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The Sunni Islam movement is generally presented as the main enemy of the Baath regime in Syria-a regime dominated for the last forty years by members of the Alawite community. This movement will likely be called on to play a major political role in the event of a regime change and is said to be drawing up major reforms. But the reality is not that clear-cut, because the Islamist movement is not behind the current uprising. Protests are mainly taking shape in the primarily rural social classes that are not its traditional breeding ground. Furthermore, the advent of an Islamist regime would not automatically mark a major break with Syria's domestic and foreign policies. Not because there is no desire to break with the past, but because a new power will inevitably face the same economic and social problems as its predecessor. Adapted from the source document.

La mouvance islamique syrienne ne constitue pas un bloc homogène. Les Frères musulmans ne jouent aucun rôle sur le terrain durant le soulèvement de 2011 mais sont très présents dans l'opposition en exil. Leur autorité est contestée par de nouveaux acteurs islamistes comme le Courant islamique démocratique indépendant. Quant aux oulémas, ils sont divisés entre ceux qui soutiennent le régime et ceux qui s'engagent aux côtés des manifestants, à leurs risques et périls.

Cet article traite de l'élite religieuse sunnite syrienne, et en particulier des oulémas. Ces derniers n'appartiennent pas à proprement parler à un « champ religieux » intégré au niveau national mais plutôt à des scènes régionales juxtaposées, composant un paysage religieux spatialement très fragmenté. Sur le plan doctrinal, ils se réclament majoritairement de l'islam hérité de l'ère ottomane (ash'arite, « madhhabiste » et soufi), après avoir remporté une victoire sans appel sur leurs rivaux salafistes. En termes d'organisation, nombre d'entre eux appartiennent à des structures d'inspiration soufie, qu'il s'agisse de confréries proprement dites ou de groupes plus récents nommés jamâ'ât. Enfin, sur le plan institutionnel, le contrôle officiel est à la fois relatif, puisqu'il n'existe pas à proprement parler de « clergé d'État », et très contraignant, l'exécutif veillant à restreindre au maximum l'accès des acteurs religieux à la sphère politique.

En octobre 2007, un an après le discours de Ratisbonne de Benoît XVI, 138 religieux musulmans invitaient les chefs des Églises chrétiennes à « une parole commune entre vous et nous ». Au-delà d'un appel au dialogue, bienvenu mais convenu, qui sont ces religieux qui lancent cette parole collective ? Ils donnent un état des lieux des différentes sensibilités qui partagent l'Islam au niveau mondial aujourd'hui.

Cet article traite de l'élite religieuse sunnite syrienne, et en particulier des oulémas. Ces derniers n'appartiennent pas à proprement parler à un "champ religieux" intégré au niveau national mais plutôt à des scènes régionales juxtaposées, composant un paysage religieux spatialement très fragmenté. Sur le plan doctrinal, ils se réclament majoritairement de l'islam hérité de l'ère ottomane (ash'arite, "madhhabiste" et soufi), après avoir remporté une victoire sans appel sur leurs rivaux salafistes. En termes d'organisation, nombre d'entre eux appartiennent à des structures d'inspiration soufie, qu'il s'agisse de confréries proprement dites ou de groupes plus récents nommés "jamâ'ât". Enfin, sur le plan institutionnel, le contrôle officiel est à la fois relatif, puisqu'il n'existe pas à proprement parler de "clergé d'Etat", et très contraignant, l'exécutif veillant à restreindre au maximum l'accès des acteurs religieux à la sphère politique. (Maghreb-Machrek/GIGA)

International audience ; As of early July 2021, Syria had witnessed its longest period of time without major military developments since the start of the civil war in 2011. Indeed, frontlines did not significantly change during the sixteen months that followed the 5 March 2020 ceasefire negotiated by Russia and Turkey to put an end to a loyalist offensive against the rebel-held province of Idlib. This situation of frozen conflict was the ultimate consequence of successive foreign interventions on behalf of each of the main surviving warring parties. From 2014 onwards, the United States helped the Kurdish YPG (later turned into the backbone of the multiethnic Syrian Democratic Forces, hereafter SDF) to seize the eastern bank of the Euphrates from the Islamic State (IS) organization; the Trump Administration further shielded the SDF from regime encroachments while allowing Turkey to invade the regions of Afrin in January 2018, and Tell Abyad-Ras al-'Ayn in October 2019. After 2015, Russian and Iranian support enabled the Assad regime to re-establish its authority over most of western and central Syria, including, in 2018, the suburbs of Damascus and southern provinces. Finally, between 2016 and 2020, Turkish troops gradually secured a northwestern crescent including regions held by the rebel Syrian National Army, north of Aleppo, and the Islamist Hay'a Tahrir al-Sham (hereafter HTS, formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra), around Idlib. The recent absence of major military developments should not be construed as stability, however. Over the last year and a half, indeed, each of the abovementioned regions has been subject to endemic violence stemming from external and internal military actors.

International audience ; As of early July 2021, Syria had witnessed its longest period of time without major military developments since the start of the civil war in 2011. Indeed, frontlines did not significantly change during the sixteen months that followed the 5 March 2020 ceasefire negotiated by Russia and Turkey to put an end to a loyalist offensive against the rebel-held province of Idlib. This situation of frozen conflict was the ultimate consequence of successive foreign interventions on behalf of each of the main surviving warring parties. From 2014 onwards, the United States helped the Kurdish YPG (later turned into the backbone of the multiethnic Syrian Democratic Forces, hereafter SDF) to seize the eastern bank of the Euphrates from the Islamic State (IS) organization; the Trump Administration further shielded the SDF from regime encroachments while allowing Turkey to invade the regions of Afrin in January 2018, and Tell Abyad-Ras al-'Ayn in October 2019. After 2015, Russian and Iranian support enabled the Assad regime to re-establish its authority over most of western and central Syria, including, in 2018, the suburbs of Damascus and southern provinces. Finally, between 2016 and 2020, Turkish troops gradually secured a northwestern crescent including regions held by the rebel Syrian National Army, north of Aleppo, and the Islamist Hay'a Tahrir al-Sham (hereafter HTS, formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra), around Idlib. The recent absence of major military developments should not be construed as stability, however. Over the last year and a half, indeed, each of the abovementioned regions has been subject to endemic violence stemming from external and internal military actors.

International audience ; As of early July 2021, Syria had witnessed its longest period of time without major military developments since the start of the civil war in 2011. Indeed, frontlines did not significantly change during the sixteen months that followed the 5 March 2020 ceasefire negotiated by Russia and Turkey to put an end to a loyalist offensive against the rebel-held province of Idlib. This situation of frozen conflict was the ultimate consequence of successive foreign interventions on behalf of each of the main surviving warring parties. From 2014 onwards, the United States helped the Kurdish YPG (later turned into the backbone of the multiethnic Syrian Democratic Forces, hereafter SDF) to seize the eastern bank of the Euphrates from the Islamic State (IS) organization; the Trump Administration further shielded the SDF from regime encroachments while allowing Turkey to invade the regions of Afrin in January 2018, and Tell Abyad-Ras al-'Ayn in October 2019. After 2015, Russian and Iranian support enabled the Assad regime to re-establish its authority over most of western and central Syria, including, in 2018, the suburbs of Damascus and southern provinces. Finally, between 2016 and 2020, Turkish troops gradually secured a northwestern crescent including regions held by the rebel Syrian National Army, north of Aleppo, and the Islamist Hay'a Tahrir al-Sham (hereafter HTS, formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra), around Idlib. The recent absence of major military developments should not be construed as stability, however. Over the last year and a half, indeed, each of the abovementioned regions has been subject to endemic violence stemming from external and internal military actors.

Issu de la mouvance jihadiste, le groupe rebelle syrien Ahrar al-Sham a opéré depuis sa création en 2011 un mouvement de déradicalisation idéologique. Cette mue, parachevée en 2017 avec l'adoption officielle du drapeau national syrien, s'est traduite par une posture « révisionniste » du groupe qui l'a graduellement éloigné des factions les plus radicales et rapproché du courant dominant révolutionnaire. Cette trajectoire peut être lue à la lumière de facteurs contextuels, en l'occurrence l'influence des États sponsors de l'insurrection syrienne et l'émergence en 2011 d'un projet de révolution populaire opposant une option idéologique crédible au projet jihadiste. Toutefois, la réponse d'Ahrar al-Sham à ces stimuli externes ne peut se comprendre qu'à travers ses ressorts organisationnels, c'est-à-dire un sevrage précoce vis-à-vis des réseaux jihadistes transnationaux et la mise en place d'une structure décisionnelle collégiale qui a permis la consolidation de l'aile réformiste du groupe aux dépens de sa rivale doctrinaire. Cette étude d'un processus de déradicalisation en temps de guerre civile entend enrichir la réflexion sur les dynamiques de modération des groupes islamistes, essentiellement étudiées jusqu'ici dans des contextes de paix ou d'adieux aux armes. Elle contribue également à une prise en compte des mécanismes de transformation idéologique des groupes armés non étatiques, question largement délaissée par les travaux théoriques sur les guerres civiles.

jihadist mouvance Issu, the Syrian rebel group Ahrar al-Sham has operated an ideological de-radicalisation movement since its creation in 2011. This move, which was completed in 2017 with the official adoption of the Syrian national flag, saw Ahrar al-Sham embracing a 'revisionist' posture which gradually removed him from the most radical factions and brought it closer to the mainstream revolutionary. This path can be read in the light of contextual factors, namely the influence of the sponsoring states of the Syrian insurgency and the emergence in 2011 of a popular revolution project between a credible ideological alternative to the jihadist project. However, Ahrar al-Sham's response to these external stimuli can only be understood through its organisational powers, i.e. early cessation of transnational jihadist networks and the establishment of a collegial decision-making structure that allowed the consolidation of the group's reformist wing at the expense of its doctrinal rival. This study of a process of deradicalisation in times of civil war is intended to enrich the reflection on the moderation dynamics of Islamist groups, which have so far been studied mainly in contexts of peace or gentlemen. It also helps to take account of the ideological transformation mechanisms of non-state armed groups, an issue largely neglected by the theoretical work on civil wars. ; International audience ; jihadist mouvance Issu, the Syrian rebel group Ahrar al-Sham has operated an ideological de-radicalisation movement since its creation in 2011. This move, which was completed in 2017 with the official adoption of the Syrian national flag, saw Ahrar al-Sham embracing a 'revisionist' posture which gradually removed him from the most radical factions and brought it closer to the mainstream revolutionary. This path can be read in the light of contextual factors, namely the influence of the sponsoring states of the Syrian insurgency and the emergence in 2011 of a popular revolution project between a credible ideological ...