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Dissociation from international institutions, i.e., states turning away from international cooperation and organizations, is a widespread phenomenon today. It often leads to significant tensions between the states that turn away and those that remain committed to an institution. This introduction to a forum on dissociation from international institutions reviews the state of the art and develops a framework for analyzing the impact of dissociation on relations between departing and remaining states. It centers on the hypothesis that dissociation leads to two types of conflicts between states, ideational and distributive, with ideational conflicts more likely to increase tensions between states. The article then reviews the five cases of dissocia-tion examined in the other contributions to the forum and summarizes their main individual and comparative findings. Taken together, the five cases suggest that dissociation can exacerbate broader structural conflicts between states; that how parties perceive of conflict during the dissociation process matters for its effects on interstate relations and that an emphasis on ideational conflict leads to more confrontational relations; and that domestic politics matter greatly not only for whether dissociation occurs but also for its effects on interstate relations.

Vor dem Hintergrund der aktuellen Krisensymptome liberaler Friedensstrategien entwickelt dieser Beitrag die Konturen eines Forschungsprogramms, das Krisen institutioneller Ordnungen und Prozesse der Dissoziation in den Blick nimmt. Es geht davon aus, dass das Ausscheren von Staaten aus institutionalisierten Ordnungen oft mit hohen Spannungen einhergeht. Die Aufgabe eines solchen Forschungsprogramms besteht folglich darin, die Dynamik derartiger Prozesse besser zu verstehen und zu prüfen, ob und wie sich Dissoziation weniger spannungsreich organisieren lässt.

While parliaments have long been neglected actors in the analysis of security policy, a research literature on the subject is growing. Current research is focused primarily on how parliaments, relying on formal legal competences, can constrain governmental policies. However, this research needs expansion in three areas. First, informal sources of parliamentary influence on security policy deserve more systematic attention as the significance of parliaments often hinges on contextual factors and individual decision-makers. Second, we still lack a systematic understanding of the effects of parliamentary involvement on security policy. Finally, the role of parliaments for the politics of security is almost completely uncharted territory. When parliaments become involved in security policy, does it foster transparency and contribute to the politicisation of security policy so that security policy becomes a 'normal' political issue? The article reviews current research, derives findings from the contributions to this Special Issue, and spells out their wider implications.

Since the 1990s, parliaments in many democracies have become more involved in the formulation and implementation of security policy. A growing number of studies in comparative politics and international relations address this phenomenon and examine the role of parliaments in decisions on war and peace, particularly on the deployment of military forces. This article reviews and summarizes this research and identifies three major trends in recent contributions. Research increasingly moves beyond a focus on formal competences and the right of parliaments to veto deployments, beyond treating parliaments as unitary actors, and beyond an exclusive focus on individual national parliaments.

Parliamentary oversight of the military constitutes an important element of the civilian control of the armed forces. However, the strength of parliaments in this realm varies greatly across democracies and little is known about the sources of this variation. We propose an explanation for one key aspect of this variation: why does parliament enjoy veto power over military deployments in some democracies but not in others? Our analysis of data from forty-nine democracies around the world suggests that at least three factors account for parliamentary strength or weakness in this realm: the external threat to which a country is exposed, its constitutional tradition, and the experience of severe military failure in the past. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society/Sage Publications Inc.]

Parliamentary oversight of the military constitutes an important element of the civilian control of the armed forces. However, the strength of parliaments in this realm varies greatly across democracies and little is known about the sources of this variation. We propose an explanation for one key aspect of this variation: why does parliament enjoy veto power over military deployments in some democracies but not in others? Our analysis of data from forty-nine democracies around the world suggests that at least three factors account for parliamentary strength or weakness in this realm: the external threat to which a country is exposed, its constitutional tradition, and the experience of severe military failure in the past.

"Parlamenten Mitbestimmungsrechte bei der Entsendung von Streitkräften einzuräumen, kann die demokratische Legitimität der Einsätze erhöhen, je nach Gestaltung der Entscheidungsregeln aber auch deren militärische Effizienz gefährden. Der Beitrag untersucht, wie Demokratien weltweit angesichts dieser Herausforderung ihre Entsenderegeln gestaltet haben. Anhand einer neuen Daten-sammlung für 49 Demokratien im Zeitraum 1989-2004 geben die Autoren einen Überblick darüber, welche Vielfalt an Mitbestimmungsrechten mittlerweile existiert. Dabei zeigt sich, dass es seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges keinen Trend zur Parlamentarisierung der Entsende-rechte gibt. Vielmehr ist eine zunehmende Ausdifferenzierung der Rechte zu erkennen, durch die den Parlamenten eher Mitentscheidungsmöglichkeiten verloren gehen." (Autorenreferat)

Giving national parliaments a say in the deployment of military forces can increase the democratic legitimacy of these deployments. But, depending on how the rules are designed, it may also jeopardize their military efficiency. This paper examines how democracies around the globe deal with this challenge in their deployment rules. Using a new data set on deployment rules comprising 49 democracies worldwide from 1989 to 2004, we demonstrate how diverse these rules are. Overall, it becomes evident that there is no trend towards a parliamentarisation of deployment rules after 1989. Rather, deployment rules appear to become increasingly differentiated. In this process, parliaments tend to lose rather than to win opportunities to co-decide over military deployments. Adapted from the source document.