice, Band 155, Heft 3-4
ISSN: 1573-7101
Due to strong evidence indicating that tax morale affects actual tax-paying behavior, finding the determinants of tax morale could help both to understand and to fight tax evasion. In this paper we analyze the effect of progressive taxation on individual tax morale using a cross-country approach-a research question that has not been investigated in the existing literature. Our theoretical analysis leads to two testable predictions. First, an individual's tax morale is higher, the more progressive the tax schedule is. Second, the positive impact of tax progressivity on tax morale declines with income. In our empirical analysis we make use of a unique dataset of tax progressivity measures, namely the World Tax Indicators, and follow most of the tax morale literature by employing the World Values Survey to measure individual tax morale. Controlling for a wide range of potential confounders, we are able to confirm both hypotheses in our empirical analysis. Adapted from the source document.
Recent discussions about rising inequality in industrialized countries have triggered calls for more government intervention and redistribution. Due to obvious behavioral effects caused by redistribution, it is however not clear whether redistributional policies are indeed able to combat inequality. This paper contributes to this relevant research question by using different contextual country-level data sources to study inequality trends in OECD countries since the 1980s. We first investigate the development of inequality over time before analyzing the question of whether governments can effectively reduce inequality. Different identification strategies, using fixed effects and instrumental variables models, provide some evidence that governments are capable of reducing income inequality despite countervailing behavioral adjustments. The effect is stronger for social expenditure policies than for progressive taxation, which seems to trigger more inequality increasing indirect behavioral effects. Our results also suggest that the use of secondary inequality data should be handled with caution.
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The view is widespread that there are just two options for the future of the Eurozone – either it is complemented by a fiscal union, or it will fall apart. In this paper, we discuss five possible elements of a fiscal union, of which three are in the centre of the current debate on fiscal union in the Eurozone. Second, we argue that the fiscal union will only work if political integration in Europe goes significantly beyond the current state of affairs. Third, we suggest an alternative approach, which places less emphasis on centralised fiscal policy coordination and focuses on financial sector reform, decentralised responsibility for government debt and sovereign debt restructurings in the case of fiscal crises.
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3815
SSRN
Working paper
In: Public choice, Band 155, Heft 3-4, S. 293-316
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3518
SSRN
There is clear evidence that fairness plays a role in redistribution. Individuals want to compensate others for their misfortune, while they allow them to enjoy the fruits of their effort. Such fairness considerations have been introduced in political economy and optimal income tax models with a focus on income acquisition. However, actual tax-benefit systems are based on much more information. We introduce fairness in a tax-benefit scheme that is based on several characteristics. The novelty is the introduction of partial control. Each characteristic differs in terms of the degree of control, i.e., the extent to which it can be changed by exerting effort. Two testable predictions result. First, the tax rate on partially controllable characteristics should be lower compared to the tax rate on non-controllable tags. Second, the total effect of non-controllable characteristics on the post-tax outcome should be equal to zero. We estimate implicit tax rates for different characteristics in 26 European countries (using EU-SILC data) and the US (using CPS data). We find a robust tendency in all countries to compensate more for the uncontrollable composite characteristic (based on sex, age and disability in our study) compared to the partially controllable one (based on family composition, immigration status, unemployment and education level). We also estimate the degree of fairness of tax-benefit schemes in different countries. Only the Continental countries France and Luxembourg pass the fairness test, whereas the Baltic and Anglo-Saxon countries (including the US) perform worst.
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Ökonomische Effizienz und soziale Gerechtigkeit stehen nicht im Widerspruch zueinander. Workfare ist sozial gerecht. Durch das Prinzip von Leistung und Gegenleistung wird dafür gesorgt, dass sich die Inanspruchnahme von Leistungen der Grundsicherung auf diejenigen beschränkt, die tatsächlich bedürftig sind.
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In: Journal of policy modeling: JPMOD ; a social science forum of world issues, Band 31, Heft 5, S. 620-636
ISSN: 0161-8938
In: Journal of policy modeling: JPMOD ; a social science forum of world issues, Band 31, Heft 5, S. 620-637
ISSN: 0161-8938
In: Review of economics: Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Band 59, Heft 2, S. 94-113
ISSN: 2366-035X
Summary
The economic literature often argues that basic income schemes and low wage subsidies to employees are just special cases of a negative income tax. In this debate, it is ignored that these concepts target different population subgroups. This paper investigates the different target groups and the particular implications on government budget and labour supply. A basic income scheme doubles the number of net benefit receiving persons whereas a more targeted wage subsidy increases this number by only 10 %. These differences explain why wage subsidy programs can be financed and evoke positive labour supply effects, while basic income schemes either lead to high costs or to negative employment effects.
In der ökonomischen Literatur wird oft argumentiert, dass Kombilohnmodelle und Grundeinkommenskonzepte im Prinzip nur Varianten einer negativen Einkommenssteuer seien. Dabei wird oft übersehen, dass diese Konzepte sehr unterschiedliche Gruppen der Bevölkerung einbeziehen. Dieser Beitrag bietet einen empirischen Vergleich der Bezugsgruppen dieser Konzepte. Wir zeigen, dass der Übergang zu einem selbst restriktiv ausgestalteten Grundeinkommen die Zahl der Transferempfänger gegenüber dem Status quo ungefähr verdoppeln würde. Beim Kombilohn würde die Zahl der Transferempfänger hingegen nur um rund zehn Prozent ansteigen. Das hat Folgen für die Finanzierbarkeit und die Beschäftigungswirkungen. Das zentrale Resultat unserer Analyse lautet, dass der Unterschied im Empfängerkreis letztlich die Ursache dafür darstellt, dass Kombilohnkonzepte finanzierbar sind und positive Beschäftigungswirkungen entfalten können, während Grundeinkommenskonzepte entweder nicht finanzierbar sind, oder, wegen der erforderlichen Gegenfinanzierung, negative Beschäftigungswirkungen entfalten. ; The economic literature often argues that basic income schemes and low wage subsidies to employees are just special cases of a negative income tax. In this debate, it is ignored that these concepts target different population subgroups. This paper investigates the different target groups and the particular implications on government budget and labour supply. A basic income scheme doubles the number of net benefit receiving persons whereas a more targeted wage subsidy increases this number by only 10%. These differences explain why wage subsidy programs can be financed and evoke positive labour supply effects, while basic income schemes either lead to high costs or to negative employment effects.
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Die empirische Messung der Wohlfahrtswirkungen von Steuerreformen hat noch nicht den Stand der theoretischen Literatur erreicht. Das Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es, die theoretischen Konzepte der Wohlfahrtsmessung mit der Technik der Mikrosimulation zu verbinden. Hierdurch soll die Möglichkeit geschaffen werden die Wohlfahrtswirkungen von verschiedenen Reformvorschlägen in einer ex-ante-Analyse empirisch abzuschätzen. Als Anwendung des Wohlfahrtsmoduls werden die Wohlfahrtswirkungen berechnet, die durch einen Übergang des aktuellen Steuersystems zu drei verschiedenen Flat-Rate-Tax-Varianten auftreten würden. Als Ergebnis dieser Analyse bleibt festzuhalten, dass es durch Einführung einer Flat-Rate-Tax möglich ist die Effizienz der Steuererhebung zu steigern. Allerdings ist hierbei zu beachten, dass diese Effizienzsteigerung durch eine Mehrbelastung der unteren und mittleren Einkommensschichten erzielt würde und somit sozialpolitisch fragwürdig ist. ; This paper combines the theoretical cognition of welfare measurement with the technique of microsimulation allowing to quantify the welfare e¤ects and the excess burden of tax systems and tax reforms. The newly developed microsimulation module is applied on several flat tax reform scenarios which can decrease the excess burden caused by the tax system depending on the tax schedule parameters.
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